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Abstract
Segregation of duties and least privilege are two business principles that protect an organisation’s valuable
data from information leak. In this thesis we demonstrate how these business principles can be addressed
through workflow-based access control. We present Business Process Access Control (BPAC), a workflow-
based access control modelling environment that properly enacts the key business principles through
constraints and we implement BPAC in the applied pi calculus. We ensure that constraints are correctly
applied within our BPAC implementation by introducing the concept of stores. We propose a selection
of security properties in respect of the business principles and we develop tests for these properties. The
collusion metric is introduced as a simple indicator as to the resistance of a workflow-based access control
policy to fraudulent collusion. We identify an anonymity property for workflows as the inability of an
outside observer to correctly match agents to workflow tasks and we propose that anonymity provides
protection against collusion. We introduce a lightweight version of labelled bisimilarity: the abstraction
test and we apply this test to workflow security properties. We develop a test for anonymity using labelled
bisimilarity and we demonstrate its application through simple examples.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Thesis problem
Access control in computer systems of organisations represents a key implementation of regulatory con-
straints. Access control is required to replicate complex regulatory requirements within a heterogeneous
mix of hardware and software. This is achieved by ensuring that users are properly assigned the resources
they require. Additionally, access to resources is prevented for those agents who lack the required levels
of authorisation.
Access control is the mapping of users or agents to resources. Role-Based Access Control systems (RBAC)
have been researched and developed extensively and a formal standard has been proposed [82] and
adopted by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [69]. Often, RBACs in-
corporate a policy language that is based upon symbolic logic, such as the Datalog-based RT family of
languages [64, 63, 60] or Cassandra [13]. Languages have been extended to incorporate such organisational
constructs as hierarchies and delegation [63, 70]. Other implementations concentrate on the verification
of policies [12, 104]. RBACs have also been applied to workflows as a more appropriate reflection of
real-world organisational structures [10, 18, 26].
No single user should be able to exercise control over an organisation’s data and resources to such an
extent that it could cause a leak of information to a third party which would be materially detrimental
to the organisation. This concept can be extended to consideration of the collective leak of information
to third parties either through fraudulent collusion or accidental distribution among users. Additionally,
users should only be able to access sufficient data and resources to properly enable them to fulfil their
duties and responsibilities within an organisation. To facilitate this protection, certain business principles
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are applied as structurally fundamental constraints to the access control paradigm: specifically, the
requirements of static and dynamic segregation of duties (SoD) and the least privilege or need-to-know
principle. Static SoD involves the generation of a fixed set of user/role/task constraints for an access
control policy ruleset whereas dynamic SoD represents a runtime user/role/task constraint base that is
dependent upon historical access mappings.
With particular reference to RBACs, we observe in the review of literature in section 2.4.4 below that
static SoD is sometimes misinterpreted as a least privilege problem [13], or it is enacted using statically
mutually exclusive roles (SMER) within access control systems. Whilst SMERs can yield static SoD as
specified in the RBAC standard [69, 83], constructing SMERs is a complex problem and verification of
SMERs is intractable [61]. Conceptually, static SoD is a comparatively straightforward implementation
of the business rule but it is also inflexible, particularly within multi-role environments and it is not well
suited to the management of human interaction with the system.
Dynamic SoD is much better suited to the complexities of real-world access control within organisations
but implementation in the literature is confused. In some papers [13, 69, 82, 104], dynamic mutually
exclusive roles (DMER) are used as a means to enacting dynamic SoD but we point out in section 2.4.4
that DMERs do not of themselves yield dynamic SoD [61]. Dynamic SoD is properly implemented
in systems of access control designed around tasks and workflows [19, 26] but these systems do not
incorporate a formal modelling structure for the analysis of security properties for the access control
system as a whole.
Our thesis presents an access control modelling environment called Business Process Access Control
(BPAC), a workflow-based paradigm that properly and fully implements static and dynamic segregation
of duties, coupled with a strict interpretation of the least privilege rule. Unlike the existing workflow-based
solutions that enable SoD constraints, our solution incorporates a formal modelling structure based upon
process calculus. This modelling structure facilitates testing of access control policies for reachability
properties, such as satisfiability and testing of the policy dynamics for information leak through agent
control of a process chain. Additionally, the modelling structure extends the testing to incorporate an
analysis and measure for n-party collusion, an area that has received considerably less attention within
the literature on RBACs and their derivatives. Furthermore, we utilise the considerable power of process
algebra, specifically observational equivalence, to produce a test for anonymity of agents interacting with
workflows.
2
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1.2 Our solution
We tackle the problem of access control modelling, in which business principles can be properly imple-
mented and analysed, by developing a modelling environment for access control that fully implements
dynamic SoD through workflow-based access control and state histories. The proposed system provides an
environment for developing access control policies and testing that the resulting security level is sufficient
to satisfy the particular requirements of an organisation. Furthermore, we extend the security model to
consider thresholds of n-party collusion as a measure of the security provided by the access control system:
the collusion metric. Additionally, we investigate the issue of agent anonymity within workflow-based
access control and we outline a test for agent anonymity based upon observational equivalence.
A workflow-based system of access control represents an evolution of role-based access control that:
• enables the application of static and dynamic segregation of duties through the combination of task
dependencies and state histories,
• provides an abstraction layer between agents and agent resources through the use of tasks. Con-
sequently, the precise details of resource allocation are irrelevant from the perspective of creating
and analysing access control policies,
• provides a means whereby access control policy creation can be linked directly to process design
within business process modelling and development,
• can be used to model traditional RBAC.
1.3 Summary of the key thesis contributions
1.3.1 Workflow-based access control systems
Whilst workflow-based access control systems have been proposed by others, e.g. Botha et al [25, 26, 27],
we concentrate on the implementation of business rules within systems of access control. Also, we propose
a selection of security properties relating to the correct or otherwise implementation of business rules.
This provides motivation for the development of security tests within our modelling environment.
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1.3.2 A modelling environment for systems of workflow-based access control:
BPAC
We present a modelling environment for workflow-based systems of access control called Business Process
Access Control (BPAC), which we implement using the applied pi calculus. The applied pi calculus can
be considered to be somewhat akin to a primitive, low-level programming language with a well established
formal theoretical structure. In particular, the applied pi calculus supports powerful analytical tools, such
as observational equivalence, that facilitate the design of tools for testing and analysis of workflow-based
access control models. This is an essential component of our modelling concept.
As part of our development of the BPAC implementation we design processes in the applied pi calculus
that enable us to handle stored data. The resulting store processes can be written to, have items deleted
from them and can be tested against via a simple pattern matching process. The stores are an essential
part of our BPAC modelling environment that enable SoD to be implemented fully. In effect, the stores
provide a means for recording access control state within the modelling environment. This is essential to
ensuring that conditional task access policies can be modelled properly without recourse to complex task
access permission matrices and the like.
There are tools, ProVerif [1, 21, 22] for example, that enable modelling and automated testing of models
prepared in the applied pi calculus and it is envisaged that, ultimately, an automated tool for the analysis
of BPAC models will be developed. However, these tools are currently somewhat limited in their scope:
observational equivalence proof techniques are not yet complete within ProVerif, there is an inability to
handle state histories and there is the problem of computational explosion. Consequently, we concentrate
upon manual coding and testing of models within this thesis so that the basic modelling environment
and analysis tools are established.
1.3.3 Security analysis of workflow-based access control models
As part of our modelling environment we propose and develop various security tests that can be ap-
plied to models of workflow-based access control within the BPAC environment. These include tests of
reachability, satisfiability, collusion analysis and anonymity.
1.3.3.1 Tests of satisfiability
We use satisfiability tests on workflow-based access control models to establish whether or not a workflow,
together with a set of agents, role assignments and an access control policy, can be completed. An access
control policy is poorly defined in respect of a workflow if that workflow cannot be completed.
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1.3.3.2 The collusion metric
We introduce a measure, which we use to analyse the consequences of the application of segregation of
duties to access control, called the collusion metric. The collusion metric represents the minimum number
of agents that are required to establish complete control over workflow resources, given a set of agents,
role assignments and an access control policy. It is a basic security measure for the workflow. The smaller
the collusion metric then the more exposed is a workflow to agent control and the fewer the number of
agents needed to release complete information and control to an outside third party.
1.3.3.3 Anonymity testing via observational equivalence
We propose an anonymity test for workflow-based access control based upon observational equivalence.
We consider anonymity for a particular agent to be preserved if it can be demonstrated that no information
about the agent and its association with a task or tasks within a workflow can be observed by an outside
third party. Anonymity is not preserved for a particular agent if it can be demonstrated that the agent
is critical to the completion of a workflow or the agent can be identified with a particular task. Failure
can occur either because of the specific mechanics of agent/task interaction or via information leak to an
outside third party.
1.4 Outline of thesis
Chapter 2 provides a background summary and related work. We discuss the modelling of workflow-
based access control, which we call Business Process Access Control (BPAC), together with examples in
chapter 3. We present a simple workflow example in chapter 4, which we revisit throughout the remainder
of the thesis. In chapter 5 we introduce the applied pi calculus, adapted for use as our access control
modelling environment. In chapter 6 we define the building blocks of our BPAC implementation using
the applied pi calculus. We return to the simple workflow example of chapter 4 in chapter 7 and we
demonstrate the encoding of the simple model in the applied pi calculus implementation of BPAC. We
discuss security analysis of models within BPAC and its application in the applied pi calculus in chapter 8
and we return once again to our simple workflow example in chapter 9 to discuss examples of security
analysis in the context of the workflow example. Finally, we present our conclusions and possible future
work in chapter 10.
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Chapter 2
Background and related work
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present a discussion of literature regarding systems of access control and business
process management (BPM). In the section assigned to BPM we concentrate on a review of suitable
modelling environments for BPM with particular emphasis on Petri nets and process calculi. We draw
together our arguments from both fields to motivate our thesis concept of Business Process Access Con-
trol (BPAC) and we present arguments to justify our selection of the applied pi calculus as the basis for
our access control modelling environment.
2.2 The security requirement
Companies, charities, professional bodies and public organisations throughout the world are subjected
to increased regulatory controls. In the European Union protection for the storage of personal data
by organisations is enacted through various national interpretations of the European Data Protection
Directive [45], such as the Data Protection Act 1998 [51] in the United Kingdom. Financial constraints
are imposed by tax laws and accounting regulations or by the regulatory frameworks of professional
bodies where applicable. These financial constraints are becoming increasingly prescriptive in respect of
the day-to-day recording and maintenance of business transactions, e.g. Sarbanes-Oxley section 404 [87] in
the USA. Additionally, organisations are keen to display their adherence to quality assurance standards,
such as ISO 9000, which require detailed documentation and application of systems and organisation
structures.
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The world press frequently highlights and dramatises breaches of IT security, especially when the breach
represents a threat to individual privacy through the failure of large organisations. Examples of security
failure include the UK Department of Health publishing applicant doctors’ personal information [40,
71] and compromise of personnel records of over half a million US military employees by a Pentagon
contractor [73, 81]. Insiders of organisations cause many security breaches, either deliberately or through
negligence or accident. An audit review in 2007 by the US Treasury of 102 employees of the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) discovered that 60% of the employee sample released login information and changed
their passwords for auditors posing as computer support helpdesk representatives [75]. When this exercise
was performed some three years earlier the failure was 35% and the failure rate was 71% some three years
prior to that. The recommendations of the report focused, not unreasonably, upon employee training and
discipline. However, given the enduring nature of employee security failure, an additional contribution
could be made by reducing the availability of information and resources to employees to that which is
strictly necessary for the performance of their duties, i.e. the proper implementation of access control.
Reducing employee access to strictly necessary IT resources implies the system-wide enforcement of two
key organisational principles, full segregation (alternatively separation) of duties and least privilege or the
need-to-know basis. In the real world, such a draconian approach to access control may be impractical
because of staff numbers, counter-productive because human beings are inclined to take shortcuts when
faced with too many obstacles or contrary to productivity or creativity within an organisation. However,
the application of these principles to real access control problems must surely be considered if the cost to
the organisation of loss of information outweighs the cost of implementation. Modelling of access control
policies provides organisations with a cost-effective means of policy appraisal that can provide valuable
information for decision making in respect of their subsequent implementation.
2.3 Access control
Access control is the assignment of resources to users or agents within organisations. Various mechanisms
for access control have been proposed and applied to real-world situations and these are discussed in
greater detail in section 2.5 below. Most current implementations of access control are based upon role-
based access control (RBAC). Within RBAC the assignment of resources to agents is mediated by the
mapping of roles to agents and access to resources is constrained to specific roles. Formally, a simple
RBAC can be defined as follows if we assume that units of resources are each assigned a single role for
access control purposes:
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Definition 1
Let S be a set of resources, A be a set of agents and R be a set of roles. We represent agent/role
assignment by the finite binary relation AR ⊆ A × R and SR ∶ S Ð→ R is a resource/role assignment
function. If for some s ∈ S there exists an a such that a ∈ A and a AR SR (s) then agent a can access
resource s.
2.3.1 Implementation of access control
Part of the implementation of access control is the application of business rules that specify how agents
interact with resources and the relationship between agent/resource interactions for a given set of agents
and resources. We discuss some of these business rules below.
2.4 Business rules
2.4.1 Segregation of duties
The Auditing Practices Board International Standard of Auditing (UK and Ireland) 315 defines segrega-
tion of duties (SoD) as follows:
"Assigning different people the responsibilities of authorizing transactions, recording trans-
actions, and maintaining custody of assets is intended to reduce the opportunities to allow any
person to be in a position to both penetrate and conceal errors or fraud in the normal course
of the person’s duties." [8]
This well-established principle has long been promoted by the major accounting and auditing institutes
worldwide as a means to counter the possibility of an individual employee of an organisation gaining
control over an entire process chain. For example, a purchase clerk controlling the ordering, authorisation
and payment for a new computer for herself would clearly be depriving the organisation. A simple
segregation of duties can be achieved in this example by assigning a second employee to the authorisation
task. Now it is observed prima facie that the purchase clerk (or the newly installed employee) cannot
control the entire process chain and a level of protection against fraud is attained. However, it is still
possible for the two employees to collude to control the process chain so although protection is improved
there is still a real risk of fraudulent activity. Increasing the number of employees to three further improves
protection against fraud, as three-party collusion is now required to gain control over the process chain.
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Whilst it is not unreasonable to assume that the greater the level of segregation of duties the greater the
protection against fraudulent activity there are practical limitations to the implementation of the policy.
These limitations include the number of available employees, the number of tasks per process chain and
the organisation’s attitude to risk.
SoD can be invoked in either a static or a dynamic context. Static SoD refers to the predefinition of
access policies for users through a matrix, say, of users mapped to permissions. Dynamic SoD, on the
other hand, assigns permissions to users based upon both the static permission mappings and the history
of previous user/permission mappings for a particular process chain. An alternative definition by Nash
and Holland is that a user can execute a transaction if they are authorised to perform that transaction
on a data item and they have not previously executed a transaction on the data item [68]. Within a real
world scenario, a purchase ledger transaction, say, it is likely that precise a priori permission mappings
as required by static SoD are not practical as users might be assigned multiple roles: a supervisor might
also be a purchases clerk, for example and a user can potentially access a transaction based upon any of
her role assignments. Consequently, the user might be assigned a transaction based upon her purchases
clerk role and then assigned a subsequent transaction within the process chain based upon her supervisor
role in breach of an SoD requirement. Dynamic SoD uses its user/permission history to enforce SoD
in this case by ensuring that if the user has accessed the first transaction as a purchases clerk then she
cannot access the subsequent transaction as a supervisor. This is an important requirement in practical
systems.
2.4.2 Least privilege
The US Department of Defense defines least privilege in its publication "Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria", commonly referred to as the Orange Book, as follows:
"Least Privilege — This principle requires that each subject in a system be granted the most
restrictive set of privileges (or lowest clearance) needed for the performance of authorized tasks.
The application of this principle limits the damage that can result from accident, error, or
unauthorized use." [38]
This principle can manifest itself in various ways. An example of least privilege occurs when roles are
assigned to employees within an organisation and an employee is able to activate more than one role.
For example, a purchases manager might be able to activate the purchases clerk role. If the manager is
accessing some manager-specific resources in pursuit of their managerial duties, that employee should not
be able to invoke their clerk role as well. Implementation of least privilege in this context can be seen
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to contribute to segregation of duties as discussed above. After all, a role-based segregation of duties
could be compromised by the presence of an employee activating multiple rules so strict least privilege is
a requirement of the segregation of duties policy.
Resources should be the minimum required for the performance of a given task and the resources should
only be made available for the duration of the task. Application of this principle reduces the opportunity
for employees to leak or damage sensitive information.
2.4.3 Delegation
Delegation is the business process whereby an agent with a resource access permission temporarily trans-
fers permission to another agent. For example, within an RBAC a delegated permission can be achieved
by temporarily assigning a role r to another agent such that r satisfies the resource/role assignment(s, r) ∈ SR for resource s. Delegation provides a mechanism to circumvent practical problems, such as
the absence of given agents, that might otherwise prevent the operation of some particular task.
2.4.4 The application of business rules within systems of access control
Given the business context for access control set out in section 2.2 above then a requirement for a system
for access control is that it should properly enact business rules and policies. These include role hierarchies
and inheritance, static and dynamic segregation of duties, delegation, role appointment, role enforcement
and strict need-to-know. It is apparent from the literature that the various proposed systems tackle some
of these rules with varying degrees of success. For example, the extensions to RT, RTT and RTD provide
language components for segregation of duties and role delegation respectively [60] and Sandhu et al’s
extensions to the RBAC96 proposed standard, RBAC1 and RBAC2 add role hierarchies and constraints
respectively [83].
Segregation of duties proves to be particularly problematic in the literature. Simon and Zurko [84] provide
a detailed review on segregation of duties and its implementation in the literature to date. They stress
that the simplicity of static SoD is coupled with inflexibility and a lack of applicability to real-world
human situations. Simon and Zurko’s discussion on dynamic segregation identifies the most flexible
variant of SoD as that which is based upon the use of individual histories assigned to users. These SoD
ideas are incorporated in the team’s authorisation tool called Adage, a self-contained user-centred RBAC.
The definition in section 2.4.1 highlights the fact that segregation of duties requires a number of different
agents to perform a connected set of tasks to ensure that no one person has control over an entire
process chain. However, in the literature SoD is sometimes dealt with in access control models, both
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within the static and the dynamic contexts, as a single party problem implemented via the activation
and deactivation of roles by agents. For instance, in Cassandra a policy can be defined so that an agent
cannot activate more than one role at the same time [13]. The policy treatment recalls a similar approach
by Ferraiolo et al some years earlier [46]. This is not strictly segregation of duties but an interpretation
of the principle of least privilege through mutual exclusivity.
In other papers, such as those by Sandhu, segregation of duties is presented as a set of constraints upon
the agent/role mapping [83] and this is the basis for static SoD as implemented in the NIST standard [69].
Ninghui Li et al refer to this implementation as Statically Mutually Exclusive Roles (SMER) [61]. Whilst
SMERs can properly be used to enforce static segregation of duties, setting up an SMER matrix for a
large organisation represents a complex task. Indeed, Li et al demonstrate that verifying that an SMER
enforces SoD is intractable (coNP complete) [61]. Operationally, the problem with SMERs is their
separation from the complexities of business processes within organisations and the lack of granularity
and flexibility of a user/role based constraint system. If a simple SMER constraint is defined over three
roles as follows per Li [61]:
c1 = smer ⟨{Warehouse,Marketing,F inance} ,2⟩
i.e. no user can be a member of any two roles in the constraint, then although this constraint properly
enforces static SoD the rule is absolute over all business processes to which the roles are assigned. Gran-
ularity can be improved by defining roles more specific to business processes but this approach increases
the complexity of the SMER and tends toward negating the benefits of RBACs via, for example, an
increased ratio of role numbers to users/agents.
If the literature is somewhat confused over static SoD, it is completely muddled over dynamic SoD.
Dynamic Mutually Exclusive Roles (DMER) are sometimes implemented in the literature. As defined
by Li et al DMER constrains a user such that she cannot simultaneously activate mutually exclusive
roles [61]. Various publications [13, 46, 69, 82, 104] interpret the application of DMER as an enactment
of dynamic SoD. DMER can be seen to be an interpretation of least privilege but as Li et al state it is
not SoD and cannot of itself enable static or dynamic SoD [61]. If there are multiple sessions within a
model of access control then an agent can activate a role and deactivate a role in one session then activate
another role in a second session so as to circumvent any dynamic SoD constraint enacted by DMER. For
example, we might require for SoD that a payroll preparation task is performed by a different person to a
payroll payment approval task. Using DMER we can ensure that a specified agent cannot simultaneously
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access both tasks but DMER does not prevent the agent from relinquishing her payroll preparation role
and subsequently enacting her payment role, circumventing the SoD constraint. Dynamic SoD is properly
handled by Botha [26] and Bertino et al [19] with their workflow and task-based systems but there are
limitations to their approaches with respect to the formal modelling and analysis of the access control
system as reported in section 2.5.6.
A key requirement of a business system of access control is to prevent single agent fraud through ensuring
that agents cannot perform a number of critical tasks within a process chain. This necessitates different
role assignments to tasks within the process chain together with the possibility of task access dependencies
on the completion of other tasks within the chain i.e. dynamic SoD. A further requirement is that the
access control system has a memory of access for the duration of the process chain or workflow. In addition,
it is desirable that the possibilities of multiple agent fraudulent collusion are reduced by ensuring that
certain communicating groups of agents cannot perform a number of critical tasks within the process chain
and by enforcing the strict need-to-know basis for agent/role/task assignments. In summary, the access
control system should incorporate an implementation of global constraints across business processes. An
important consequence of the application of these requirements is the reduced potential for information
leak from the system to unauthorised parties by ensuring that agents are unable to access information
outside of their role/task responsibilities.
We have identified above that a number of access control systems either do not attempt to implement
DDoS or that they use DMER to enact DDoS. These access control systems are limited in their ability
to prevent agents from gaining control over a process chain either singly or in a small colluding group
and deliberate or accidental information leak to untrusted third parties can arise as a consequence.
Assuming that an access control system can be established that satisfies the requirements outlined above,
then there should be a mechanism for testing that the system is satisfactorily protected against single
and n-party fraud and information leak. This requires the modelling of the access control system within
a suitable analysis environment. We discuss possible environments later in this chapter.
2.5 A brief history of access control
2.5.1 Mandatory access control (MAC)
An early and significant academic development in access control was the formal mathematical presenta-
tion of security in computer systems by David Bell and Leonard LaPadula [15, 17, 16], the Bell-LaPadula
model, which signifies the emergence of the subject as an academic discipline. The consequence was
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the development of Mandatory Access Control (MAC) as the first major authorisation security model.
MAC is an authorisation method devised for the US military based upon the US classification system
and the assignment of access rights according to clearance. The Bell-LaPadula MAC model is sometimes
summarised in publications by the mantra: "no read-up, no write-down" [6, 23]. Whilst various interpre-
tations of MAC have been devised in an attempt to expand the model to non-military applications, such
as that due to David Clark and David Wilson [29], the limitations of the model are apparent when it is
applied to business environments, for example. The MAC model is somewhat inflexible and unsuited to
situations where practical constraints, such as staff sickness and holidays, require a softening of the strict
security requirements. For instance, flexibility may be required to facilitate delegation of responsibilities
and the selective elevation of access rights and privileges.
2.5.2 Discretionary access control (DAC)
Butler Lampson suggested an alternative approach to the protection of computer-based resources in 1971
in a seminal article called ”Protection” [59]. In this model resource users (domains in the literature)
are mapped to resources (files, programs, domains) via access rights or attributes and a mapping is
maintained within an access control matrix (ACM). Typically, the Discretionary Access control (DAC)
model provides flexibility of assignment of access rights to the owner of resources, hence the title. The
DAC model subsequently evolved into Access Control Lists and the attributes-based system of access
control, which is familiar to users of modern computer operating systems. Although DAC provides greater
flexibility than MAC, it does so through dilution of the security requirement. DAC incurs scalability and
management problems as the numbers of users and resources increase, particularly in respect of the ACM
implementation of the model. Additionally, users do not necessarily understand their assigned rights
and responsibilities and system security can be seriously undermined by the inappropriate use of root or
administrator access capabilities.
2.5.3 Role-based access control (RBAC)
Whilst MAC is the generally accepted authorisation model within the military and DAC evolved into the
access control system applied to the major operating systems, the academic world was shifting its attention
elsewhere within the field of authorisation. Research was directed towards the formal analysis of access
control systems [2] and to the development of scalable models of access control that are more appropriate
to complex heterogeneous computer systems, such as Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [47, 70, 83].
David Ferraiolo and Richard Kuhn outlined their basic RBAC model as a more appropriate system of
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control in civilian government or commercial organisations than either the multilayer security of MAC or
the user-centred security model of DAC [47]. Matunda Nyanchama and Sylvia Osborn extended RBAC
research through modelling and analysis of roles and hierarchies and the interactions between roles within
RBAC models. They developed a hierarchical role graph model for role-based access control based upon
organisational hierarchies [70]. Ravi Sandhu et al proposed a family of RBAC models to provide a
reference point for further RBAC development [83]. Extensions to the base RBAC model, such as role
hierarchies and constraints, were outlined and discussed.
Evolution of this early work ultimately resulted in the development of a proposed standard for RBAC
by Ferraiolo, Kuhn, Sandhu and others under the aegis of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) [48] and its subsequent adoption as a full standard 359–2004 by the American National
Standards Institute (ANSI) [69].
The underlying principle of the RBAC model as detailed in this early work is the abstraction of resources
from users via a set of roles. Consequently, the set of users is mapped many-to-many to the set of roles:
a given user can occupy a number of roles and a number of users can occupy a given role. The set of
roles is mapped many-to-many to the set of resources [83].
2.5.4 Policy languages based upon Datalog
Further to the early work on RBAC, numbers of research groups now targeted the development of
practical models of RBAC, policy languages, the encoding of business principles and formal modelling
and analysis. In particular, policy language development provided a fertile ground for researchers in
formal methods and logic. Frequently, policy languages were devised from predicate calculus, particularly
Horn clause subsets of predicate calculus, such as Datalog. The benefit of this approach is that, in its
purest form, Datalog is decidable [13, 37] and it retains the formal proof structure, coupled with the
inherited syntax and semantics, of predicate calculus. The cost of using Datalog is a restriction on its
expressiveness: pure Datalog is not Turing-complete. Examples of Datalog-based languages include RT0
and extensions [64, 63, 60] by Ninghui Li and others, DeTreville’s Binder [37] and Becker and Sewell’s
Cassandra [14, 13], each of which is discussed below.
The RT family of policy languages represent a trust management RBAC environment. This is a superset
of the SDSI 2.0 certificate handling language for authorisation developed by Ellison et al as part of
their SPKI certificate theory [41]. Through language extensions devised via careful additions to the
basic Datalog-style model, the expressiveness of RT is enhanced to accommodate attribute assignment,
segregation of duties and delegation [63]. Negation (or prohibition in policy terms) is not facilitated.
14
2.5 A brief history of access control
Binder was devised as a direct interpretation of Datalog for trust management and access control to
ensure polynomial time query resolution coupled with communication constructs [37]. A consequence of
the tight binding to Datalog is that there are limitations to the expressiveness of the Binder language,
particularly in respect of attributes, constraints and negation.
Cassandra is based upon an extension to Datalog, called Datalog with constraints [13]. Datalog with
constraints is more expressive than Datalog but is only decidable if restrictions are carefully applied to
the constraint domain [62]. Cassandra provides a powerful, decidable, trust-based policy language within
its own, self-contained implementation, which can encode business rules such as hierarchies, delegation
and limited segregation of duties. However, Cassandra cannot handle externally triggered conditions,
segregation of duties based upon different agents or full negation. These limitations arise as a consequence
of restricting the constraint domain to ensure decidability.
2.5.5 Policy languages not based upon Datalog
Alternatives to the Datalog approach to policy languages include Halpern and Weissman’s Lithium [50],
Ponder by Damianou et al [34, 33] (subsequently Ponder2) and RW by Nan Zhang, Mark Ryan, Dimitar
Guelev and others [49, 104].
Halpern and Weissman used an alternative subset of predicate calculus for their Lithium policy lan-
guage [50] and were able to incorporate negation. However, such flexibility was gained with a tractability
cost that necessitated careful development of the language meta-logic to ensure that the system always
terminates.
Instead of using a formal logic foundation to its language, the Ponder team developed a policy language
from object-oriented programming principles and concentrated on producing an expressive language that
is applicable to various security problems in addition to access control [34]. Whilst the language is wide-
ranging and powerful, nonetheless it lacks the constructs to counter policy conflicts or the formal logical
semantics that enable reasoning over the problem domain. Consequently, researchers such as Bandara,
Lupu and Rosso investigated translating Ponder into a formal calculus (specifically event calculus) so
that policy analysis can be performed to resolve conflicts and inconsistencies and provide methods for
optimising policy rulesets [12].
RW is based upon propositional calculus with predicates such that variables are extended over a finite
space [49]. As propositional calculus is decidable then RW is decidable and indeed is well suited to
analysis through truth functional modelling, e.g. Binary Decision Diagrams. Whilst the RW language
incorporates a simple syntax, it is capable of encoding policy rules such as permissions assignment.
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However, the language is limited in its expressiveness in respect of organisational requirements such as
role hierarchies and denial of permissions.
2.5.6 Access models extending RBAC
Before discussing models of access control that extend RBAC it is worth mentioning that, about the
time that research teams were starting to look into RBAC, Thomas and Sandhu proposed an alternative
access control approach based upon tasks [86]. This approach implies a paradigm shift away from the user
toward the organisation and processes and can be construed as a precursor to workflow-based control.
The model is not based upon sequences of tasks, however, but upon task and sub-task groups and there
is no concept of roles.
Various research teams have responded to limitations within the basic RBAC model. In particular,
most implementations of RBAC do not provide mechanisms to incorporate external influences, temporal
constraints or state histories. Attempts to extend the RBAC model include the work of Elisa Bertino
and others. They incorporated a formal authorisation constraint model and policy language within
workflow management systems [20, 19] for the definition of full static and dynamic segregation of duties.
Subsequently, Bertino et al added temporal constraints on roles with their definition of a fully specified
policy language called Temporal Role-Based Access Control (TRBAC) [18]. It should be noted that the
constraint language was the prime focus of the research by Bertino et al and that they did not set out
to model the entire access control process, nor did they endeavour to model the full variety of workflow
types beyond a straightforward sequential workflow. Later work [55] generalises the constraints language
incorporating temporal constraints and cardinalities. Whilst the Generalized Temporal Role-Based Access
Control (GTRBAC) represents a powerful and comprehensive language for the definition of constraints,
there is no formalised modelling environment with which to analyse the security properties of the access
control system as a whole.
Atluri and Huang devised a model of workflow-synchronised access control using coloured and timed Petri
nets [10]. Their model, the Workflow Authorization Model (WAM), limits access to the timeframe for
the enacting of tasks and incorporates time-based constraints on the performance of tasks. However, the
model does not include a role-based approach and problems such as hierarchical inheritance, role-based
segregation of duties and delegation are not tackled as a consequence. A further problem is that Petri
nets can rapidly become very complex when used for analysing complex organisations and they do not
lend themselves naturally to modelling open, mobile systems [43] and the vagaries of human behaviour.
An alternative approach was provided by Botha and Eloff who prioritised the business principle of least
privilege, dynamic separation of duties, conflicting roles and users and event sequencing within the
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application of access control to workflow management [25, 26, 27]. However, the access control model
designed by Botha is a self-contained practical implementation that neither specifies a logically derived
policy language nor provides for a formal means of analysis and testing [26].
2.5.7 W-RBAC
A review of the work by Wainer et al [98, 99, 100] reveals a comprehensive model of workflow-based role-
based access control (W-RBAC). The authors properly identify key business principles, such as static
and dynamic segregation of duties, that should be incorporated into a system for access control and the
published work is populated with informative examples of the application of these business principles.
A detailed policy and constraint language is specified, based upon logical propositions and a prolog-
based implementation that is designed to be coupled to a workflow system. The model was subsequently
extended to incorporate role hierarchies and delegation plus a policy metalanguage for the specification
of workflow controls.
The access control model of Wainer et al addresses a number of areas that are key to my thesis. However,
this work, like the work of Botha et al [25, 26, 27], Atluri and Huang [10] and Bertino et al [20, 19] does
not seek to address important issues arising from access control policy design and implementation, namely
reachability testing of policy rulesets and evaluation of policy rulesets against threat models, anonymity
and collusion analysis.
2.5.8 Reference model for workflow systems
Crampton developed an access control model for the specification of constraints such as separation of duty
that is independent of the access control implementation [31]. The model was subsequently updated to
incorporate additional access control features such as delegation [32]. The key test requirement within the
model is the satisfiability of any given constrained workflow. The model does not incorporate roles within
the model execution itself, i.e. roles are used to preassign users to tasks and the user/task assignment
is utilised within the model. Also, the model defines constraints on each pair of users in respect of task
pairs. Whilst it is possible to define constraints over a more complex space using pairs, such an approach
adds complexity when compared to our history-based approach.
The reference model is somewhat limited in its capabilities regarding the identification and analysis of
security issues arising from the application of access control policy.
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2.5.9 X-Policy
Qunoo and Ryan [78] extended the work of Zhang [104] in respect of the RW access control policy
modelling framework and developed X-Policy. X-Policy is able to model dynamic systems of access control
through read/write actions with preconditions called execution permissions that specify the access control
policy. X-Policy utilises predicate-based atomic formulae so that a read action returns the truth values
of any number of predefined atomic formulae and a write action alters the truth values of any number
of predefined atomic formulae. Execution permissions are constructed from atomic formulae together
with the basic logic operators: negation (¬), conjunction (∧), disjunction (∨), implication (→) and the
existential (∃) and universal (∀) quantifiers. Consequently, the write action provides the modelling
environment with a dynamic state modifier (as execution permissions use the truth values of atomic
formulae) that enables modelling of dynamic segregation of duties and least privilege. Whilst it is possible
to model workflow-based access control systems using X-Policy, the declarative nature of the modelling
language requires a multitude of predicates to model interactions with each task and a complex interaction
of write actions and execution permissions to model task execution dependencies. Also, it is not apparent
that anything other than the simplest of workflow structures such as series and parallel tasks can be
modelled using X-Policy.
2.6 Business process management (BPM)
2.6.1 Introduction
The Workflow Management Coalition defines a business process as:
"A set of one or more linked procedures or activities which collectively realise a business
objective or policy goal, normally within the context of an organisational structure defining
functional roles and relationships." [101]
Business processes provide the operational framework for organisations, e.g. companies, public bodies,
charities and non-profit organisations, so that they can properly perform their day-to-day activities. A
business process that is automated constitutes a workflow [101] and a computer-based system for control
of workflows is called a workflow management system [101]. Numerous systems have been devised and
consultant man-hours and finances invested in workflow management systems.
Various standards bodies have developed frameworks for the definition of business processes and workflows
in XML-based languages such as BPML, BPEL4WS and XPDL [97, 96]. To date, the situation has been
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a confused mixture of standards and standard setters and a battle for supremacy has ensued based upon
adoption and support of standards by the major corporate players in the industry. Currently (March
2011), the major players IBM, Microsoft, SAP, Siebel, BEA are implementing their jointly authored BPM
language BPEL4WS version 1.1 within their BPM products [7]. The Organization for the Advancement
of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) has developed a full standard for the next iteration called
WSBPEL version 2 [5]. It is apparent that BPM is seen to be an important topic within the corporate
systems industry.
The industry motivation has been to produce a web services style XML language for the development and
management of BPM models. From an academic viewpoint, the focus has been more upon frameworks for
modelling, analysing and testing workflow systems that are abstracted from the practical implementation.
Wil van der Aalst and colleagues formalised workflow modelling through the application and extension
of Petri nets [94, 88] and proposed a set of patterns in workflows as defined in the higher-order Petri
nets [93, 79].
An alternative approach to workflow modelling and analysis was presented by Cook et al [30, 56] who
devised a programming language called Orc for orchestrating tasks. Using Orc, Cook et al modelled
the set of workflow patterns proposed by van der Aalst as discussed above. Meanwhile, Puhlmann and
Weske [77] demonstrated that it is possible to use the pi calculus as a modelling environment for workflows
including the encoding of van der Aalst’s workflow patterns.
There has been considerable debate concerning alternative modelling environments for workflows. This
is exemplified by a published article in 2004 by Smith and Finbar [85] in which the authors argue enthu-
siastically that the pi calculus provides an ideal environment for the construction of a Business Process
Management System (BPMS) of which workflow management is a subset. Van der Aalst countered this
argument with a couple of publications [92, 90] in which the assertions concerning the pi calculus (par-
ticularly the use of the calculus as a basis for BPML — the Business Process Modeling Language) are
rebutted and examples of workflows are proposed that are easily modelled in Petri nets but are difficult
in the pi calculus.
The various approaches to workflow modelling are still battling for supremacy and choosing between the
alternatives is likely to be application specific or a matter of personal preference.
A discussion of the various modelling environments is set out below.
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2.6.2 Petri nets
Carl Adam Petri devised Petri nets in the 1960s [74] as a graphical yet mathematically rigorous method
for analysing states and state transitions in distributed systems [11]. The basic components of a Petri
net are places or states (S), transitions (T ) and edges (F ). A net (N) is defined as a tuple N = (S,T,F )
and the dynamics of the net are represented by the placement of tokens in the state spaces. A simple
collection of rules is defined for Petri nets: a.) all edges are directed, b.) state-to-state and transaction-
to-transaction connections are not permitted and c.) states can hold zero or more tokens. If a transition
contains tokens on all of its inputs, the transition “fires” such that tokens are decremented by one unit on
each input and tokens are incremented by one unit on each output [89]. Given this simple framework and
an extensive theoretical foundation then Petri nets provide a powerful tool for the modelling of complex
distributed system state dynamics over static nets.
Although Petri nets are a powerful analytical tool nonetheless they suffer from a number of limitations
when applied to realistic systems. They can become large, complex and unwieldy, they cannot handle
time-constrained transitions, they cannot test whether or not a state space is empty and they do not
satisfactorily represent the movement through nets of complex components [91]. Consequently, various
additions to basic Petri net theory have been proposed to extend its descriptive power. Jensen et al
developed the coloured Petri net model [54, 58], extending the initial work of Zervos [103] and others.
Coloured Petri nets provide for the tokens of basic Petri nets to be assigned values and the rules governing
transitions are expanded accordingly. Tokens can now be assigned to identifiable objects within a net
such as the documents that flow through a purchase ledger order system. Van der Aalst [91] extended the
work of van Hee and others [95] by invoking time delay management in Petri nets through the assignment
of timestamps to all tokens in a net. The timestamp in this model is an indicator of a token’s availability
and a transition is ready to fire when the maximum timestamp (the “enabling time” in the literature) for
the transition inputs is attained. Huber, Jensen and Shapiro proposed a further extension to coloured
Petri nets [53], namely hierarchies. The hierarchical coloured Petri net enables reuse of workflow patterns
and the ability to construct high-level summary workflows with places representing lower level workflows.
The extended, higher order Petri nets have been developed to provide a suitable environment for the
modelling of workflows. They address the workflow-modelling problem by providing an intuitive visual
analysis tool that is formally specified with a sound theoretical framework.
However, there are still deficiencies:
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2.6.2.1 Deficiencies in Petri nets as a tool for modelling workflows (and access control)
Petri nets do not provide a satisfactory environment for the modelling of mobile or dynamic processes
or workflows. Eshuis and Dehnert pointed out that Petri nets model closed active systems whereas
workflow management systems tend to be open and reactive [43]. Consequently, whilst it may be possible
to model a workflow and test the system with token dynamics, the real-world enactment of the workflow
may involve externally triggered conditions on transitions between states, such that the real-world and
model dynamics differ considerably. In particular, practical workflows (and indeed access control systems)
involve the interaction with human agents with all of the decision-making uncertainty and irrationality
that this entails.
Oren and Haller [72] suggested that modelling activities, environmental events and data within Petri
nets can be achieved in various ways and each method causes problems with workflows. Summarising
their arguments: modelling activities as transitions leads to a lack of definition between descriptive and
prescriptive behaviours i.e. between workflow activities and workflow management, whilst modelling ac-
tivities as places is impractical as activities change workflow parameters whereas places are merely state
descriptors. Also, modelling of external trigger events as transitions blurs the difference between events
and activities, whilst modelling events as places and tokens yields functional problems with communica-
tion of these events.
Global constraints and cancellation events are difficult to model as they extend over the whole or some
fraction of the whole of a workflow and not just over local transitions or states [72]. In effect, modelling
workflows under global constraints requires a set of different workflows each satisfying all of the permu-
tations under the global constraint. Alternatively, it requires a complex rat’s nest of edges to apply the
constraints to all transitions and places as appropriate.
2.6.3 Process calculi
Robin Milner developed the pi calculus, a calculus for concurrent processes, as an extension of his earlier
work with the Calculus of Communicating Systems (CCS) [66, 67]. Milner’s CCS was itself influenced by
the earlier work of Hoare with his Communicating Serial Processes (CSP) calculus [52]. The pi calculus
was built upon the work of others, notably the labelling semantics of the Extended CCS of Engberg
and Nielson [42]. Milner introduced the capability within the calculus to facilitate communication of the
names of channels, whilst simplifying the naming conventions and retaining the underlying theoretical
formalism. Consequently, the pi calculus provides a modelling environment for dynamic processes.
The pi calculus is Turing complete as demonstrated by Milner in his famous 1989 paper "Functions as
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Processes" [65] through the encoding in the pi calculus of the Turing complete λ calculus. In addition,
the calculus is syntactically compact so although it is possible to model workflows or security, say, within
the calculus such encodings may be neither efficient nor human comprehensible. Consequently, various
extensions to the pi calculus have been proposed in response to specific problem spaces so as to provide a
more appropriate syntactic framework, whilst retaining the underlying theory and analysis tools. Some
extensions to the pi calculus have been devised to provide an environment for modelling security protocols
such as the applied pi calculus [2, 3] or access control [28] and other calculi have been specified to tackle
wider ranging problems such as biochemical molecular processes [76]. Workflows and workflow patterns
have been tackled by Pulhmann and Weske [77].
We consider pi calculus and its derivatives to be suitable for modelling workflows. Indeed a pi calculus
environment tackles the areas where Petri nets are observed to be weak given that the calculus was devised
for distributed and mobile environments. However, the calculus environment lacks the user-friendly visual
appeal of Petri nets and depending upon the calculus formalism used, then certain workflow patterns and
constructs can be very complex and unwieldy to model within the calculus.
The applied pi calculus of Abadi and Fournet [3] extends the pi calculus to incorporate functions and
names. These additional features, when combined with an equational theory, enable modelling of complex
processes in a more succinct style whilst retaining a powerful underlying theory. To our knowledge the
applied pi calculus has not been used to model BPM. However, the applied pi calculus is a promising
candidate, not only for modelling BPM but also, and crucially to our thesis, the modelling of workflow-
based access control.
2.6.4 Specialised languages and formalisms
An alternative approach to workflow modelling is briefly discussed in section 2.6.1 above, namely the
formulation of a programming language such as Orc [56]. Whilst the language was developed primarily
as a programming style environment, work is under way to provide a formal theoretical framework and
semantics [56].
Given that Orc was designed with workflow modelling in mind, then it is reasonable to assume that
there is a good fit between the two and this is demonstrated by the encoding of van der Aalst’s workflow
patterns by Cook et al [30]. However, the language lacks the extensive theoretical foundations of Petri
nets and process calculi and this could be problematic when attempting to test and verify the dynamics
of workflow formalisms.
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2.6.5 Other approaches — UML
Other methods for modelling workflows have been used, most notably approaches using the Unified
Modeling Language (UML) and associated diagrammatic tools. UML is a loosely coupled modelling
framework with a large syntax that allows for individual interpretation and application of constructs to
model development [36]. Efforts have been made to define, for example, the workflow patterns in UML2.0
in comparison with the Business Process Modeling Notation (BPMN) (a diagrammatic environment for
the visualisation of business procedures) [102], or as a test of expressiveness in respect of workflow
patterns [39]. Whilst these investigations demonstrate that such diagrammatic tools can be used to
visually describe workflows and in the case of BPMN, in a business-user, non-technical way, these methods
provide no mechanism for a formal analysis of workflows for reachability or redundancy, say.
Work by Derrick, Boiten et al was directed at formalisation within the UML architecture, specifically
in respect of conformance, consistency, unification and refinement [36, 24]. This approach provides a
theoretical framework for UML model analysis, particularly in respect of the matching of UML models to
programs (conformance), consistency checking between diagrams within a UML model and consistency
within successive UML model specifications (refinement). The framework provides a suitable environment
for analytical project development. However, we consider that the applied pi calculus is currently better
suited to analysing the security properties of workflows and access control for our purpose, through the
use of observational equivalence and an underlying equational theory.
2.7 The interaction between BPM and access control
We discuss access control in section 2.3 and an extension of access control to a workflow-based imple-
mentation is outlined in section 2.5.6 et seq. We can model BPM as workflows and if we couple the BPM
workflow models with RBAC together with a mechanism for specifying and implementing constraints, we
can implement a business process access control modelling environment as discussed in the next section.
2.8 Business process access control (BPAC)
Business processes generally comprise a collection of discrete processes called tasks that are connected by
the control flow of documents and authorisations (or their virtual equivalents within a computer system).
A task may represent an activity (or group of activities) that has to be performed by some agent. The
agent can be either a human, e.g. an employee within an organisation, or a computer process. Within the
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context of our access control model we consider the task to be associated with a set of resources that are
necessary for the satisfactory completion of that task by an agent. Consequently, when an agent gains
access to a particular task then they also gain access to the set of resources associated with that task.
Workflows and tasks represent an abstraction layer between agents and resources that:
• enables the simplified modelling of access control without the complexity of multiple agent/resource
allocations — tasks can be treated as atomic processes,
• allows resources to be updated and altered in respect of specific tasks without affecting the access
control model,
• enables proper implementation and modelling of business rules such as segregation of duties,
• couples access control management to BPM so that it can be considered to be an additional com-
ponent of BPM modelling and implementation and
• enables modelling of access control through the use of process algebra.
Given this BPM-based modelling environment, access control can then be implemented by traditional
means, such as role-based access control using static agent/role assignments coupled with dynamic con-
straints handling, applied to agent/task or agent/workflow interactions.
Having abstracted access control away from resources we can devise a modelling environment for access
control that enables us to analyse and test possible access control policies within a BPM context. We call
this Business Process Access Control (BPAC) and we model it using the applied pi calculus to provide
us with a powerful analytical tool for interactive processes. Our justification for using the applied pi
calculus as the basis for our model is presented in the next section.
2.9 Applied pi calculus as the basis for BPAC
The previous sections provide motivation for the adoption of a process-centric workflow-based approach
to access control specification and modelling. Now we turn our attention to the selection of a suitable
modelling environment for BPAC.
The key requirements for a suitable modelling environment are as follows:
• the capability to handle modelling of complex workflows, including complex interrelations between
tasks,
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• a formal underlying theory that provides suitable tools for security testing of workflow-based access
control models,
• a comprehensive syntax that can be used to model interactions between entities and can replicate
predicates that represent properties of entities or associations between entities,
• the potential for automation of modelling and analysis via existing or future software tools,
• the scope for expanding models around the basic access control model to incorporate additional
model properties such as inter-agent communication,
• a well established security model,
• abstraction from specific programming environments enabling translation into a variety of different
computer-based implementations.
Based upon the contents of the previous sections, particularly the discussion concerning BPM in sec-
tion 2.6, we consider the applied pi calculus of Abadi and Fournet [3] to be suitable for BPAC modelling.
The applied pi calculus satisfies all of the requirements listed above and because it is an extension of
the pi calculus then it retains the capability to handle Puhlmann and Weske constructs for modelling
workflows [77]. We favour the use of the applied pi calculus when coupled with workflow constructs as
the basis for our BPAC modelling environment over the more traditional Horn clause Datalog approach,
Prolog implementations or Petri nets. None of the alternatives are as capable at providing the power
and flexibility of the applied pi calculus, particularly in respect of its theoretically underpinned analytical
potential.
2.10 Summary
In this chapter we present a description of access control and business rules. We follow this with an
outline of the history of research in access control, then a discussion of BPM and possible modelling
environments for same. Drawing these ideas together, we present the motivation for our access control
modelling environment called Business Process Access Control (BPAC) and we outline our justification
for the selection of the applied pi calculus as the modelling environment for BPAC. We discuss BPAC in
greater detail in the next chapter.
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Business process access control (BPAC)
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we define formally our understanding of workflows and business process access con-
trol (BPAC). We introduce the security problems in respect of BPAC that we investigate in subsequent
chapters via our modelling environment. Throughout, we present a trivial workflow example to demon-
strate the operation of BPAC and we discuss the security problems within the context of this trivial
model. Following this discussion we present two access control examples and we review some examples
of coding using protocol examples from the literature.
3.2 Workflows
3.2.1 A formal presentation of workflows
For our formal definition of a workflow we utilise the definitions of Eshuis and Kumar [44] with minor
adaptations for our requirements. Specifically, we change the nomenclature so that it is consistent with
our model definitions and we add constraints that ensure that conjunctive (resp. disjunctive) splits are
matched to conjunctive (resp. disjunctive) joins. We define a workflow as a directed graph comprising
tasks as graph nodes connected by edges. We identify seven different types of task: a task immediately
followed by two or more parallel tasks is a conjunctive (AND) split task and a task that follows two or
more parallel tasks is a conjunctive (AND) join. A task that involves a choice in respect of the subsequent
paths is represented by a disjunctive (XOR) split. If a task action is triggered by the action of one of
a number of preceding parallel tasks then the task is represented as a disjunctive (XOR) join. A task
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that is preceded by a single task and followed by a single task is a sequential task. The task at the
commencement of the workflow is the start task, ts and the terminating task is the end task, te.
Definition 2
A workflow is a directed graph W = (T,F ) where T is a set of tasks as nodes and F ⊆ T ×T is a precedence
relation.
T is a disjoint set of XOR splits T⊕s, XOR joins T⊕j, AND splits T∧s, AND joins T∧j, sequential nodes
Tseq and {ts, te} where ts is the start node and te is the end node.
Auxiliary functions are inedge, outedge ∶ T Ð→ P (F ). Given a node t ∈ T , let inedge (t) = {(x, y) ∈ F ∣ y = t}
and outedge (t) = {(x, y) ∈ F ∣ x = t}.
3.2.2 Structural constraints
Each workflow should satisfy the following constraints:
• the start node has no incoming edge and at least one outgoing edge
∣inedge (ts)∣ = 0 ∧ ∣outedge (ts)∣ ≥ 1;
• the end node has at least one incoming edge and no outgoing edge
∣inedge (te)∣ ≥ 1 ∧ ∣outedge (te)∣ = 0;
• each sequential node has one incoming and one outgoing edge
∀t ∈ Tseq ∶ ∣inedge (t)∣ = ∣outedge (t)∣ = 1;
• each split node has one incoming and two or more outgoing edges
∀t ∈ T∧s ∪ T⊕s ∶ ∣inedge (t)∣ = 1 ∧ ∣outedge (t)∣ > 1;
• each join node has two or more incoming and one outgoing edge
∀t ∈ T∧j ∪ T⊕j ∶ ∣inedge (t)∣ > 1 ∧ ∣outedge (t)∣ = 1;
• all AND splits have a corresponding AND join
If t∧s ∈ T∧s, t∧j ∈ T∧j then
∃t ∈ T ∶ t∧sF ∗t ∧ tF ∗t∧j
where F ∗ denotes the reflexive-transitive closure of F ;
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• all XOR splits have a corresponding XOR join
If t⊕s ∈ T⊕s , t⊕j ∈ T⊕j
∃t ∈ T ∶ t⊕sF ∗t ∧ tF ∗t⊕j
where F ∗ denotes the reflexive-transitive closure of F ;
• each node is on a path from the start to the end node
∀t ∈ T ∶ tsF ∗t ∧ tF ∗te.
3.2.3 Instance subgraphs
Instance subgraphs represent the runtime behaviour of the workflow. Instance subgraphs are built induc-
tively from a start node and the construction rules ensure that all active conjunctive parallel paths and
single active disjunctive parallel paths are included within the summary of runtime behaviour. A valid
and correct subgraph is defined as follows:
Definition 3
Let (T,F ) be a workflow graph. An instance subgraph is a tuple (T ′, F ′) such that:
1. T ′ ⊆ T ;
2. F ′ ⊆ F ;
3. ts ∈ T ′ and outedge (ts) ⊆ F ′;
4. t ∈ T ′ and t ∈ Tseq ⇒ outedge (t) ⊆ F ′;
5. t ∈ T ′ and t ∈ T∧s ∪ T∧j and inedge (t) ⊆ F ′ ⇒ outedge (t) ⊆ F ′;
6. t ∈ T ′ and t ∈ T⊕s ∪ T⊕j and ∣inedge (t) ∩ F ′∣ = 1⇒ ∣outedge (t) ∩ F ′∣ = 1;
7. t ∈ T ′ and t ∈ T∧j then inedge (t) ⊆ F ′
8. t ∈ T ′ and t ∈ T⊕j then ∣inedge (t) ∩ F ′∣ = 1
9. (x, y) ∈ F ′ ⇒ x, y ∈ T ′;
10. t ∈ T ′ and inedge (t) ∩ F ′ = ∅⇒ t = ts.
The final definition ensures that only valid instance subgraphs are allowed by ensuring that the only task
node within the subgraph that has no incoming edge is the start node.
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3.2.4 Terminating instance subgraph
A terminating instance subgraph is a subgraph that includes the end node te. The existence of a termi-
nating instance subgraph for a given workflow indicates that a path can be found from a start node to
an end node for that workflow.
Definition 4
Let Wsub = (T ′, F ′) be an instance subgraph for the workflow graph W = (T,F ) and let te ∈ T be an end
node. If te ∈ T ′ and inedge (te) ⊆ F ′ then Wsub is a terminating instance subgraph of the graph W .
3.3 Business process access control (BPAC)
In chapter 2 we introduce workflow-based access control as an extension of role-based access control. In
this section we present a formal definition of business process access control (BPAC), our interpretation
of workflow-based access control, followed by formal descriptions of the security properties: completeness,
satisfiability, collusion and anonymity.
3.3.1 Constraints
We define constraints as per Li and Mitchell [62]. Firstly, we define a constraint domain, then we define
constraint expressions as a conjunction of primitive constraint predicates within the constraint domain.
Later in this chapter, we discuss constraint tests and constraint commands that provide tools for the
manipulation of these constraint expressions.
3.3.2 Constraint domain
A constraint domain for a workflow W provides the toolkit with which constraint rules assigned to tasks
within the workflow can be constructed. We define a constraint domain Φ as a collection of predicates,
functions, names and variables together with their associated mappings and relations.
Definition 5
Given a workflow W = (T,F ), a set of agents A and a set of roles R then a constraint domain Φ over
the workflow W is a 3-tuple (Σ,D,L). Σ is a signature comprising a set of constants and a collection
29
3.3 Business process access control (BPAC)
of predicate and function symbols, each with an associated “arity”, indicating the number of arguments to
the symbol. D is a Σ-structure comprising the following: a set D called the universe of the structure that
includes all workflow task names i.e. T ⊆ D, the workflow name W and an infinite set of variables, a
mapping from each constant to an element in D, a mapping from each predicate symbol in Σ of degree k
to a k-ary relation over D and a mapping from each function symbol in Σ of degree k to a function from
Dk to D. L is a set of quantifier-free first-order formulas over Σ, called the primitive constraints of the
domain.
3.3.2.1 Constraint domain specifics
We assume that the unary predicate symbol ¬ is contained in Σ and is interpreted as negation in D. We
also assume that ⊺ (true) is in L and that L is closed under variable renaming.
3.3.3 Constraint expression
A constraint expression (referred to simply as a constraint) is a conjunctive formula associated with a
task in a workflow. If the formula is satisfied by an agent together with the matching of the agent’s
role to the task role then the agent is permitted access to the task. We define a constraint expression in
respect of a constraint domain Φ. The constraint expression is built from primitive constraint predicates
in conjunction with the negations of primitive constraint predicates formulated over signature Σ within
the constraint domain Φ.
Definition 6
Let Φ be a constraint domain. A constraint expression (in variables x1, . . . , xk) is a finite conjunction
c = ϕ0 ∧ . . . ϕi . . . ∧ ϕn ∧ ¬ψ0 ∧ . . .¬ψj . . . ∧ ¬ψm where each ϕi, 0 ≤ i ≤ n, ψj, 0 ≤ j ≤ m is a primitive
constraint predicate without negation in Φ. Further, the variables in ϕi and ψj are among x1, . . . , xk.
A constraint expression c is alternatively described in set notation as:
c = {ϕ0, . . . , ϕi, . . . , ϕn,¬ψ0, . . . ,¬ψj , . . . ,¬ψm}.
The set of all constraint expressions for a particular workflow W is C.
3.3.4 Evaluating constraints against a store
Our BPAC environment uses a memory of constraint terms called a store that is updated on a task-by-
task basis. Evaluation of constraints against the store forms the basis of our constraints testing. We
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represent a constraint store as a world and the store can contain primitive constraint terms without
negation formulated over Σ within the constraint domain Φ of section 3.3.2.
Definition 7
Let W be a set of worlds and let W ∈W. If ϕ, ψ are primitive constraint predicates without negation and
c is a constraint expression with no free variables then we define [[c]]W by induction over the structure
of c as follows:
[[ϕ]]W =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
⊺ if ϕ ∈W
 if ϕ ∉W
[[¬ψ]]W =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
⊺ if ψ ∉W
 if ψ ∈W
and if c1 and c2 are constraint expressions then:
[[c1 ∧ c2]]W = [[c1]]W ∧ [[c2]]W .
3.3.5 Workflow-based access control
Having defined the basic workflow we now incorporate access control within our workflow model. We
utilise roles as per our definition of RBAC in section 2.3 and we assign the roles to agents and tasks.
Consequently, for an agent to be allowed access to task resources an agent’s role must match a task role.
Additionally, we assign constraints as per section 3.3.3 to tasks that further restrict the access of agents
to tasks and these constraints can be global or local and based upon static or dynamic information.
We extend workflowW to a 7-tuple to incorporate access control components. Our definition incorporates
a task/role assignment function and a set of constraints together with a task/constraint assignment
function that specify the conditions under which agents can be assigned to tasks. Also, we include a set
of worlds wherein a world represents a store for constraint terms and a transition function that updates
worlds.
Definition 8
We define an access control workflow as a 7-tuple W = (T,F,TR,C,TC,W, δ) where T is a set of tasks,
F ⊆ T × T is a precedence relation, TR ∶ T Ð→ R is a task/role assignment function, C is a set of
31
3.3 Business process access control (BPAC)
constraints as defined in section 3.3.3, TC ∶ T ×AÐ→ C is a task/agent/constraint assignment function,
W is a set of worlds associated with the workflow and δ ∶ T ×W Ð→W is a transition function. We
define R as a set of roles and A as a set of agents. We represent agent/role assignment by the finite
binary relation AR ⊆ A ×R.
3.3.6 Terminating instance subgraph
We extend the definition of a terminating instance subgraph Wsub to a 7-tuple to incorporate access
control components. As in the previous definition our definition incorporates a task/role assignment
function, a set of constraints that specify the conditions under which agents can be assigned to tasks, a
task/agent/constraint assignment function, a set of worlds and a transition function. The existence of a
terminating instance subgraph for a workflow indicates that a path can be found from a start node to an
end node for that workflow given the access control conditions.
Definition 9
Let W = (T,F,TR,C,TC,W, δ) be an access control workflow and let te be an end node then if there
exists an instance subgraph Wsub = (T ′, F ′, TR,C,TC,W, δ) such that T ′ ⊆ T , F ′ ⊆ F , te ∈ T ′ and
inedge (te) ⊆ F ′ then Wsub is called a terminating instance subgraph for graph W .
3.3.7 Assignment function (AW)
The assignment function AW represents the allocation of agents, subject to role assignments and con-
straints, to every task in a workflow.
Definition 10
Let workflow be W = (T,F,TR,C,TC,W, δ). An assignment function AW ∶ T → A is called valid in set
of worlds W if
1. let AR be an agent/role assignment relation, TR be a task/role assignment function and a be AW (t)
then for all t ∈ T ∃a such that a AR TR (t),
2. let TC be a task/agent/constraint assignment function then for any task t and world W if[[TC (t,AW (t))]]W =  then δ (t,W) =W.
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3.3.8 Satisfiable assignment function (SAW)
The definition is similar to AW except that SAW is not a total function over T . We define the satisfiable
assignment function (SAW) in respect of a terminating instance subgraph i.e. a path from ts to te .
Definition 11
Let terminating instance subgraph be Wsub = (T ′, F ′, TR,C.TC,W, δ). A satisfiable assignment function
SAW ∶ T ′ → A is called valid in set of worlds W if
1. let AR be an agent/role assignment relation, TR be a task/role assignment function and a′ be
SAW (t) then for all t′ ∈ T ′ ∃a′ such that a′ AR TR (t′),
2. let TC be a task/agent/constraint assignment function then for any task t′ ∈ T ′ and world W if[[TC (t′, SAW (t′))]]W =  then δ (t′,W) =W.
3.3.9 The transition function
The transition function δ provides for the updating of worlds in respect of workflow tasks to represent
the dynamic modification of the constraint store. We present an example of the transition function that
we subsequently use in our BPAC environment.
3.3.9.1 An example of the transition function
We devise an operator called ‘test’ that identifies whether or not a constraint expression associated with
a particular task/node is satisfied by an agent:
we use the syntax (t, test (c (a) ,W)) in our BPAC model to represent the verification of a constraint
expression assigned to task t for some agent a ∈ A against the store W where c ∶ A Ð→ {⊺,} is a
constraint expression and (t, test (c (a) ,W)) = [[TC (t, a)]]W .
We devise operators called ‘write’ and ‘delete’ using the constraint syntax that interact with the store in
respect of specific task nodes. The operators allow us to modify the store contents by adding or removing
constraint expressions to or from the current world. For example if:
(t,write ({c1, . . . , cn} ,W)) , (t, test (c (a) ,W)) , (t, delete ({d1, . . . , dm} ,W)) , (t,write ({e1, . . . , ep} ,W))
is a list of operators called the policy rule assigned to task t where c (a) is a constraint expression and
c1, . . . , cn, d1, . . . , dm and e1, . . . , ep are primitive constraint predicates without negation then:
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δ (t,W) = (((W ∪ {c1, . . . , cn}) ∖ {d1, . . . , dm}) ∪ {e1, . . . , ep})
We use the list of constraint operators outlined above on a task-by-task basis to construct a workflow
constraint policy within a BPAC workflow model.
3.3.10 Constructing the BPAC model
Based upon the definitions presented above the implementation of the full BPAC model comprises the
following components:
• sets of tasks T , agents A and roles R are identified for the particular example;
• a workflowW is constructed from the tasks, adding dummy tasks if necessary such as a terminating
task te to ensure that the workflow structure is consistent with the workflow definition;
• agent/role (AR) and task/role (TR) assignments are specified;
• task/constraint (TC) assignments are specified. Constraint expressions attached to tasks are de-
termined using the policy language summarised below and contain a variable (usually represented
as a) that takes an agent identity value at runtime.
• We assume by default that the store is always updated once an agent has been matched to a
task and we do not therefore explicitly specify commands for these store updates. That is, a(t,write (hasAccessed (a, t,W ) ,W)) command is associated with all tasks in a workflow model.
Additional store update commands e.g. (t,write ({c1, . . . , cn} ,W)), (t, delete ({d1, . . . , dm} ,W))
and (t,write ({e1, . . . , ep} ,W)) as per section 3.3.9.1 above are assigned to tasks in order as neces-
sary using the policy language summarised below. A collection of commands for an entire workflow
constitutes the workflow constraint policy.
3.3.11 BNF for constraint handling in the BPAC environment
The policy language that we use for constraint handling in our BPAC modelling environment consistent
with the workflow-based access control definitions outlined above is presented in table 3.1. A workflow
constraint policy is built from optional constraint policies devised for each workflow task. Task constraint
policies comprise a sequence of optional constraint operators: a ‘write’ rule followed by a ‘test’ rule then
a ‘delete’ rule and finally another ‘write’ rule. We use the rule order to indicate that an agent constraint
term can be written to the store either before or after a constraint test is performed. In practice, a
‘write’ before ‘test’ can occur if an agent is attempting to access a task and has satisfied the task/role
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⟨workflow constraint policy⟩ ∶∶= (⟨task constraint policy⟩ [”,”])∗⟨task constraint policy⟩ ∶∶= [⟨write policy rule⟩] [”,”] [⟨test policy rule⟩] [”,”][⟨delete policy rule⟩] [”,”] [⟨write policy rule⟩]⟨test policy rule⟩ ∶∶= ”(” ⟨task⟩ ”,” ⟨test formula⟩ ”)”⟨write policy rule⟩ ∶∶= ”(” ⟨task⟩ ”,” ⟨write formula⟩ ”)”⟨delete policy rule⟩ ∶∶= ”(” ⟨task⟩ ”,” ⟨delete formula⟩ ”)”⟨test formula⟩ ∶∶= ⟨test⟩ ”(” ⟨conjunction⟩ [ ”,” ⟨store⟩ ] ”)”⟨write formula⟩ ∶∶= ⟨write⟩ ”(” ⟨positive conjunction⟩ [ ”,” ⟨store⟩ ] ”)”⟨delete formula⟩ ∶∶= ⟨delete⟩ ”(” ⟨positive conjunction⟩ [ ”,” ⟨store⟩ ] ”)”⟨positive conjunction⟩ ∶∶= ⟨positive conjunction term⟩(⟨and⟩ ⟨positive conjunction term⟩)∗⟨conjunction⟩ ∶∶= ⟨conjunction term⟩ (⟨and⟩ ⟨conjunction term⟩)∗⟨conjunction term⟩ ∶∶= ⟨predicate term⟩ ∣ ⟨negation⟩ ⟨predicate term⟩⟨positive conjunction term⟩ ∶∶= ⟨predicate term⟩⟨predicate term⟩ ∶∶= ⟨predicate⟩ ”(” ⟨base term⟩ ”)”⟨base term⟩ ∶∶= ⟨variable⟩ (”,” ⟨variable⟩)∗⟨variable⟩ ∶∶= ⟨Id⟩⟨predicate⟩ ∶∶= ⟨Id⟩⟨task⟩ ∶∶= ⟨Id⟩⟨store⟩ ∶∶= ⟨Id⟩⟨test⟩ ∶∶= ”test”⟨write⟩ ∶∶= ”write”⟨delete⟩ ∶∶= ”delete”⟨negation⟩ ∶∶= ”not” ∣ ”¬”⟨and⟩ ∶∶= ”and” ∣ ” ∧ ”⟨Id⟩ ∶∶= ⟨letter⟩ (⟨letter⟩ ∣ ⟨digit⟩ ∣ ”_” ∣ ” − ”)∗
Table 3.1: BNF for constraint handling in BPAC
requirements but has not yet satisfied the constraint requirements. Alternatively, a ‘write’ after ‘test’
indicates that the agent has fulfilled the constraint terms prior to an update of the store. A case in which
‘write’ before ‘test’ is used is the provision of a concurrent access constraint for parallel tasks. In order
to ensure that an agent can access no more than one concurrent task we ‘write’ before ‘test’ an access
constraint ‘canAccess’ in respect of a given task and we test for this constraint in the parallel tasks. An
example of ‘write’ before ‘test’ is given in chapter 4.
3.3.12 Example - a simple 2-task workflow
Let us consider a very simple example of a BPAC model.
Let W be a workflow comprising two tasks Task1 and Task2 that are linked, perhaps, by the flow of
an authorisation document from Task1 to Task2 so that Task2 cannot commence until Task1 has been
completed and the correct documentation has been transferred from Task1 to Task2 (note that flow in
this context might be the physical or computer-based transfer of a document from one agent to another
or the placement of a document in a specific location for subsequent take-up by another agent). These
tasks can be identified respectively as the initial task or node, ts, followed by the final task, te, as per our
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workflow definition above. Each task has a selection of resource access requirements that are associated
with the task process. We have a set of agents {Agent1,Agent2,Agent3} and each agent is assigned a
role based upon their position within the organisation. For the purpose of this simple example we have
a set of available roles {clerk, supervisor,manager}. We represent agent/role assignment by the binary
relation of agent/role assignments as follows:
AR = {(Agent1, clerk) ,
(Agent2, supervisor) ,
(Agent3,manager)}
So agent Agent1 has role clerk, agent Agent2 has role supervisor and agent Agent3 has role manager.
Next we define our access control policy as follows mapping each task Taski to its role via the task/role
assignment function:
TR = {(Task1, clerk) , (Task2, supervisor)}
(Task1, clerk) models the fact that the agent mapped to task Task1 must have role clerk and(Task2, supervisor) the agent mapped to Task2 must have role supervisor.
We associate a set of worlds representing a dynamic constraint store, W, with the workflow W .
Over this RBAC-based access control model we consider dynamic segregation of duties constraints
mapped to tasks as follows wherein a is the only variable:
(Task2, test (¬hasAccessed (a,Task1,W ) ,W2))
as the workflow constraint policy i.e. the agent mapped to task Task2 cannot have been mapped to task
Task1 in workflow W given constraint store W2 associated with the task.
If we consider this simple example then a valid assignment function AW and a valid satisfiable assignment
function SAW for the workflow in set of worldsW both exist and are represented by the following graph:
{(Task1,Agent1) , (Task2,Agent2)}
36
3.4 Security properties of workflows
with the delta function for each task based upon an initial store/world W1 = ∅ being:
δ (Task1,W1) = {hasAccessed (Agent1, Task1,W )}
δ (Task2,W2) = {hasAccessed (Agent1, Task1,W ) ,
hasAccessed (Agent2, Task2,W )}
as the store is implicitly updated for each task with constraint terms indicating which agent has accessed
the task at runtime.
In workflows that are constructed from sequences and/or conjunctive parallelism there is no difference
between satisfiable assignment functions and assignment functions. Differences arise when the workflow
incorporates disjunctive parallelism and/or loops.
3.4 Security properties of workflows
3.4.1 Discussion of security properties associated with the 2-task workflow
Given the simplicity of the 2-task workflow model it is a straightforward observational exercise to identify
the security properties of the workflow. We return to this example in chapter 8 where we analyse the
security properties in a more formal manner using applied pi calculus tools.
3.4.2 Completeness of BPAC policies
Completeness as defined for our modelling environment is an example of the reachability property in
which all components of a workflow-based access control can be completed using available tasks and
agents, given some collection of constraints that govern agent/task interaction and a set of worlds W.
Arguably this is the most basic property of workflow-based access control that one would expect to be
attained for a given model. For complex workflows that incorporate disjunctive or conditional branching,
for the workflow to be complete all tasks identified by the workflow manager including those within all
branches of the workflow must be available and must be accessible by available agents.
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Definition 12
Let workflow be W = (T,F,TR,C,TC,W, δ). Workflow W is complete if there exists a valid assignment
function AW ∶ T → A in set of worlds W.
3.4.2.1 2-task workflow completeness example
We can establish by observation that the simple workflow is complete under the definition of section 3.4.2
above. Given the role assignment, constraint and worlds W, agent Agent1 can access task Task1 and
Agent2 can access Task2 so workflow W is complete given the set of agents and the access control policy.
3.4.3 Satisfiability of BPAC policies
Satisfiability as defined for our modelling environment is an example of the reachability property in
which a workflow-based access control or some portion thereof can be terminated using available tasks
and agents and given some collection of constraints that govern agent/task interaction together with a
set of worlds W. For a workflow to be terminated in this context we say that the terminating process te
must be triggered as a consequence of agent and task assignments. It is important to note that whilst
a workflow may be identified as satisfiable this does not necessarily mean that the workflow is complete
as per section 3.4.2 and that a workflow that is complete may be satisfiable by a number of different
workflow paths and agent and task assignments.
Definition 13
Let workflow be W = (T,F,TR,C.TC,W, δ). Workflow W is satisfiable if there exists a terminating
instance subgraph Wsub = (T ′, F ′, TR,C,TC,W, δ) in respect of workflow W and there exists a valid
satisfiable assignment function SAW ∶ T ′ → A′ in set of worlds W.
3.4.3.1 2-task workflow satisfiability example
We can establish by observation that the workflow is satisfiable under the definition in section 3.4.3 above.
Given the role assignment, constraint and set of worlds W, agent Agent1 can access task Task1, Agent2
can access Task2 and Task2 is a terminating task/node consistent with the workflow constraint terms of
section 3.2.2 so workflow W is satisfiable given the set of agents and the access control policy.
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3.4.4 The security problem - collusion
The collusion metric is the minimum of the set of all of the cardinalities of different image elements of
the satisfiable assignment function for a workflow W .
The simple collusion metric represents an attempt to quantify the “robustness” of a workflow in respect
of the potential for some set of agents either to collectively secure control over the entire workflow or
over some satisfiable path through the workflow or to pass over control of the entire workflow or some
satisfiable path to some external third party. An estimate of the simple collusion metric is obtained by
identifying the minimum number of agents that are required to ensure that a workflow or some path
through the workflow is satisfiable. Intuitively, a workflow is robust against collusion if, through the
proper implementation of segregation of duties, a relatively large number of agents is required to secure
control of the workflow or some satisfiable path. Conversely, a workflow is weak against collusion if a
small number of agents or perhaps just one agent alone can secure control over the workflow.
Definition 14
Let W = (T,F,TR,C,TC,W, δ) be a workflow. Let SAW be the set of all valid assignment functions for
the workflow then we define the collusion metric cmW to be:
cmW ≜ Min
saw∈SAW {# ⋃t∈TSAW (t)}
3.4.4.1 2-task workflow collusion metric example
We observe that the only possible pattern of agent/task access is that identified in the previous test of
satisfiability as agent Agent3 can access neither Task1 nor Task2, Agent1 can access task Task1 but not
Task2 and agent Agent2 can access Task2 but not Task1. We can conclude, therefore, that the minimum
number of agents required to complete W is two, i.e. the collusion metric for the workflow is two.
3.4.5 The security problem - anonymity
We define anonymity as a property of a BPAC model whereby some outside observer is unable to match
an agent to tasks and workflows within the model. If anonymity is breached, this provides a shortcut
towards gaining control over a workflow in that identified agents can be targeted by another agent or
third party. A breach of anonymity can occur if an agent or outside observer can observe the functioning
or otherwise of a workflow given the presence or absence of a targeted agent and can potentially associate
the targeted agent with tasks in consequence. For example, if a workflow becomes deadlocked when
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an agent is absent then an observer can infer that there is a likelihood that the agent is critical to the
workflow and she might also be able to link the agent to a specific task. Within our BPAC modelling
environment we say that anonymity in respect of some targeted agent is preserved for a workflow if that
workflow is complete both with and without the presence of the agent.
Definition 15
Let W = (T,F,TR,C,TC,W, δ) be a workflow and a be an agent. Anonymity is preserved in respect of
agent a if for all valid assignments AW ∶ T Ð→ A there exists a valid assignment AW ′ ∶ T Ð→ A such
that AW ′ (t) = AW (t) if AW (t) ≠ a and AW ′ (t) ≠ a for all tasks t ∈ T .
3.4.5.1 2-task workflow anonymity example
We observe that, given the set of agents, task Task1 can only be accessed by agent Agent1 and that
Agent1 is critical to the completion of the simple workflow W . Anonymity is not preserved in respect of
agent Agent1 and task Task1 as Agent1 is directly associated with Task1 and the completion of Task1
can only have occurred because of the interaction between Agent1 and Task1. Likewise, anonymity is not
preserved in respect of agent Agent2 and task Task2. From the perspective of workflow W we can argue
that anonymity of Agent3 is preserved as Agent3 cannot be associated with any aspect of the workflow
W .
3.4.6 Conclusion
In this section we define BPAC and security issues associated with workflow-based access control. Through-
out, we present a very simple example of 2-task workflow-based access control and we discuss the security
issues within the context of the 2-task model. In the next section we present a selection of workflow-
based access control examples and we discuss why we consider existing access control modelling solutions
inadequate for the purpose of modelling these examples and how we can apply BPAC to these examples.
3.5 Practical examples of access control problems
In this section we present two examples of access control problems using Cassandra and RW. We highlight
the limitations of each approach that we seek to address with BPAC and its modelling environment.
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Figure 3.1: Data update workflow
3.5.1 Example 1: updating standing data in a medical practice
3.5.1.1 The problem
Medical Practice X is a small organisation operating within the National Health Service.
Consider the simple example of the requirement to update the standing data of a patient on the practice’s
computer-based records system, a change of address, say. A possible system might be as follows:
a patient has a very limited access to portions of her own patient records and to a selection of resources
and processes. The patient fills out a change of address form on a computer terminal but on submission
the address is only provisionally updated prior to verification.
The practice administrator checks the records and is required to verify the new address against some
documentary evidence, a utility bill, say. A copy of the evidence is scanned and entered with the patient
record update. The administrator is then able to update the patient records.
This example can be represented by the trivial two-task workflow shown in figure 3.1. The administrator
need only access the patient update task contingent upon the satisfaction of the precondition, namely,
the submission of the update request by the patient and conditional upon the administrator not being
the patient herself. Furthermore, access to the initial task by the patient requires both the assignment
of the patient role and access based upon the identity of the user. Within the context of the security
model the aim of this business process is to ensure that the administrator does not have total control
over valuable personal data. Most access control systems lack the combination of features that enable
this security model: the dependency of access control on historical access control information and the
application of global constraints based upon the user set as well as the role set. As an example, the
definition of an access control policy set using Becker’s Cassandra [13] is considered below. It should be
noted that Cassandra is a policy language and does not incorporate a modelling and testing environment
for access control policies.
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3.5.1.2 An attempt to devise a policy ruleset for the problem using Cassandra
The following code snippets provide examples of Cassandra policy rules for the medical practice problem.
The policy ruleset (code snippets)
A policy ruleset for the example set out above is as follows:
canActivate (pat,Request − update − patient − records (pat))←
hasActivated (pat,Patient ()) ,
no −main − role − active (pat)
That is the patient pat can activate the Request − update − patient − records () action provided that
they have already activated the Patient () role and no other roles are active.
canActivate (admin,Update − patient − records (pat, admin))←
hasActivated (admin,Administrator ()) ,
canActivate (pat,Patient ()) ,
no −main − role − active (admin)
states that administrator admin can activate the Update − patient − records () action provided that
they have already activated the Administrator () role, that they have no other roles active and that the
patient pat is capable of activating the Patient () role where:
no −main − role − active (user)←
count − patient − activations (n,user) ,
count − admin − activations (n,user) ,
⋮
n = 0
uses cardinality constraints to implement mutual exclusion and the cardinality constraints are defined as,
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for example:
count − patient − activations (count (u) , user)←
hasActivated (user,Patient ())
⋮
The policy code above provides the administrator with patient record update rights to all patient records
at all times provided that the administrator has activated her administrator role and has not activated
any other roles. Therefore, the policy ruleset is not sufficient to provide the level of constraint required
in the example i.e. the administrator is not sufficiently constrained so as to access the specific patient’s
details only. The scope of constraints that can be placed upon this access policy ruleset is limited although
any number of constraints can be applied to the policy ruleset. Currently, the constraints are the role
activation cardinality rule and a rule that states that the patient pat is able to activate the patient role.
If we altered the rule using:
⋮
hasActivated (pat,Patient ()) ,
⋮
instead of:
⋮
canActivate (pat,Patient ()) ,
⋮
then the administrator would only be able to update the patient records if the patient had activated and
not deactivated her patient role in the current session, which is clearly impractical.
The Cassandra policy language allows us to assign set membership constraints, temporal constraints
and constraints based upon credentials. Whilst it is possible that a solution to this simple example
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could be devised (e.g. using the patient to update some form of credential that provides a trigger to the
administrator’s update records policy, or by increasing the granularity of roles and actions) it is apparent
that such a solution requires a counterintuitive and potentially complex interpretation of the Cassandra
policy language.
3.5.1.3 Using BPAC to model the example
Now we consider the modelling of the data update example using BPAC.
We have a set of agents A = {Agent1,Agent2}, roles R = {patient, administrator} and a set of worlds
W. We represent the workflow by 2 tasks T = {Task1, Task2}:
• Task1 — complete and submit change of address form
• Task2 — review request, check and scan utility bill and authorise change of address
and a single edge F = {(Task1, Task2)}.
Next, we populate initial store/world W1 ∈ W with patient identity constraint terms of the form
hasIdentity (Agent, IDpat) where IDpat is a uniquely assigned identity for agent Agent:
W1 = {hasIdentity (Agent1, IDpat1) , hasIdentity (Agent2, IDpat2)}
We define agent/role assignment as follows:
AR = {(Agent1, patient) , (Agent2, administrator)}
and task/role assignment:
TR = {(Task1, patient) , (Task2, administrator)}
then constraints over the workflow tasks are specified as the following workflow constraint policy with a
as a variable:
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(Task1, test (hasIdentity (a, IDpat1) ,W1)) ,
(Task2, test (¬hasAccessed (a,Task1,W ) ,W2))
The delta function for each task based upon the initial store/world W1 is:
δ (Task1,W1) = {hasIdentity (Agent1, IDpat1) , hasIdentity (Agent2, IDpat2) ,
hasAccessed (Agent1, Task1,W )}
δ (Task2,W2) = {hasIdentity (Agent1, IDpat1) , hasIdentity (Agent2, IDpat2) ,
{hasAccessed (Agent1, Task1,W ) ,
hasAccessed (Agent2, Task2,W )}
With this simple encoding we ensure that only the agent who is a patient and who has identity IDpat1 can
access task Task1 and can complete and submit a change of address form. Evaluation of the constraint
test for task Task1 against storeW1 is successful for agent Agent1 in this example. The request is reviewed
under task Task2 only once Task1 has been completed and only by the agent who is an administrator
and who has not completed task Task1 herself. Evaluation of the constraint test for task Task2 against
store W2 is successful for agent Agent2 in the example. By this method we successfully incorporate
all of the security requirements specified in the outline of the problem in section 3.5.1.1 whilst avoiding
potential SoD issues arising from role activation/deactivation and mutual exclusivity of roles.
3.5.1.4 Conclusion
Whilst this example would appear to be somewhat trivial, the point to note is that by applying a standard
RBAC policy solution to the problem the administrator is still endowed with the freedom to view and
amend any patient records without restriction. This problem arises because Cassandra uses activation
and deactivation of roles, coupled with mutual exclusivity of role restrictions for SoD, and this approach
lacks the granularity to apply SoD to a specific task. However, because Cassandra is a policy language
only and there is no associated mechanism for verification and testing of policy languages then such
limitations only become apparent by observation, or through the setting-up and testing of prototypes
and real-world studies.
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BPAC addresses some of the limitations identified above. Workflows can be used to temporally constrain
access actions so that an administrator is only able to update patient records (via a task) if a request
for such an update has been made beforehand (via a previous task). Also, dynamic segregation of duties
constraints can be utilised to limit accessibility to specific patient records with reference to previous task
activities e.g. an administrator can be restricted to the records identified in the patient request of the
previous task.
Our BPAC modelling environment provides a mechanism for testing the security limitations of access
policies, such as the simple example above, prior to live testing and implementation. This approach
could potentially yield considerable resource savings and reduce the risk of security failure within an
organisation. As the BPAC formalism is a workflow-based access control approach then our modelling
environment is more expressive than traditional RBAC policy languages. Also, access policy creation
can be addressed in a manner that is broadly isomorphic to BPM methods that are commonplace within
organisations.
3.5.2 Example 2: submitting a paper to an academic publication
3.5.2.1 The problem
Journal Y is a popular academic publication produced by the Institute Z as quarterly issues of its
collection of peer-reviewed papers. The business process for submission of papers for review, approval
and publication is described by the workflow displayed in figs 3.2 and 3.3. Points of interest in this
particular model are as follows:
• The editor cannot be the author of the paper.
• The reviewers should be different and cannot be the author of the paper. There should be a
minimum of two reviewers.
• The editor can be a reviewer but in this case there needs to be at least two additional reviewers.
• A reviewer cannot access the resources (or the reviews) of her fellow reviewers.
• The editor collates the completed reviews.
An important component of this business process is that agents are unable to invoke dual roles within a
session, for example author and reviewer or reviewer and reviewer. Additionally, it should not be possible
for an agent to alter or manipulate records and resources that are made available as part of their task
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Figure 3.2: Paper submission and review workflow — part 1
execution once the paper has passed to the next task stage in the workflow. For example, once a reviewer
has submitted her review then her involvement with the particular paper ceases and she cannot amend
or alter records after the event and after she has discovered the names of the author or the names of the
other reviewers.
3.5.2.2 An attempt to devise a policy model for the problem using RW
We consider the use of Nan Zhang’s RW [104] for this particular problem and discuss a selection of the
resulting policy rules.
The policy ruleset (code snippets)
Predicate terms are true (⊺) or false (). For instance author (p, a) is true if a is the author of p and false
otherwise. w is a mapping that rewrites the truth value of the predicate term to true or false. Formulas
define conditions under which an agent denoted by variable x can read and overwrite the truth value of
the variable represented by the instance predicate term.
A selection of policy rules using RW is set out below.
A review, written by agent a, of a paper p can be defined in respect of the writer of the review, being
agent a, having the role of reviewer, who is not the paper’s author and who has not submitted a review
for the paper already:
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Figure 3.3: Paper submission and review workflow — part 2
w (review (p, a) , x) ⇌ (x = a) ∧ reviewer (p, x)
∧¬author (p, x) ∧ ¬submittedreview (p, x)
and the policy language controls the access control management as well as the access control itself so
that:
w (reviewer (p, a) , x) ⇌ editor (x) ∧ ¬author (p, a)
provides the editor with the policy to nominate and remove reviewers so long as she is the editor and the
nominee reviewer is not the author of the paper. Note that the non-deterministic dynamic segregation of
duties that is given in the example in respect of the editor and whether or not she can be a reviewer is
merely absorbed into the decision-making process of the editor in the above policy rule. This is a more
liberal and flexible interpretation of the access control than is required in the example as there is neither
restriction on reviewer numbers nor prevention of the editor from being the sole reviewer.
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r (submittedreview (p, a) , x) ⇌ (editor (x) ∧ ¬author (p, x))
∨ ((x = a) ∧ review (p, x))
States that either the editor, who is not the author of the paper, or the reviewer of the paper or both
can read the submitted review. Whilst:
w (submittedreview (p, a) , x) ⇌ (x = a) ∧ review (p, x)
says that the agent who wrote the review can submit the review.
w (collatereviews (p) , x) ⇌ editor (x) ∧ ¬author (p, x)
∧∀y ∈ Σ (submittedreview (p, y)
∧reviewer (p, y))
States that the editor can collate reviews provided that all appointed reviewers have submitted the
reviews.
These attempts at coding the access control demonstrate that the RW policy language is very compact
and powerful despite its basic syntax. Sessions are defined via the named variables such as the paper
identifier p so that for example the author argument author (p, x) identifies the author for the given paper.
Consequently, policy constraints can be granular and specific: author (p, x), or general: author (y, x),
where y is a member of the set of submitted papers. However, there is a problem with the language
in this particular example. The example coding above provides the editor with considerable power over
the review and selection process. If we restrict the paper review process to exclude the editor, a static
segregation of duties can be invoked through mutual exclusion. However, the scenario allows for the editor
being a reviewer so this is not appropriate. Alternatively, the reviewer () predicate can be extended to
provide one version for ordinary reviewers and another for the editor reviewer, editorreviewer (). Now,
the policy rule for writing a review might look like the following:
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w (review (p, a) , x) ⇌ (x = a) ∧ ¬submittedreview (p, x)
∧ ((editorreviewer (p, b) ∧ (x = b))
∨ ((reviewer (p, c) ∧ (x = c)
∧¬∃y ∈ Σreview (p, y))
∨ (reviewer (p, d) ∧ (x = d)
∧∃z ∈ Σ (review (p, z) ∧ (z ≠ x))) ∧ ¬editor (x)))
∧¬author (p, x)
This rule says that agent x can write a review if she has not already submitted a review and she is
the editor-reviewer or she is a reviewer and not the editor and no one is writing a review or there are
others writing reviews but not her. Whilst this rule should provide the required constraint it is rather
more complex than previous rules and it is not intuitively associated with the underlying central business
process.
What happens if we tweak the initial example requirements slightly? For example, the editor can collate
submitted reviews provided that she has not submitted a review herself, otherwise another editor is
required to collate the reviews (a dynamic SoD example). The policy rule for the collation of reviews can
be amended to incorporate the additional constraint:
w (collatereviews (p) , x) ⇌ ((editor (x) ∧ ¬editorreviewer (p, x))
∨ (editor (x)
∧∃y ∈ Σ (editorreviewer (p, x) ∧ (y ≠ x)
∧ (y ≠ x))))
∧¬author (p, x)
∧∀z ∈ Σ (submittedreview (p, z)
∧reviewer (p, z))
that says the editor can collate reviews provided that she is not an editor-reviewer or there is an editor-
reviewer and she is not the editor-reviewer.
Ostensibly, we now have a set of rules that provide the access policy requirement. However, there is a
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difficulty in that the original editor can potentially circumvent this additional restriction. Firstly, she
can write a review, then secondly, she can legitimately resign her role as editor-reviewer, averting the
collation constraint in consequence. This is the fundamental problem with utilising mutual exclusion to
enact dynamic SoD and is why RBACs are not suited to implementing this business principle.
Unlike Cassandra discussed in the previous example RW incorporates a powerful modelling and testing
environment that is able to identify security problems in access control policies. However, whilst this
testing environment can identify flaws such as contradictions between policy rulesets, it is not so able to
highlight failure or limitations of the application of business rules such as dynamic segregation of duties.
3.5.2.3 Using BPAC to model the example (code snippets)
We consider the modelling of the review section of this example using BPAC for this exercise.
We have a set of agents A = {Agent1,Agent2,Agent3, . . .} , roles R = {PCMember, editor, . . .} and a set
of worlds W. We represent the workflow by tasks T = {Task1, . . . , Task11}:
• Task1 — ensure paper in proper format , check and submit
⋮
• Task6 — select peer review team
• Task7 — review paper
• Task8 — review paper
• Task9 — review paper
• Task10 — Collate reviews and decide on publication
⋮
We extend the set of task/nodes to include dummy (non-interactive) nodes to ensure that the workflow
form is consistent with the workflow definitions and constraints in sections 3.2 and 3.3:
Tmod = T ∪ {Tnode1, Tnode2, Tnode3, Tnode4, . . .}
where Tnode1, . . . , Tnode4 are dummy nodes representing splits and joins in the workflow and Tmod is the
new task set for the model. We modify the workflow model so that it properly reflects the possibilities for
paper review being performed either by two reviewers nominated by the editor or by the editor and two
reviewers as shown in figure 3.4. Disjunctive splits and joins are identified in figure 3.4 by XOR labels
and conjunctive splits and joins are unlabelled.
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T8
review p
T9
review p
Tnode3Tnode2
Tnode1 Tnode4
T10
collate
XOR split XOR join
from workflow to workflow
Figure 3.4: Paper submission and review BPAC segment
We define agent/role assignment as follows:
AR = {(Agent1,member) , (Agent1, editor) , (Agent2,member) ,
(Agent2, reviewer) , (Agent3,member) , (Agent3, reviewer) , . . .}
and task/role assignment:
TR = {(Task1, PCmember) , (Task6, editor) , (Task7, reviewer) ,
(Task8, reviewer) , (Task9, editor) , . . .}
then tests of constraints over workflow tasks are specified in respect of n worlds W = {W1, . . .Wn} as the
following workflow constraint policy (extracts):
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. . . , (Task6, test (¬hasAccessed (a,Task1,W ) ,W6)) ,
(Task7, test (¬hasAccessed (a,Task1,W )
∧¬hasAccessed (a,Task6,W )
∧¬hasAccessed (a,Task8,W )
∧¬hasAccessed (a,Task9,W ) ,W7)) ,
(Task8, test (¬hasAccessed (a,Task1,W )
∧¬hasAccessed (a,Task6,W )
∧¬hasAccessed (a,Task7,W )
∧¬hasAccessed (a,Task9,W ) ,W8)) ,
(Task9, test (¬hasAccessed (a,Task1,W )
∧¬hasAccessed (a,Task7,W )
∧¬hasAccessed (a,Task8,W ) ,W9)) , . . .
With this encoding we ensure that only the editor accesses task Task6 so long as she has not accessed
task Task1 and is not therefore the author of the paper. Subsequently, review tasks are either performed
by two reviewers, neither of whom is the editor nor the author, or the editor plus two reviewers. None
of the reviewers has already reviewed or is in the process of reviewing the paper. This encoding is
consistent with the key points identified in section 3.5.2.1. It demonstrates that a workflow-based access
control approach such as BPAC constrains access control through the application of traditional RBAC
via task-specific, dynamic constraints and by the progress from one task to another within the workflow
itself.
3.5.2.4 Conclusion
Enforcement of least privilege and segregation of duties within RW requires the addition of increasing
numbers of constraint terms as the policy requirements become more complex. RW uses statically mu-
tually exclusive roles to invoke SoD and as is pointed out in section 2.4.4, verification of enforceability of
static SoD by SMERs is intractable.
RW’s policy approach mixes roles, activities and role management. Consequently, setting up and main-
taining constraints that extend across activities or tasks within the role or activity context and without
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session histories is counterintuitive. Constraints are more naturally and economically applied by consid-
ering them within the centralised business process context.
Mutually exclusive roles are not, by themselves, sufficient to enforce dynamic segregation of duties. The
example above demonstrates that, without session histories, mutual exclusion can be circumvented by
establishing separate sessions through, for example, resigning roles.
The BPAC modelling environment addresses these limitations by shifting focus to centralised business
processes. Applying constraints to linked tasks simplifies the constraint management process. Session
histories maintained across business processes facilitates full dynamic SoD.
BPAC would be of limited usefulness if it was not able to correctly reveal security flaws that can also be
identified by existing access control modelling environments, such as RW. In chapter 8 we demonstrate
that the applied pi calculus implementation of BPAC can identify a security flaw in a simple conference
management system, as can RW and then we proceed to demonstrate security tests that are not possible
with RW such as the quantification of agent collusion and anonymity.
3.5.3 Practical examples — overall conclusions
A key problem with the application of RW, Cassandra and RBACs in general within complex workflows
is that the policy languages are agent-centric or role-centric i.e. the policy language and constraints
focus upon the definition of rules for agents or roles. Consequently, the implementation of least privilege
and segregation of duties constraints becomes more complex as the number of discrete tasks increases.
In effect, for each additional task, an additional constraint rule is added to the policy rules for each
agent/role. Also, design and management of the agent-centric or role-centric access control model is
counterintuitive. When managers consider countermeasures to security threats to their organisation they
do so from the organisation’s perspective and not from the employee’s or agent’s perspective. Access
controls from an organisational perspective are concerned primarily with rules to ascertain whether or
not processes or resources can be accessed by agents, that is, the rules attached to these processes or
resources define some set of properties that must be associated with an agent if she is to be permitted
access. Such rules can be attached directly to an organisation’s documented structures such as its
systems of financial control as exemplified by our BPAC modelling environment. Access control rules as
exemplified by Cassandra and RW specify, on the other hand, permissions assigned to agents in respect
of their capacity to access resources or to perform certain actions.
Without preconditions users may be able to exercise excessive levels of control over data and resources as
we observe in the example in section 3.5.1 above. Our thesis proposal provides for preconditions through
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simple workflow constructs and session histories.
Additionally, we observe through the examples above that dynamic segregation of duties, whilst a sig-
nificant requirement within business processes, is not always properly enacted with role-based access
control systems and the use of mutual exclusion of roles coupled with activation and deactivation of roles.
Our implementation of BPAC circumvents this deficiency by utilising session histories across business
processes.
Overall, therefore, our BPAC environment represents a paradigm shift towards a process-centric approach
to access control modelling so that constraints are applicable across the process space. This alternative
view simplifies the constraints process and attaches it to its natural environment: constraints are imple-
mentations of business rules and business rules are applied to the business processes of an organisation.
Full, dynamic segregation of duties is enacted across business processes through session histories and
strict least privilege is exercised through preconditions as workflows.
However, this is only part of the solution as the system also needs to incorporate mechanisms for formally
verifying that the application of global constraints properly achieves the required security objectives.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter we introduce our understanding of BPAC and of the security issues that we associate with
access control. We present a trivial 2-task workflow example to demonstrate how a workflow-based access
control model works and we discuss the security issues: satisfiability, collusion and anonymity in respect
of this trivial model. Subsequently, we present two practical examples of workflow-based access control
and discuss why current policy languages or modelling environments are not sufficient for the modelling
and analysis of these examples.
In the next chapter we present a simple practical workflow example in respect of a purchase order. We
revisit this workflow example in subsequent chapters as we develop our implementation of BPAC and
present the tools for security analysis.
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A simple workflow
4.1 Introduction
In a previous chapter we introduce the concept of workflow-based access control within the context of
business process management, which we call BPAC. In this chapter we present a simple example of a
workflow-based access control problem in BPAC, which we subsequently model in chapter 7 using the
applied pi calculus modelling environment of chapter 6.
4.2 A simple purchase order workflow
Financial transactions within organisations tend to follow sequences of predetermined steps. Different
agents of the organisation are required to perform processes that in total result in the completion of the
transaction under consideration. These sequences of steps can be visualised as workflows. The assignment
of agents to their respective processes is usually based upon a variety of properties associated with the
agent such as expertise, location, availability and authority within the organisation. It is generally in the
interest of the organisation that the most appropriate agents are assigned to the various processes. This
ensures that the transaction is performed to a high standard, in as timely and cost-effective means as
possible. As discussed above, role-based access control provides authorisation that matches appropriate
agents to processes and within BPAC we assume that specific resources are assigned to each process.
In a previous chapter, we discuss segregation (or separation) of duties (SoD) as a mechanism for the
prevention of fraudulent behaviour in respect of transactions within organisations. Except in the simplest
of circumstances, role-based access control is not by itself best suited to the enforcement of SoD. If,
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however, we combine the workflow properties of a transaction with role-based access control, we obtain
an authorisation mechanism that properly addresses SoD.
Consider the simple access control workflow representing a purchase order within some organisation as
set out in figure 4.1 and outlined in respect of task processes below. We assume that resources have been
assigned to each task so that they can be completed satisfactorily by agents. The workflow W comprises
a set of tasks T = {Task1, . . . , Task6} together with a precedence relation as follows:
F = {(Task1, Task2) , (Task2, Task3) , (Task2, Task4) , (Task3, Task5) ,
(Task4, Task5) , (Task5, Task6)}
with tasks:
• Task1 — an employee submits a request for a low-value item to the purchases department.
• Task2 — A purchase clerk, who has not submitted the request, processes the request, checks it
against available resources and prepares the purchase order.
• Task3 and Task4 — The purchase order is reviewed and approved by two different supervisors,
neither of whom submitted or processed the request and is returned to a purchases clerk.
• Task5 — The purchases clerk, who has not submitted the request and has not reviewed and
approved the order, processes the order only once it has been reviewed and approved by both
supervisors.
• Task6 — The employee who originated the request receives the order item and confirms that the
correct goods have been received in good condition.
Resources are assigned to each task to ensure their satisfactory completion and access to resources is
mediated by access control over the tasks.
Within this example access control is defined by role assignment and by dynamic constraints based upon
process history.
The workflow represents a sequence of connected tasks each requiring access by a single agent to perform
the duties associated with these tasks. Agents need different levels of organisational seniority to perform
the various tasks (agents are assigned to roles) and constraints are required to ensure that a minimum
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Task1 Task2
Task3
Task4
Task5 Task6
Agents
(Task4,supervisor),
(Task4,write(canAccess(a,Task4,w),W4)),
(Task4, test(¬hasAccessed(a,Task1,w)
∧¬hasAccessed(a,Task2,w)
∧¬canAccess(a,Task3,w),W4))
Workflow details
Task1 place order
Task2 check order to resources
Task3 review & approve payment
Task4 review & approve payment
Task5 process order
Task6 confirm goods received
KEY
Task1 ... Task6   
w    
Agents                    
W2... W6  
task identifiers 
workflow identifier
set of agents
store/worlds
(Task3,supervisor),
(Task3,write(canAccess
(a,Task3,w),W3)),
(Task3,test(¬hasAccessed(a,Task1,w)
∧¬hasAccessed(a,Task2,w)
∧¬canAccess(a,Task4,w),W3))
(Task2,clerk),
(Task2,test(¬hasAccessed(a,Task1,w),W2))
(Task1,employee)
(Task6,employee),
(Task6, test(hasAccessed(a,Task1,w) ,W6))
(Task5,clerk),
(Task5,test(¬hasAccessed(a,Task1,w)
∧¬hasAccessed(a,Task3,w)
∧¬hasAccessed(a,Task4,w), W5))
Figure 4.1: A simple purchase workflow
58
4.2 A simple purchase order workflow
number of agents of the appropriate level of seniority are needed to complete the entire workflow for
segregation of duties.
We define the following set of roles:
R = {employee, clerk, supervisor}
and set of agents:
A = {Agent1, Agent2, Agent3, Agent4, Agent5}
and the binary relation of agent/role assignments is given as follows:
AR = {(Agent1, employee) ,
(Agent2, employee) , (Agent2, clerk) ,
(Agent3, employee) , (Agent3, clerk) ,
(Agent4, employee) , (Agent4, clerk) ,
(Agent4, supervisor) ,
(Agent5, employee) , (Agent5, supervisor)}
As in the previous example of chapter 3 a basic RBAC constraint for this example is provided by the
following task/role mapping:
TR = {(Task1, employee) , (Task2, clerk) ,
(Task3, supervisor) , (Task4, supervisor) ,
(Task5, clerk) , (Task6, employee)}
So that (Task1, employee) models that the agent mapped to task Task1 must have role employee,(Task2, clerk) the agent mapped to Task2 must have role clerk etc.
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Over this RBAC-based access control model we consider dynamic segregation of duties constraints as
policy rules, in respect of a store represented by a set of worlds W = {W1, . . . ,W6}, as follows:
(Task2, test (¬hasAccessed (a,Task1,W ) ,W2)) ,
(Task3,write (canAccess (a,Task3,W ) ,W3)) ,
(Task3, test (¬hasAccessed (a,Task1,W )
∧¬hasAccessed (a,Task2,W )
∧¬canAccess (a,Task4,W ) ,W3)) ,
(Task4,write (canAccess (a,Task4,W ) ,W4)) ,
(Task4, test (¬hasAccessed (a,Task1,W )
∧¬hasAccessed (a,Task2,W )
∧¬canAccess (a,Task3,W ) ,W4)) ,
(Task5, test (¬hasAccessed (a,Task1,W )
∧¬hasAccessed (a,Task3,W )
∧¬hasAccessed (a,Task4,W ) ,W5)) ,
(Task6, test (hasAccessed (a,Task1,W ) ,W6))
i.e. the agent mapped to task Task2 cannot have been mapped to task Task1 etc. By this method we
avoid the complexity that arises with SMER matrices. However, we rely upon stateful resolution of our
constraints when we test our access control model against the set of worlds W. We note the use of a
‘write’ before ‘test’ as outlined in section 3.3.11 for parallel tasks Task3 and Task4, with the appropriate
constraint tests to ensure that an agent accessing task Task3 cannot concurrently access task Task4and
vice versa.
4.3 Summary
In this chapter we present a simple workflow-based access control model, which is representative of a
typical financial transaction within an organisation, namely a low value purchase order. Following a
narrative discussion of the financial transaction and its access control requirements, we then present the
transaction in detail as a workflow-based access control process.
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In the next chapter we detail the syntax and semantics of the applied pi calculus that forms the basis of
our access control model. In chapter 6 we develop a modelling environment for BPAC based upon the
applied pi calculus of chapter 5. In chapter 7 we apply the modelling environment of chapter 6 to the
simple workflow example outlined in this chapter.
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Applied pi calculus for BPAC
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we present a simple practical example of a workflow-based access control process
in BPAC as motivation for the development of our modelling environment. In this chapter, we turn
our attention to the basis for our modelling environment, namely, the applied pi calculus of Abadi and
Fournet [3]. We summarise the syntax and semantics below and we extend the calculus with syntactic
sugar so that our modelling environment is more concise and easier to read. Syntactic sugaring is a
common technique for hiding the details of reusable blocks of process algebra code so as to aid human
understanding and to simplify modelling and analysis with the code. Writing complex code can be error
prone and sugaring can mitigate against these errors. The technique is exemplified by the definition
of Casper [80] as a high level derivative of CSP that aids comprehension of protocol models and yet
facilitates analysis of protocol examples.
5.2 Applied pi calculus
Abadi and Fournet’s applied pi calculus is a powerful, more comprehensible extension of Milner’s pi
calculus. It adds functions, an equational theory and separate identification of names and variables to
pi calculus whilst maintaining the underlying theory. The applied pi calculus has often been applied to
analysis of security protocols, particularly in respect of authentication such as Abadi et al’s modelling
of Just-fast keying [4] and Ryan et al’s analysis of anonymity [9] and privacy within electronic voting
protocols [57, 35]. Its expressive syntax and ability to handle concurrent processes, coupled with powerful
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L,M,N,T,U, V ∶∶=
a, b, c, . . . , k, . . .m,n, . . . , s name
x, y, z variable
f (M1, . . . ,Ml) function
ã and x̃ represent tuples over names and variables respectively.
Table 5.1: Terms
pk (y) public key of y where y is a key seed
sk (y) secret key of y where y is a key seed
key (y) symmetric key of y where y is a key seed
enc (x, y) encryption of x with key y
dec (x, y) decryption of x with key y
encs (x, y) signature encryption of x with key y
decs (x, y) signature decryption of x with key y
ok constant symbol
true true symbol
false false symbol
hit hit symbol
miss miss symbol∅ empty set
fst ((x, y)) first element of a pair
snd ((x, y)) second element of a pair
fst ((x, y, z)) first element of a triple
snd ((x, y, z)) second element of a triple
thd ((x, y, z)) third element of a triple
fst ((x, y, z,w)) first element of a 4-tuple
snd ((x, y, z,w)) second element of a 4-tuple
thd ((x, y, z,w)) third element of a 4-tuple
fth ((x, y, z,w)) fourth element of a 4-tuple
Table 5.2: Function terms
analytical tools such as observational equivalence, make the applied pi calculus a suitable environment
for BPAC.
5.3 Syntax and semantics
We define a signature Σ as comprising a finite set of function symbols together with an equational theory.
Terms are defined in table 5.1 as per the applied pi calculus [3] and comprise infinite sets of variables and
names together with function symbols f with arity l that range over Σ.
Function terms that are used within the modelling environment include terms for encryption and signature
checking together with pair and tuple manipulation terms as outlined in table 5.2. Additionally, we use
data function terms of arity n as per ProVerif to represent predicates [22]. These data functions are
essentially named n-tuples that can be constructed and deconstructed by an attacker.
The equational theory consists of a finite set of equational axioms. It includes typical cryptographic equa-
tions for symmetric and asymmetric encryption together with tuple destructors as outlined in table 5.3.
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dec (enc (x, pk (y)) , sk (y)) = x asymmetric encryption
decs (encs (x, sk (y)) , pk (y)) = x signature checking
fst ((x, y)) = x pair destructor — first element
snd ((x, y)) = y pair destructor — second element
fst ((x, y, z)) = x triple destructor — first element
snd ((x, y, z)) = y triple destructor — second element
thd ((x, y, z)) = z triple destructor — third element
fst ((x, y, z,w)) = x 4-tuple destructor — first element
snd ((x, y, z,w)) = y 4-tuple destructor — second element
thd ((x, y, z,w)) = z 4-tuple destructor — third element
fth ((x, y, z,w)) = w 4-tuple destructor — fourth element
Table 5.3: Equational axioms
P,Q,R ∶∶=
0 inaction
P ∣ Q parallel composition
!P replication
νn.P name restriction
u ⟨N⟩ .P output
u (x) .P input
if M = N then P else Q conditional
Table 5.4: Plain processes
Plain processes (table 5.4) of the applied pi calculus are adopted for the modelling environment and are
defined in the same manner as per Abadi and Fournet [3]. Specifically, the null process 0 does nothing,
P ∣ Q represents the parallel running of two processes P and Q, !P is multiple parallel processes P , νn.P
creates a new private name n and then runs as P , u ⟨N⟩ .P sends message N on channel u then behaves
as process P , u (x) .P receives a message on channel u then replaces variable x with the message in P
and if M = N then P else Q represents a typical conditional that branches on the equality or otherwise
of M and N , proceeding as P or Q as appropriate.
Extended processes and their semantics are adopted in their entirety from Abadi and Fournet [3] without
amendment as per table 5.5. The active substitution {M/x} replaces all instances of variable x that it
touches with M and usually arises as the consequence of the output of M to the environment.
When discussing the scope of names and variables we often refer to sets of free or bound names and
variables. Binding of scope occurs through the application of the restriction νn or νx or input a (x). The
sets of bound names and variables in A are written bn (A) (resp. bv (A)) and the sets of free names and
variables in A are written fn (A) (resp. fv (A)). An extended process is closed if all process variables
are bound or defined by an active substitution. A frame (usually referred to as ϕ or ψ [3]) is an extended
process constructed from 0 and active substitutions {M/x}.
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A,B,C ∶∶=
P plain process
A ∣ B parallel composition
νx.A variable restriction
νn.A name restriction{M/x} active substitution
Table 5.5: Extended processes
5.3.1 Syntactic sugar
We define the following syntactic sugar to simplify the modelling process.
5.3.1.1 Internal process
We adopt τ to represent an undefined internal process. The exact nature of this internal process is not
of importance to us as it is merely used as a sequential placeholder, particularly when a conditional
statement is placed at the end of a process.
5.3.1.2 Trigger process
It is sometimes necessary to provide communication in which the actual message is not relevant to a
process as a whole. For example, two sequential task processes, T1 and T2, say, that comprise a simple
sequential workflow can be implemented as two parallel processes linked by a communication:
νt, a. (T1.t ⟨a⟩ ∣ t (x) .T2)
The new name a is arbitrary and does not occur in either T1 or T2. Consequently, we represent such
communication as per Puhlmann and Weske [77]:
νt. (T1.t ∣ t.T2)
wherein t and t are private triggers and this representation is sufficient to enable us to model various
workflow structures as outlined by Puhlmann and Weske [77].
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5.3.1.3 Summation process
Modelling workflows may sometimes require non-deterministic branching to emulate decision processes.
In traditional pi calculus this is represented by the summation operator +:
(νv.p ⟨v⟩ .v (x) .P ) + q ⟨w⟩ .Q
This process proceeds as follows: a fresh name v is declared and sent over channel p then v becomes a
channel over which some message is received that substitutes for variable x in process P and the process
q ⟨w⟩ .Q is lost. Alternatively, name w is sent over channel q then the process proceeds as Q and process
νv.p ⟨v⟩ .v (x) .P is lost.
We can replicate the summation operator in the above example in the applied pi calculus as follows:
νint. (int ∣ int. (νv.p ⟨v⟩ .v (x) .P ) ∣ int. (q ⟨w⟩ .Q))
Where int is a freshly declared trigger. Either int. (νv.p ⟨v⟩ .v (x) .P ) or int. (q ⟨w⟩ .Q) proceed depending
upon which int is triggered.
In general, therefore, we use + as defined as follows:
P +Q ≜ νint. (int ∣ int.P ∣ int.Q)
where P and Q are normal processes.
5.3.1.4 Restricted active substitution
The restricted active substitution υx. ({M/x} ∣ P ) is represented by let x = M in P , which is more
intuitive.
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1. Abelian monoid laws
A ∣ 0 ≡ A
A ∣ B ≡ B ∣ A
A ∣ (B ∣ C) ≡ (A ∣ B) ∣ C
2. replication law
!P ≡!P ∣ P
3. scope laws
νu.0 ≡ 0
νu.νv.A ≡ νv.νu.A
νu. (A ∣ B) ≡ A ∣ νu.B
where u ∉ fv (A) ∪ fn (A)
4. substitution laws
νx.{M/x} ≡ 0{M/x} ∣ A ≡ {M/x} ∣ A{M/x}{M/x} ≡ {N/x}
when Σ ⊢M = N
Table 5.6: Structural congruences
5.3.1.5 Product operator
We use a product operator to represent multiple parallel processes of similar syntactic form so that:
∏
n
Pn ≜ P1 ∣ P2 ∣ . . . ∣ Pn
5.3.2 Operational semantics
We adopt the structural equivalence forms of the applied pi calculus where the structural equivalence ≡, is
the least equivalence on extended processes that is closed under α conversion on variables and names, by
application of evaluation contexts and is given by the definitions in table 5.6 [3]. Contexts and evaluation
contexts are defined in section 5.3.4.
Furthermore, we adopt the internal reduction forms of the applied pi calculus where internal reduction→ is the least relation on extended processes closed by structural congruence such that the expressions
of table 5.7 hold.
5.3.3 Labelled operational semantics
The semantics of section 5.3.2 are extended to incorporate interactions between extended processes and
their environment via an input label a (M) or output labels of the form a ⟨u⟩ or (νu)a ⟨u⟩, where M is
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communication
a ⟨x⟩ .P ∣ a (x) .Q→ P ∣ Q
conditional
if M = N then P else Q→ P
for ground terms M and N s.t. Σ ⊢M = N
if M = N then P else Q→ Q
for ground terms M and N s.t. Σ ⊬M = N
Table 5.7: Internal reduction
out-atom
a ⟨u⟩ .P a⟨u⟩Ð→ P
in
a (x) .P a(M)Ð→ P {M/x}
open-atom
A
a⟨u⟩Ð→ A′ u ≠ a
νu.A
νu.a⟨u⟩Ð→ A′
scope
A
αÐ→ A′ u does not occur in α
νu.A
αÐ→ νu.A′
par
A
αÐ→ A′ bv (α) ∩ fv (B) = bn (α) ∩ fn (B) = ∅
A ∣ B αÐ→ A′ ∣ B
struct
A ≡ B B αÐ→ B′ B′ ≡ A′
A
αÐ→ A′
Table 5.8: Labelled operational semantics
a term containing names or variables and u is a channel name or name of base type as per Abadi and
Fournet [3]. The labelled semantics rules are defined as per table 5.8.
5.3.4 Observational equivalence
We adopt the full definition of observational equivalence as per Abadi and Fournet [3]. Intuitively,
observational equivalence is when two processes cannot be differentiated by an outside observer regardless
of the context that the observer may apply to them. This is a powerful analytical tool for establishing
secrecy properties of processes. We define the barb A ⇓ a wherein A is permitted to send a message on
a. We define a context C [_] in the usual way as an expression with a hole. If C [A] is closed then C [_]
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closes A. An evaluation context is a context with a hole that is not under a conditional, input, output
or replication.
Definition 16
Observational equivalence (≈) is the largest symmetric relation R between signature closed extended pro-
cesses with the same domain such that AR B implies:
1. A ⇓ a then B ⇓ a,
2. if AÐ→∗ A′ then B Ð→∗ B′ and A′ R B′ for some B′ and
3. C [A] R C [B] for closing evaluation contexts C [_].
Next we adopt the rules for static equivalence and labelled bisimilarity in respect of the labelled opera-
tional semantics defined in section 5.3.3 above.
5.3.5 Static equivalence
Static equivalence is defined as per Abadi and Fournet [3]. Static equivalence is, in effect, the static
part of observational equivalence and is therefore concerned with equivalence between processes (or more
specifically their frames) up to their current state and is not concerned with the future transitions that
the processes may subsequently undergo.
Definition 17
Two terms M and N are equal in the frame ϕ iff ϕ ≡ νn˜.σ, Mσ = Nσ and {n˜} ∩ (fn (M) ∪ fn (N)) = ∅
for some names n˜ and substitution σ modulo the equational theory.
Definition 18
Two closed frames ϕ and ψ are statically equivalent, written ϕ ≈s ψ, when dom (ϕ) = dom (ψ) and when,
for all terms M and N , we have Mϕ = Nϕ iff Mψ = Nψ.
Two closed extended processes A and B are statically equivalent, written A ≈s B, when their frames are
statically equivalent.
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5.3.6 Labelled bisimilarity
Observational equivalence requires quantification over all extended contexts and is very difficult to use.
Labelled bisimilarity represents a more practical alternative to observational equivalence that utilises
static equivalence to establish equivalence between frames and then compares the dynamics of processes
under a set of interactions with an outside observer that is specified by the labelled semantics of sec-
tion 5.3.3.
Definition 19
Labelled bisimilarity (≈l) is the largest symmetric relation R on closed extended processes such that AR B
implies:
1. A ≈s B;
2. if AÐ→∗ A′ then there exists B′ s.t. B Ð→∗ B′ and A′ R B′;
3. if A
αÐ→ A′ and fv (α) ⊆ dom (A) and bn (α) ∩ fn (B) = ∅, then
B Ð→∗ αÐ→Ð→∗ B′ and A′ R B′
An important theorem per Abadi and Fournet is as follows:
Theorem 1
Observational equivalence is labelled bisimilarity (≈=≈l).
This theorem was introduced by Abadi and Fournet in their paper “Mobile Values, New Names and
Secure Communication” [3] and we make use of this in our security analysis of chapter 8 without further
discussion or proof.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter we present the syntax and semantics of the applied pi calculus together with such additions
as we consider necessary for our access control modelling environment. Whilst the basic applied pi calculus
of Abadi and Fournet [3] is sufficiently expressive for our needs we add some syntactic sugar to simplify
the modelling process such as triggers and the sequential placeholder τ .
In the next chapter we present the core components of our implementation of BPAC in the applied pi
calculus.
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The applied pi calculus implementation
of BPAC
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we describe the applied pi calculus as the basis for our model implementation of
BPAC. In this chapter we present the core components of the access control modelling environment.
For the purpose of modelling workflow-based access control, we identify three core processes that we
use to represent the key components of a workflow-based access control system: the agent, the task and
the workflow manager. These three processes interact in a specified way that we call the standard core
protocol. Also, we specify store and set handling processes that provide the toolkit for implementation
of role-based access control with dynamic constraints based upon access history. Next, we discuss the
initialisation process, which is a crucial component of the workflow modelling environment. This process
initialises names used in the model, runs the set and store processes and pre-populates the stores as
necessary. Finally, we present the translation of the BPAC environment to the applied pi calculus
implementation followed by a summary of the complete model.
6.2 The programming environment: the applied pi calculus
We present the applied pi calculus, its syntax and semantics, together with the additional syntactic com-
ponents required for our modelling environment in chapter 5. We adopt the equational theory specified
in section 5.3 of chapter 5 and this provides us with functions that can be used, for example, to replicate
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key creation, public key encryption and decryption and signature creation and verification as well as tuple
creation and deconstruction.
6.3 The applied pi calculus model formalism
6.3.1 The standard core protocol
Figure 6.1 displays the process components that we use to create workflow-based access control models
with the applied pi calculus. The interaction between these processes follows a prescribed form, which we
refer to as the standard core protocol, and complex workflow examples are constructed from a number
of standard core protocol interactions linked together by Puhlmann and Weske trigger constructs [77].
The full detail of the coding of the standard core protocol is presented in appendix A but the principle
feature of the protocol is that agent, workflow manager and task processes communicate with each other
using public key encryption over a public (unbound) channel. Access control policies are tested by the
workflow manager against store processes via private communication channels. The stores are updated
by task processes as necessary to provide stateful access control information for dynamic constraints.
6.3.2 Tasks
Task processes are representations of BPAC tasks within the applied pi calculus model. We are not
concerned with modelling details of a specific task, that is, neither the details of work performed within
a task nor the precise identity of resources associated with the task are of concern to us. However, we are
interested in how these tasks interact with agent and workflow manager processes given a collection of
access control constraints. Task processes interact with stores by writing access control state information
to them over internal private communication channels.
6.3.3 Agents
Agent processes are used within the applied pi calculus workflow model to represent human or computer
agents in the BPAC environment. A typical workflow model incorporates a number of unique agent
processes that are capable of public channel encrypted interaction with workflow tasks via a workflow
manager.
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6.3.4 The workflow manager
The workflow manager process is a central mediator between agent, task and store processes. We do
not have a direct analogy for this process within the BPAC model but we can consider this process
as facilitating the application of the workflow-based access control policy within BPAC. The workflow
manager comprises a number of sub-processes called task-calls that are linked together using triggers to
represent the workflow structure of the BPAC model.
6.3.4.1 Task-call sub-processes
Task-call sub-processes implement access control policy in respect of specific task and agent process
interactions. These sub-processes test access control constraints for agent processes seeking access to
tasks against information in the stores, over internal private channels. If the constraint is satisfied,
the sub-process initiates encrypted communication over a public channel between the agent and task
processes, otherwise the process halts.
6.3.5 The stores
In order that we can properly model static and dynamic constraints over workflow models we set up a
number of memory stores for our static and dynamic data. We can write information to these stores via
suitable processes. Also, we can test information as data functions against the stored information and we
can delete store entries if necessary. Usually, we adopt a store for our agent/role assignments, which we
call R, and a dynamic constraint store S. Workflows modelled under BPAC enact access control policy
rules through private channel interaction between workflow processes and the stores. We discuss stores
in greater detail later in this chapter.
6.3.6 The initialisation process — M
The initialisation process M has no analogy in the BPAC model. Within the applied pi calculus model
we require certain names to be declared so that they are private in scope across the model. These names
include key seeds for public key encryption as part of the core protocol that have to be kept private and
secret from an outside observer of the workflow model. Also, the stores and supporting processes have to
be run as ongoing parallel processes for the duration of the model run and these have to be pre-populated
with standing information such as agent/role assignment. Process M satisfies this requirement prior to
the running of the workflow model.
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Workflow
Task Call
Agent Task
Stores
Workflow-based access control
Figure 6.1: the standard core protocol
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6.3.7 Summary
We outline the basic processes that are used to generate our workflow model in the applied pi calculus
and we discuss how these processes represent the BPAC access control model. We return to each of these
sections in more detail in the following sections as we present the macros used to build our representation
of the workflow model in the applied pi calculus.
6.4 The standard core protocol
When the workflow manager W per section 6.7 interacts, via a single task-call sub-process, with a single
task Tj per section 6.5 and a single agent Ai per 6.6, as indicated by figure 6.1, then this interaction
comprises a number of encrypted communication steps over a public channel as discussed in detail in
appendix A. We call this interaction the standard core protocol C. Complex workflows are built from
a number of instances of the standard core protocol constructed by linking together multiple task-call
sub-processes using Puhlmann and Weske trigger patterns [77].
6.5 Tasks
The task process represents a collection of resources associated with an atomic process within an organ-
isation as per the BPAC model. For the purpose of our model, the task is represented as an applied
pi calculus process that engages in encrypted communication over a public channel with the workflow
manager and agents. Successful access to a task by an agent is represented by the passing of a message
MTj from the j
th task process to the agent. If a process has access to the message MTj , it has access to
the resources of task Tj . We use the following syntactic sugar to represent the core components of a task
process Tj , the details of which are outlined in appendix A:
task ⟨⟨IDTj ,KTj ,MTj , [] , []⟩⟩
where IDTj is an identity name for the task created by the workflow manager, KTj is a key seed associated
with public key encrypted communication of the task process and MTj represents the task resources.
The pair of holes indicated by [] are spaces for possible interactions between the task process and the
stores. These spaces are optional. The detailed coding of the task process, as outlined in appendix A
section A.5.1, includes as standard a write command to store S that records that an agent has accessed
75
6.6 Agents
the task: W (S) (hasAccessed (IDA, IDT , IDW )). Usually these holes are populated with a τ to indicate
an internal process as the inbuilt write commands are generally sufficient.
The term IDTj is created and passed to the task process by the workflow manager process and the terms
KTj and MTj are free in task ⟨⟨IDTj ,KTj ,MTj , [] , []⟩⟩. Key seed KTj is declared new as part of the
initialisation process M whilst MTj is a public name.
Based on the above, a task Taska without additional user-generated code is defined as follows:
Taska ≜ task ⟨⟨IDTa ,KTa ,MTa , [τ] , [τ]⟩⟩
and a task Taskb that deletes a term review (IDA, p) from the store S and writes a new term
submitted (IDA, p) to the store S via private channels is written as follows:
Taskb ≜ task ⟨⟨IDTb ,KTb ,MTb , [D (S) (review (IDA, p))] ,
[W (S) (submitted (IDA, p))]⟩⟩
6.6 Agents
The agent process represents an employee (or perhaps a computer program) within an organisation who
is required to interact with resources subject to access control constraints. Within our applied pi calculus
modelling environment we represent the core components of an agent process Ai by the following syntactic
sugar, a detailed explanation of which is presented in appendix A:
agent ⟨⟨IDAi ,KAi⟩⟩
where IDAi is an agent identifier name and KAi is a key seed associated with agent Ai. This agent
process uses public key encryption, with private and public keys generated from the key seed KAi , to
communicate over a public channel with workflow and task processes. Generally, IDAi represents a secret
known by both the organisation and the agent/employee and KAi is likely to be known by the agent only.
We declare both names as fresh at the start of the model run so that IDAi can be used within the stores
for agent/role assignment and KAi remains constant over multiple instances of the agent process.
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6.7 The workflow manager
The workflow manager initiates a task session in accordance with a workflow blueprint and coordinates
the communication between the agent and the task. In particular, the workflow manager tests a com-
municating agent against the sets of constraints contained within the stores and allows or otherwise the
direct interaction between agent and task processes.
A workflow is built up from parallel sub-processes, which we call task-calls. Task-calls are linked by
internal communication that recreates workflow patterns in the style of Puhlmann and Weske [77].
6.7.1 Implementing constraints
As we discuss in previous chapters, workflow-based access control depends upon the verification of static
and dynamic constraints. Static constraints include such properties as agent/role and task/role assign-
ments and in the BPAC model per chapter 3 we specify agent/role assignments as pairs. For example,
the pair:
(Agent1, employee)
represents the fact that agent Agent1 is mapped to the role employee. In the applied pi calculus modelling
environment this data pair is represented by the data function, where data functions are as defined in
section 5.3:
role (IDAgent1 , employee)
An example of a task/role assignment pair given in chapter 4 is:
(Task1, employee)
representing the access control constraint that the agent assigned to task Task1 must have the role
employee. In our modelling environment this access control constraint is represented by a test performed
by a workflow manager process against a store of agent/role assignments:
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T (R) (role (idA, employee)) ∶
This can be interpreted as: test agent/role store R to see if there exists data function role (idA, employee)
for some agent identity substituted for idA (idA is a variable that is assigned the identity name of the
agent that is attempting to access a specific task) representing the agent/role assignment pair:
(Agent, employee)
and if true then continue. Note that the task identity is not included within the test syntax. This is
because the test is incorporated within a task-call sub-process of the workflow process that calls the
relevant task.
Dynamic constraints, such as agent/task access, are represented in a similar manner to static constraints
only this time the data function representing the constraint is written to a different constraint store S
during the workflow process and tests against the constraint store are performed within the task-call
processes of the workflow manager.
An example of a dynamic constraint given in chapter 4 is:
(Task2, test (¬hasAccessed (a,Task1,W ) ,W))
meaning that the agent that accesses task Task2 cannot be the same agent who accessed task Task1
under store/world W.
In our modelling environment this constraint is implemented using a data function that represents the
fact that an agent has accessed some task. The data function is written to the store S by a task process.
A subsequent task-call sub-process within the workflow process tests for the existence of the data function
within the store S. For example, our dynamic constraint given above is represented as follows:
Firstly, task process Task1 writes to the store S that an agent, Agent1, has accessed Task1 within
workflow W , using the following syntax:
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W (S) (hasAccessed (IDAgent1 , IDTask1 , IDW ))
where IDAgent1 , IDTask1 and IDW are unique identifiers respectively for agent Agent1, task Task1 and
workflow W . The term hasAccessed () is a three argument data function such that:
hasAccessed (IDAgent1 , IDTask1 , IDW )
can be interpreted as agent Agent1 has accessed task Task1 within workflow W .
Having written the data function to the store, a test on the existence of the data function within the
store S can now be performed by the task-call sub-process of the workflow process W . For example, if we
wish to constrain access to task Task2 as per our example above, the task-call process within workflow
W , which facilitates access to task Task2, tests using the following syntax:
T (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDT1 , IDW )) ∶ 0 ∶
This can be interpreted as: if the data function hasAccessed (idA, IDT1 , IDW ) with an agent identity
substituted for variable idA exists in store S then halt the process otherwise continue.
6.7.2 Task-calls
Task-calls are the main working components of workflow processes. A task-call mediates the interaction
between an agent and a task through interrogation of a number of stores. Task-calls never exist outside
of a workflow manager process. We represent the task-call process by the following syntactic sugar:
taskCall ⟨⟨IDTm ,KTm , IDW ,KW , []⟩⟩
Where IDTm is a fresh identity for a new task instance, KT is the key seed associated with the task
process and IDW and KW represent the identity and key seed associated with the workflow manager
process W . The hole is used to specify the query or nest of queries that are applied against the stores.
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An example of a task-call incorporated within a workflow manager process W (as indicated by the
inclusion of identity IDW and key seed KW ) using this syntax is:
TaskCall2 ≜ νIDT2 .taskCall ⟨⟨IDT2 ,KT2 , IDW ,KW ,
[(T (R) (role (IDA, clerk)) ∶
T (S) (hasAccessed (IDA, IDT1 , IDW )) ∶ 0 ∶)]⟩⟩
where an instance of the task process identified by the key seed KT2 is assigned a fresh identity IDT2
and the task is advertised on the public channel. Once the task identity has been picked up by an agent
process then the task manager checks the credentials of the agent against the stores using the T (R) andT (S) test processes. On a satisfactory outcome the workflow manager then facilitates communication
between the successful agent and the task.
6.7.3 Combining task-calls to create workflows
In order to create our workflow-based access control models we combine a number of parallel task-calls
represented by the sub-process TaskCall using Puhlmann and Weske workflow modelling [77]. Firstly,
we initialise channel triggers tn for the workflow and task identities IDT . The reason that these names
are declared within the workflow process W and not within the initialisation process M is that we
want to ensure that these names are always fresh for each workflow model instance. This ensures that
multiple instances of workflows do not trigger each other and freshness of task identities contributes to
the uniqueness property of our modelling environment, which is discussed in chapter 8.
A simple example of workflow manager coding is as follows:
Consider a simple workflow comprising four tasks, task 1 is followed by both tasks 2 and 3 in parallel
then task 4 follows after the completion of both tasks 2 and 3. Our workflow manager for this particular
workflow would be as follows assuming that there are no access constraints:
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Control flow patterns Name
P1.t1∣ t1.Q1 Sequence
P1. (t1 ∣ t2) ∣ t1.Q1 ∣ t2.Q2 Parallel split
P1.t1 ∣ P2.t2 ∣ t1.t2.Q1 Synchronization
P1. (t1 + t2) ∣ t1.Q1 ∣ t2.Q2 Exclusive choice
P1.t1 ∣ P2.t1 ∣ t1.Q1 Simple merge
Table 6.1: Basic Puhlmann and Weske workflow constructs
W ≜ νt2, t3, t4a, t4b, IDW , IDT1 , IDT2 , IDT3 , IDT4 .
(taskCall ⟨⟨IDT1 ,KT1 , IDW ,KW , []⟩⟩ . (t2 ∣ t3)
∣ t2.taskCall ⟨⟨IDT2 ,KT2 , IDW ,KW , []⟩⟩ .t4a
∣ t3.taskCall ⟨⟨IDT3 ,KT3 , IDW ,KW , []⟩⟩ .t4b
∣ t4a.t4b.taskCall ⟨⟨IDT4 ,KT4 , IDW ,KW , []⟩⟩)
This example demonstrates the coding for a workflow incorporating series and parallel components as
follows:
following taskCall ⟨⟨IDT1 ,KT1 , IDW ,KW , []⟩⟩, two parallel triggers (t2 ∣ t3) are sent that are received
by processes t2.taskCall ⟨⟨IDT2 ,KT2 , IDW ,KW , []⟩⟩ .t4a and t3.taskCall ⟨⟨IDT3 ,KT3 , IDW ,KW , []⟩⟩ .t4b.
On completion, both of these processes send triggers t4a and t4b and both of these have to be received
by parallel process t4a.t4b.taskCall ⟨⟨IDT4 ,KT4 , IDW ,KW , []⟩⟩ in order for it to continue.
There are numerous alternative coding constructs identified by Puhlmann and Weske to enable various
complex workflow constructs, like path choice, multi-choice and multiple instances, to be encoded in the
pi calculus (and the applied pi calculus by extension). We summarise the basic constructs in table 6.1
where P1, P2, Q1 and Q2 are plain processes and t1 and t2 are triggers.
6.8 Modelling the store
In section 6.3.5 we introduce stores as a key requirement for modelling workflow-based access control.
A store provides the means by which static and dynamic segregation of duties is enforced across tasks
within workflows. In essence, when an agent is permitted access to task resources then the agent identity,
role and task identity are written to a store. Subsequent access attempts to task resources by agents can
then be tested against the store as part of the task access control policy.
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For example, we consider a simple workflow W comprising two sequential tasks, T1 and T2, two agents
A1 and A2, agent roles employee and clerk with role employee assigned to A1 and roles employee and
clerk assigned to A2. We define an access control policy as follows:
1. Task T1 can be accessed by an agent with role employee
2. Task T2 can be accessed by an agent with role clerk
3. Task T2 cannot be accessed by an agent who has accessed task T1
Policy rule 3. enforces dynamic segregation of duties across the workflow, ensuring that no one agent can
have complete control of the workflow and workflow resources.
To model this access control example we require a set of agent/role assignments R that can be interrogated
by the model and a store S. Constraints are represented as data functions as we discuss in section 6.7.1
above. In the case of task T1, an agent attempts access to T1 and the system queries the agent/role
assignment for the agent against R. If the agent/role assignment satisfies the access rule 1, the system
permits access for the agent and writes to the store S that the agent with role employee has accessed T1.
Once access control has passed to T2 and an agent attempts access to T2 then the system verifies the
agent/role assignment against R as before and additionally checks the store S as to whether or not the
agent has accessed T1. If the agent/role assignment satisfies rule 2 and if the agent has not accessed T1,
the system permits access for the agent and writes to the store that the agent with role clerk has accessed
task T2.
In applied pi calculus the store model requires processes to represent set handling:
6.8.1 Modelling sets
We use stores to retain both static and dynamic constraint information against which access control prop-
erties can be verified within an access control example. Initially, it was considered that a simple addition
to our definition of function terms, coupled with a basic equational theory to provide idempotency and
commutativity, as per Abadi and Blanchet [4, 22], would be sufficient for our store requirements. How-
ever, it was discovered that a membership deletion function is necessary for our modelling environment
and such a function is inconsistent with the equational theory. Consequently, it was decided that sets
would be implemented as lists with defined processes manipulating these lists. Strictly speaking, the sets
produced by this method are represented by ordered lists where the order is based upon the temporal
relationship of set updates.
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We implement lists in the calculus as nested pairs so that the head of the list is the first element in
the outermost pair, the tail of the list is the second element in the outermost pair and the store process
initialises the list with an empty set symbol.
Definitions of key processes for set manipulation are given below. The processes are hierarchical in that
headSet and tailSet extend the pair destructors that are defined within our applied pi calculus syntax
in chapter 5 so as to properly output the empty set symbol if that is the only member of the list. The
memberSet process utilises headSet and tailSet to identify whether or not an input message is present
or otherwise in the list. The insertMem process utilises memberSet and adds an input message to a
list if it is not already in the list. The deleteMem process utilise memberSet, the headSet and tailset
processes to remove an input message from the list if it is in the list.
The processes as stated initially utilise an unbound channel set for communication with other processes
and messages are not encrypted. Subsequently, fresh channels provided by the communicating processes
are utilised. In practice, it is assumed that set handling is an internal server matter and channel set
is restricted in scope over the extent of the access control model. Consequently, the contents of these
processes are not exposed to an attacker.
6.8.1.1 headSet process
This process as listed below takes an input message and checks that the first component of the message
matches the instruction term head. If the third component M matches the empty set term ∅ then,
utilising the second component as a fresh channel set1, the process returns a message ∅ otherwise the
process returns the first element of M on channel set1.
headSet ≜ set (instr, set1,M)
.if instr = head then
if M = ∅ then set1 ⟨∅⟩
else set1 ⟨fst (M)⟩
6.8.1.2 tailSet process
This process as listed below takes an input message and checks that the first component of the message
matches the instruction term tail. If the third componentM matches the empty set term ∅ then, utilising
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the second component as a fresh channel set1, the process returns a message ∅ otherwise the process
returns the second element of M on channel set1.
tailSet ≜ set (instr, set1,M)
if instr = tail then
if M = ∅ then set1 ⟨∅⟩
else set1 ⟨snd (M)⟩
6.8.1.3 memberSet process
The memberSet process represents an element member check against the head element in a list followed,
if a match is not achieved, by a recursive procedure on the tail of the list.
The process listed below first creates an internal private channel set1 then it takes an input message
comprising four terms and checks that the first component of the message matches the instruction term
member. Subsequently, the process creates a new instance of an internal parallel process by internally
passing a message comprising the second, third and fourth elements of the original message. The second
element represents a fresh channel, the third element represents a name to be checked for membership
against the fourth element that represents a list. If the fourth element, M , matches the empty set term∅ then, utilising the second component as a fresh channel set1, the process returns a message false.
Alternatively, the process makes a call to the headSet process with M and receives a message headM on
a fresh channel (being the first element of the list), then a call to tailSet with M and receives a message
tailM (being the tail of the list). Now the process checks the test variable against the head variable
headM and sends message true on the fresh channel, otherwise a new instance of the process is initialised
using message tailM .
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memberSet ≜ νset1. (set (instr, set4, x1,M1)
.if instr =member then set1 ⟨set4, x1,M1⟩)
∣! (set1 (mem,x,M) .if M = ∅ thenmem ⟨false⟩
else νheadch. (set ⟨head, headch,M⟩ .headch (headM))
.νtailch. (set ⟨tail, tailch,M⟩ .tailch (tailM))
.if x = headM thenmem ⟨true⟩
else νset5. (set1 ⟨set5, x, tailM⟩)))
6.8.1.4 insertMem process
This process represents element insertion into a list provided that the element is not already present in
the list.
On receipt of the message on the channel set, the process tests the first component of the message against
the term insert and if true the memberSet process is called by sending a four element message over the
set channel. The first element comprises the term member, the second element is a fresh return channel,
the third element is the name to be inserted in the list and the fourth element is the list itself. If the
returned variable matches the term true, the process outputs the list, otherwise the process returns the
list paired with the inserted name.
insertMem ≜ (set (instr, set4, x1,M1)
.if instr = insert then
νset2. (set ⟨member, set2, x1,M1⟩ .set2 (memM))
.if memM = true then set4 ⟨M1⟩)
.else set4 ⟨(x1,M1)⟩)
6.8.1.5 deleteMem process
The deleteMem process proceeds on broadly similar lines to the memberSet process already discussed
above in that an empty set check is followed by a check against the head of the list and a return of the
tail if there is a match. If there is not a match, a recursive process strips successive head elements from
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the list until or otherwise a match is obtained. The list is then successively rebuilt without the deleted
element if appropriate.
Following the initialisation of fresh internal channels, a message is received from some process on the
set channel and if the first component of the message matches the term delete, a fresh parallel internal
process is instantiated by sending the second component (representing a process-generated channel), third
component (representing the name to be removed from the list) and the fourth component (representing
the list). Subsequently, the process performs the empty set check as previously discussed and returns a
message with value ∅, otherwise the process calls the headSet and tailSet processes to return respectively
the head and tail of the list. Now the variable that takes the element to be deleted as a message value
is compared to the variable returned from the headSet process and if true then the tailSet variable is
returned. If the match is false, a fresh parallel delete process is called for the tailSet variable and following
the return message from the fresh process the combined headSet variable and the return message is
combined as a pair and returned. Ultimately, the reconstructed list as a pair is returned to the calling
process.
deleteMem ≜ νset1. (νset2. (set (instr, set4, x1,M1)
.if instr = delete then
set1 ⟨set2, x1,M1⟩ .set2 (delM) .set4 ⟨delM⟩)
∣! (set1 (set3, x,M) .if M = ∅ then set3 ⟨∅⟩
else νheadch. (set ⟨head, headch,M⟩ .headch (headM))
.νtailch. (set ⟨tail, tailch,M⟩ .tailch (tailM))
.if x = headM then set3 ⟨tailM⟩
else νset5. (set1 ⟨set5, x, tailM⟩ .set5 (nextM)
.set3 ⟨(headM,nextM)⟩)))
6.8.2 Encoding store processes
We model the historical stores within our modelling environment using an adaptation of the duplicate
message filter defined by Abadi, Blanchet and Fournet for the modelling of the Just Fast Keying protocol
in the applied pi calculus [4], together with the collection of set processes outlined in section 6.8.1. We
model three stores for our particular model although there is no restriction on store numbers in principle.
Store Q represents a public key server, store S accumulates dynamic access control information and store
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R accumulates static access control information such as role assignments. It is envisaged that the stores
be kept private and not exposed to an attacker. Consequently, internal store communication proceeds
over fresh private channels and communication with protocol processes proceeds over channels restricted
in scope over the entire model space.
The store processes interact with the processes of section 6.8.1 to perform set updates using the channel
set that is restricted over the model space and fresh channels created by the stores.
System processes interact with the stores Q, R and S by sending a triple over the system-wide private
channels storeQ, storeR or storeS comprising some data function representing a constraint predicate
term, a 0-arity data function symbol, either write, test or delete and a channel for receiving the result
of store processing. The result of store processing is a 0-arity data function symbol, either done or hit or
miss.
All stores proceed in a similar way. The store creates an internal channel, then passes the empty set term∅ over the channel to instantiate the ongoing store process. On receipt of this message the process is
then in a wait state until a message triple is received on the external store communication channel, either
storeQ, storeS or storeR, scoped over the model space. The variable representing the second element
of the message is compared to a write term and if true then the InsertMem process is called and the
updated store is received as the newStore variable. The newStore variable is then sent over the internal
channel to create a fresh instance of the store process and term done is sent as a message back to the
protocol process. If the second element is successfully compared to the test term, the memberSet process
is called. If true is returned, the term hit is sent as a message back to the protocol process, otherwise
miss is sent as a message instead. Finally, if the second element is successfully compared to the delete
term, the deleteMem process is called and the updated store is received as the memberDelete variable.
The memberDelete variable is sent over the internal channel and the term done is sent as a message back
to the protocol process.
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S ≜ νst. (st ⟨∅⟩ ∣! (st (store) .storeS (z1, z2, z3) .
(if z2 = write then
νset4. (set ⟨insert, set4, z1, store⟩ .set4 (newStore)) .
st ⟨newStore⟩ .z3 ⟨done⟩
else if z2 = test then (st ⟨store⟩ .
νset5. (set ⟨member, set5, z1, store⟩ .set5 (memberTest)
. (if memberTest = true then z3 ⟨hit⟩ else z3 ⟨miss⟩)))
else if z2 = delete then
νset6. (set ⟨delete, set6, z1, store⟩ .set6 (memberDelete)
.st ⟨memberDelete⟩ .z3 ⟨done⟩)
else st ⟨store⟩)))
and a similar process can be used to model the set of agent/role assignments:
R ≜ νrt. (rt ⟨∅⟩ ∣! (rt (store) .storeR (z1, z2, z3) .
(if z2 = write then
νset4. (set ⟨insert, set4, z1, store⟩ .set4 (newStore)) .
rt ⟨newStore⟩ .z3 ⟨done⟩
else if z2 = test then (rt ⟨store⟩ .
νset5. (set ⟨member, set5, z1, store⟩ .set5 (memberTest)
. (if memberTest = true then z3 ⟨hit⟩ else z3 ⟨miss⟩)))
else if z2 = delete then
νset6. (set ⟨delete, set6, z1, store⟩ .set6 (memberDelete)
.rt ⟨memberDelete⟩ .z3 ⟨done⟩)
else rt ⟨store⟩)))
and a public key server:
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Q ≜ νqt. (qt ⟨∅⟩ ∣! (qt (store) .storeQ (z1, z2, z3) .
(if z2 = write then
νset4. (set ⟨insert, set4, z1, store⟩ .set4 (newStore)) .
qt ⟨newStore⟩ .z3 ⟨done⟩
else if z2 = test then (qt ⟨store⟩ .
νset5. (set ⟨member, set5, z1, store⟩ .set5 (memberTest)
. (if memberTest = true then z3 ⟨hit⟩ else z3 ⟨miss⟩)))
else if z2 = delete then
νset6. (set ⟨delete, set6, z1, store⟩ .set6 (memberDelete)
.qt ⟨memberDelete⟩ .z3 ⟨done⟩)
else qt ⟨store⟩)))
6.8.3 Syntactic sugar for the interaction between processes and the stores
In section 6.8.2 above we discuss the coding of the stores and their interactions with set manipulation
processes. In this section we discuss the interaction between protocol processes and the stores in greater
detail and we adopt syntactic sugar to simplify the reading of these interactions.
Interaction between processes (the workflow manager and tasks) and the stores follows a consistent
pattern within the modelling of the workflow: agents send a message to a store and receive a reply. In the
case of a write instruction an agent identifies a store and sends a data function representing a constraint
term to that store. The store replies with an acknowledgement. We use the following syntactic sugar to
represent this agent/store behaviour:
W (STORE) (dataFunction (a1, . . . , an)) = νpteChannel.
(storeX ⟨
dataFunction (a1, . . . , an) ,
write, pteChannel⟩
.pteChannel (x))
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where STORE is the specific store to which the constraint expression is to be written, storeX is a
store-specific channel restricted over the model space and not visible to an attacker and data function (as
defined in section 5.3) dataFunction (a1, . . . , an) represents a constraint term together with n arguments.
For example:
W (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDT , IDW )) = νpteChannel. (storeS ⟨
hasAccessed (idA, IDT , IDW ) ,
write, pteChannel⟩
.pteChannel (x))
writes to store S on channel storeS the constraint data function term:
hasAccessed (idA, IDT , IDW )
indicating that agent A has accessed task T of workflow W .
The syntactic sugar for a test of a store’s contents is slightly more complex as the store response is
conditional upon the successful matching of the queried constraint data term to the store contents. We
adopt the following:
T (STORE) (dataFunction (a1, . . . , an)) ∶ P ∶ Q = νpteChannel. (storeX ⟨
dataFunction (a1, . . . , an) ,
storeProcess,
pteChannel⟩
.pteChannel (x) if x = hit
then P else Q)
wherein the STORE, storeX and dataFunction (a1, . . . , an) terms are as before but now we have two
outcomes P and Q depending upon the result of the comparison test, i.e. if the store returns hit for a
match to the store, P executes, otherwise Q executes. If we require the process to stop on a successful
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match but execute Q otherwise, the term will be:
T (STORE) (dataFunction (a1, . . . , an)) ∶ 0 ∶ Q
and conversely an execution of P following a successful match or otherwise a process halt is given by:
T (STORE) (dataFunction (a1, . . . , an)) ∶ P ∶ 0
that we abbreviate to:
T (STORE) (dataFunction (a1, . . . , an)) ∶ P
For the purpose of our model we substitute the internal process τ for P or Q as a continuity marker and
we restrict our consequent and alternative patterns to P = τ when Q = 0 and Q = τ when P = 0.
The syntactic sugar for deletion of a data function representing a constraint term from a store is as
follows:
D (STORE) (dataFunction (a1, . . . , an)) = νpteChannel. (storeX ⟨
dataFunction (a1, . . . , an) ,
delete, pteChannel⟩
.pteChannel (x))
where STORE, storeX and dataFunction are defined as for the write and test processes above. An
example of the delete process in which the constraint data function reviewer (idA, p) is removed from
the store S if it is present is as below:
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D (S) (reviewer (idA, p)) = νpteChannel. (storeS ⟨
reviewer (idA, p) ,
delete, pteChannel⟩
.pteChannel (x))
6.9 Initialising the modelling environment — M
In the previous sections we present the various core processes that comprise the building blocks for the
access control modelling environment. In this section we address the important task of initialisation for
models at runtime. The process M sets up private names for various secrets that have experiment-wide
scope, such as cryptographic key seeds, and this component of M is discussed further in section 6.9.1.
Next, M starts the set and store processes, which are active throughout the experiment as per sec-
tion 6.9.2. Finally, process M pre-populates the stores as appropriate for the experiment, for instance,
agent/role assignments are written to the role store and this is discussed in section 6.9.3. Section 6.9.4
draws together these concepts and provides a definition of the initialisation process M.
6.9.1 Declaration of names
The declaration of new names is an important part of the applied pi calculus and plays a significant
role within the context of our workflow modelling environment. Certain names within the modelling
environment are persistent throughout the model run whilst others are created on an ad hoc basis. Also,
the scope of declared names may vary depending upon workflow requirements. In the case of ad hoc
names such as nonces then these are declared within the body of the workflow code. However, names
such as agent identities IDA and agent key seeds KA that are required to be persistent across the model
run are declared at the commencement of the model run and scoped across the agent, task and workflow
processes as appropriate. In the workflow example of chapter 4 above we have sets of agents, tasks and the
workflow process that require the initialising of identities and key seeds, together with private channels
which are used for the store processes. Our initialisation sequence is as follows:
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νKW ,KOrg,KT1 ,KT2 ,KT3 ,KT4 ,KT5 ,KT6 ,
IDA1 , IDA2 , IDA3 , IDA4 , IDA5 , IDA6 ,
KA1 ,KA2 ,KA3 ,KA4 ,KA5 ,KA6 ,
set, storeQ, storeR, storeS
Clearly, the content of this initialisation sequence depends upon the nature of the modelling that we wish
to perform. Generally this sequence always includes the declaration of private names to represent agent
identities IDA, cryptographic key seeds KA assigned to each agent, cryptographic key seeds KT assigned
to each task process and cryptographic key seeds for the workflow, KW , and the organisation, KOrg.
Channel names are declared for the set and store processes set, storeQ etc.
6.9.2 Running the set and store processes
Set and store processes have to run continuously for the purpose of our modelling environment and so
we run them as part of our initialisation, M. We always run stores Q, R and S for the public key
server, agent/role assignment and dynamic access control information respectively and we summarise
these support processes as χ in our initialisation sequence.
6.9.3 Population of stores
Whilst some stores, particularly store S, are used to store dynamic information at runtime other stores,
such as the agent/role assignment store R, require populating prior to model runtime as these stores
represent broadly static information for the modelling process. For example, let us consider the simple
workflow example of chapter 4. We recall that in this example the agent/role assignment is represented
by the following relation:
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AR = {(Agent1, employee) ,
(Agent2, employee) , (Agent2, clerk) ,
(Agent3, employee) , (Agent3, clerk) ,
(Agent4, employee) , (Agent4, clerk) ,
(Agent4, supervisor) ,
(Agent5, employee) , (Agent5, supervisor)}
so that agent Agent1 is assigned role employee, Agent2 is assigned role employee and role clerk etc.
In order to model this particular workflow example we populate store R with agent/role assignments
represented by data functions, prior to the running of workflow W , using the syntax of the previous
section as follows:
W (R) (role (IDAgent1 , employee))
.W (R) (role (IDAgent2 , employee))
.W (R) (role (IDAgent2 , clerk))
.W (R) (role (IDAgent3 , employee))
.W (R) (role (IDAgent3 , clerk))
.W (R) (role (IDAgent4 , employee))
.W (R) (role (IDAgent4 , clerk))
.W (R) (role (IDAgent4 , supervisor))
.W (R) (role (IDAgent5 , employee))
.W (R) (role (IDAgent5 , supervisor))
Once populated as above the store R retains its set of agent/role assignments for the duration of the
model run unless they are deleted as part of the run.
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6.9.4 The initialisation process M
The initialisation processM for our workflow model combines the declaration of names per section 6.9.1,
running the set and store processes of section 6.9.2 and populating the stores as appropriate as per
section 6.9.3. Once M has been established then we can run any number of instances of our workflow
model together with any other models that we may require for the purpose of security analysis.
6.10 Translation between BPAC and applied pi calculus
In this section we provide a full summary of the translation from the BPAC modelling environment
of chapter 3 to the applied pi calculus implementation of the modelling environment presented in this
chapter.
BPAC Applied pi calculus
Component Symbol/graphical representation
Initialisation No analogy in BPAC although pre-population M
of the store may sometimes be necessary. required to define names, run support
processes, populate stores if necessary.
Task No analogy in BPAC MTi
message message associated with tasks.
Required to indicate agent access to tasks.
Workflow W W =Wi ∣Wi+1 ∣ . . . ∣ Ti ∣ Ti+1
Role r role
Agent ai Ai = agent ⟨⟨IDAi ,KAi⟩⟩
Task ti Wi ∣ Ti where
Wi = taskCall ⟨⟨IDTi ,KTi , IDW ,KW , []⟩⟩
and Ti = task ⟨⟨IDTi ,KTi ,MTi , [] , []⟩⟩
Task start
ts ti
Ws.ti ∣ ti.Wi.ti+1 ∣ . . . ∣ Ts ∣ Ti ∣ . . .
ts
Task end
ti te
. . . ∣ ti.Wi.te ∣ te.We ∣ Ti ∣ Te ∣ . . .
te
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BPAC Applied pi calculus
Component Symbol/graphical representation
Task sequence
ti ti+1ti-1
. . . ∣ ti−1.Wi−1.ti ∣ ti.Wi.ti+1 ∣ ti+1.Wi+1.ti+2 ∣ . . .
ti = tseq ∣ Ti−1 ∣ Ti ∣ Ti+1 ∣ . . .
Conjunctive
tj
tk
ti
. . . ∣ ti.Wi. (tj ∣ tk) ∣ tj .Wj .tj+1 ∣ tk.Wk.tk+1 ∣ . . .
split ti = t∧s ∣ Ti ∣ Tj ∣ Tk ∣ . . .
Conjunctive
ti
tj
tk
. . . ∣ ti.Wi.tka ∣ tj .Wj .tkb ∣ tka.tkb.Wk.tk+1 ∣ . . .
join tk = t∧j ∣ Ti ∣ Tj ∣ Tk ∣ . . .
Disjunctive
tj
tk
ti XOR split
. . . ∣ ti.Wi. (tj + tk) ∣ tj .Wj .tj+1 ∣ tk.Wk.tk+1 ∣ . . .
split ti = t⊕s ∣ Ti ∣ Tj ∣ Tk ∣ . . .
Disjunctive
ti
tj
tkXOR join
. . . ∣ ti.Wi.tk ∣ tj .Wj .tk ∣ tk.Wk.tk+1 ∣ . . .
join tk = t⊕j ∣ Ti ∣ Tj ∣ Tk ∣ . . .
Store W Q,R,S, . . . Separate stores maintained for
e.g. agent/role assignment in applied pi.
Agent/role (ai, rj) role (IDAi , rj)
assignment
96
6.10 Translation between BPAC and applied pi calculus
BPAC Applied pi calculus
Component Symbol/graphical representation
Task/role (ti, rj) test = T (R) (role (IDAk , rj)) ∶ in
assignment Wi = taskCall ⟨⟨IDTi ,KTi , IDW ,KW , [test]⟩⟩
for task Ti
Primitive ϕ = pred (x1, . . . , xn) dataFunction (x1, . . . , xn)
constraint e.g. hasAccessed (a,Taski,W ) e.g. hasAccessed (IDA, IDTi , IDW )
predicate
Negative ¬ϕ = ¬pred (x1, . . . , xn) see constraint test below
constraint e.g. ¬hasAccessed (a,Taski,W )
predicate
Constraint c = ϕ0 ∧ . . . ϕi . . . ∧ ϕn see constraint test below
expression ∧¬ψ0 ∧ . . .¬ψj . . . ∧ ¬ψm
Constraint (ti, test (c,W)) test = T (S) (dataFunction (x1, . . . , xn)) ∶ . . .
test T (S) (dataFunction (x′1, . . . , x′n)) ∶ 0 ∶ . . .
in process Wi for task Ti
where T (S) () ∶ 0 ∶ is test for negation
and colon means proceed to the next test.
e.g. e.g.
(Taski, test (hasAccessed (a,Task1,W ) T (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDTask1 , IDW )) ∶
∧¬hasAccessed (a,Task2,W ) , T (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDTask2 , IDW )) ∶ 0 ∶
∧¬hasAccessed (a,Task3,W ) ,W)) , T (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDTask3 , IDW )) ∶ 0 ∶
in Wi for task Ti
Write (ti,write (c,W)) write =W (S) (dataFunction (x1, . . . , xn)) . . . ..
command W (S) (dataFunction (x′1, . . . , x′n))
in Wi or in task process Ti
e.g. e.g.
(ti,write (hasAccessed (a,Taski,W ) ,W)) T (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDTaski , IDW ))
in task Ti
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BPAC Applied pi calculus
Component Symbol/graphical representation
Delete (ti, delete (c,W)) delete = D (S) (dataFunction (x1, . . . , xn)) . . . ..
command D (S) (dataFunction (x′1, . . . , x′n))
in task process Ti
e.g. e.g.
(ti, delete (review (a, p) ,W)) D (S) (review (idA, p))
in task Ti
Policy rule (ti,write ({c1, . . . , cn} ,W)) , (ti, test (c,W)) , write.test in hole in Wi, delete in 1st hole
(ti, delete ({d1, . . . , dm} ,W)) , (ti,write ({e1, . . . , ep} ,W)) in Ti and write in 2nd hole in Ti
followed by an implicit followed by a pre-programmed
(t,write (hasAccessed (a, t,W ) ,W)) in ti W (S) (hasAccessed (ida, IDTi , IDW )) in Ti
6.11 The complete model
Drawing together all of the modelling components discussed above we can now specify the complete
workflow access control model.
All workflows are constructed as parallel multiples of the core protocol, being encrypted interactions over
a public channel between the workflow manager, agent and task processes. We generalise the workflow
access control model as follows:
Firstly, we run the initialisation process M, then we run any number of instances of the workflow-based
access control model P, say, defined as follows:
P ≜ W ∣∏
i
!agent ⟨⟨IDAi ,KAi⟩⟩ ∣∏
n
!task ⟨⟨IDTn ,KTn ,MTn , [] , []⟩⟩
for i number of agent processes and n number of task processes and where
W ≜ ∏
m
νIDTm . (Trig1m.taskCall ⟨⟨IDTm ,KTm , IDW ,KW []⟩⟩ .T rig2m)
represents the workflow manager with Trig1m and Trig2m being Puhlmann and Weske workflow trigger
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sub-processes as discussed in section 6.7.3.
All m instances of taskCall ⟨⟨IDTm ,KTm , IDW ,KW []⟩⟩ in the workflow management process W , where
context [] is populated with access control tests or τ , interact with a task task ⟨⟨IDTn ,KTn ,MTn , [] , []⟩⟩,
with contexts populated with store write and delete instructions or τ , and an agent agent ⟨⟨IDAi ,KAi⟩⟩.
Interaction is in accordance with the standard core protocol, which we discuss in detail in appendix A.
6.12 Well-formed workflows
A workflow model constructed purely in accordance with the format of section 6.11 above, without any
additional code, is secure from the perspective of an outside observer. That is, an outside observer is
unable to distinguish between workflow transitions and random chatter, as all communication that com-
prises the standard core protocol is encrypted over the public channel and any additional communication,
such as in respect of the stores, is private. We call such a model a well-formed workflow.
6.13 Summary
In this chapter we present the basic building blocks of our applied pi calculus implementation of BPAC.
We discuss the core process components: agents, tasks and workflows and we display the syntax of
these core components. Additionally, we present the initialisation process M, which creates and defines
private names, stores and support processes and populates the stores with access control information as
appropriate. Also, we summarise the translation from the BPAC environment of chapter 3 to the applied
pi calculus implementation presented in this chapter.
Based upon this modelling environment, in the next chapter, we revisit our simple workflow access control
example of chapter 4 and in the following chapter we investigate security testing and analysis using the
applied pi calculus workflow model.
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Modelling the simple workflow in
BPAC
7.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we outline the basic components of our applied pi calculus implementation of
BPAC. In this chapter we use this modelling environment to encode the workflow example presented in
chapter 4.
7.2 The model
7.2.1 Defining the initialisation process M
Our first task is to initialise the names that we will be using in the model and to setup the stores and
their support processes. Firstly, we need to initialise some of the private names that are used throughout
the model space, such as key seeds and agent identities. We initialise a workflow key seed KW , which
enables public key encrypted communication with the workflow manager process, and an organisation
key seed KOrg, which enables general communication between processes within the organisation. Key
seeds KTaskx and KAgenty are initialised for targeted communication with the task process Taskx and
the agent process Agenty. Channel names set and storeQ, storeR and storeS are declared for store
process management.
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The role assignment store R needs to be populated with the agent/role assignments. We recall that in
BPAC the agent/role assignments for our simple workflow are summarised by the following relation:
AR = {(Agent1, employee) ,
(Agent2, employee) , (Agent2, clerk) ,
(Agent3, employee) , (Agent3, clerk) ,
(Agent4, employee) , (Agent4, clerk) ,
(Agent4, supervisor) ,
(Agent5, employee) , (Agent5, supervisor)}
for a set of roles:
R = {employee, clerk, supervisor}
and set of agents:
A = {Agent1, Agent2, Agent3, Agent4,Agent5}
We assign these roles as follows in our applied pi calculus model:
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role (IDAgent1 , employee)
role (IDAgent2 , employee)
role (IDAgent2 , clerk)
role (IDAgent3 , employee)
role (IDAgent3 , clerk)
role (IDAgent4 , employee)
role (IDAgent4 , clerk)
role (IDAgent4 , supervisor)
role (IDAgent5 , employee)
role (IDAgent5 , supervisor)
Where role (x, y) is a data function that matches y to x and IDAgentz is a private name that is used to
represent a unique identifier for the agent, Agentz. So M is defined as:
M ≜ νKW ,KOrg,KTask1 ,KTask2 ,KTask3 ,KTask4 ,KTask5 , (7.1)
KTask6 , IDAgent1 , IDAgent2 , IDAgent3 , IDAgent4 , IDAgent5 ,
KAgent1 ,KAgent2 ,KAgent3 ,KAgent4 ,KAgent5 ,
set, storeQ, storeR, storeS.
((W (R) (role (IDAgent1 , employee))
.W (R) (role (IDAgent2 , employee))
.W (R) (role (IDAgent2 , clerk))
.W (R) (role (IDAgent3 , employee))
.W (R) (role (IDAgent3 , clerk))
.W (R) (role (IDAgent4 , employee))
.W (R) (role (IDAgent4 , clerk))
.W (R) (role (IDAgent4 , supervisor))
.W (R) (role (IDAgent5 , employee))
.W (R) (role (IDAgent5 , supervisor))) ∣ χ)
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Where W (R) (x) is our “write” process that sends x to our store R and χ represents the stores and their
support processes.
7.2.2 Agent processes
The agent processes are represented in the applied pi calculus implementation of BPAC as:
Agent1 ≜ !agent ⟨⟨IDAgent1 ,KAgent1⟩⟩ (7.2)
Agent2 ≜ !agent ⟨⟨IDAgent2 ,KAgent2⟩⟩
Agent3 ≜ !agent ⟨⟨IDAgent3 ,KAgent3⟩⟩
Agent4 ≜ !agent ⟨⟨IDAgent4 ,KAgent4⟩⟩
Agent5 ≜ !agent ⟨⟨IDAgent5 ,KAgent5⟩⟩
Each agent is represented as multiple instances (via the replication operator) of the standard agent
process as detailed in appendix A section A.5.2, identified with the specific agent via the agent identifiers
IDAgent1 . . . IDAgent5 and the agent key seeds KAgent1 . . .KAgent5 , which ensure that communication is
isolated to individual agents.
7.2.3 Task processes
The task processes are represented as:
Task1 ≜ !task ⟨⟨IDTask1 ,KTask1 ,MTask1 , [τ] , [τ]⟩⟩ (7.3)
Task2 ≜ !task ⟨⟨IDTask2 ,KTask2 ,MTask2 , [τ] , [τ]⟩⟩
Task3 ≜ !task ⟨⟨IDTask3 ,KTask3 ,MTask3 , [τ] , [τ]⟩⟩
Task4 ≜ !task ⟨⟨IDTask4 ,KTask4 ,MTask4 , [τ] , [τ]⟩⟩
Task5 ≜ !task ⟨⟨IDTask5 ,KTask5 ,MTask5 , [τ] , [τ]⟩⟩
Task6 ≜ !task ⟨⟨IDTask6 ,KTask6 ,MTask6 , [τ] , [τ]⟩⟩
Each task is represented as multiple instances of the standard task process as detailed in appendix A sec-
tion A.5.1. MTask1 . . .MTask6 are the messages that act as labels for task resources, IDTask1 . . . IDTask6
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are fresh task identities created by the workflow manager and KTask1 . . .KTask6 are the key seeds asso-
ciated with each task, which ensure that communication can be isolated to each task process.
7.2.4 Workflow manager
As discussed in chapter 6 the workflow manager mediates the communication between agents and tasks,
checks agent credentials against stores in accordance with access control policy, permits or otherwise
communication between agents and tasks and implements the overall workflow structure.
We define the workflow manager process W in our modelling environment as follows:
W ≜ νIDW , IDTask1 , IDTask2 , IDTask3 , IDTask4 , IDTask5 , (7.4)
IDTask6 , t2, t3, t4, t5a, t5b, t6, tend.
(taskCall ⟨⟨IDTask1 ,KTask1 , IDW ,KW ,
[T (R) (role (idA, employee)) ∶]⟩⟩ .t2
∣ t2.taskCall ⟨⟨IDTask2 ,KTask2 , IDW ,KW ,
[T (R) (role (idA, clerk)) ∶
T (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDTask1 , IDW )) ∶ 0 ∶]⟩⟩
. (t3 ∣ t4)
∣ t3.taskCall ⟨⟨IDTask3 ,KTask3 , IDW ,KW ,
[T (R) (role (idA, supervisor)) ∶
W (S) (canAccess (idA, IDTask3 , IDW )) .
T (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDTask1 , IDW )) ∶ 0 ∶
T (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDTask2 , IDW )) ∶ 0 ∶
T (S) (canAccess (idA, IDTask4 , IDW )) ∶ 0 ∶]⟩⟩
.t5a
∣ t4.taskCall ⟨⟨IDTask4 ,KTask4 , IDW ,KW ,
[T (R) (role (idA, supervisor)) ∶
W (S) (canAccess (idA, IDTask4 , IDW )) .
T (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDTask1 , IDW )) ∶ 0 ∶
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T (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDTask2 , IDW )) ∶ 0 ∶
T (S) (canAccess (idA, IDTask3 , IDW )) ∶ 0 ∶]⟩⟩
.t5b
∣ t5a.t5b.taskCall ⟨⟨IDTask5 ,KTask5 , IDW ,KW ,
[T (R) (role (idA, clerk)) ∶
T (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDTask1 , IDW )) ∶ 0 ∶
T (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDTask3 , IDW )) ∶ 0 ∶
T (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDTask4 , IDW )) ∶ 0 ∶]⟩⟩
.t6
∣ t6.taskCall ⟨⟨IDTask6 ,KTask6 , IDW ,KW ,
[T (R) (role (idA, employee)) ∶
T (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDTask1 , IDW )) ∶]⟩⟩)
that we sometimes abbreviate for analysis purposes to:
W ≜ νIDW , IDTask1 , IDTask2 , IDTask3 , (7.5)
IDTask4 , IDTask5 , IDTask6 ,
t2, t3, t4, t5a, t5b, t6.
(W1.t2 ∣ t2.W2. (t3 ∣ t4)
∣ t3.W3.t5a ∣ t4.W4.t5b
∣ t5a.t5b.W5.t6 ∣ t6.W6)
and a terminating version of W , Wterm is as follows:
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Wterm ≜ νIDW , IDTask1 , IDTask2 , IDTask3 , (7.6)
IDTask4 , IDTask5 , IDTask6 ,
t2, t3, t4, t5a, t5b, t6, tend.
(W1.t2 ∣ t2.W2. (t3 ∣ t4)
∣ t3.W3.t5a ∣ t4.W4.t5b
∣ t5a.t5b.W5.t6 ∣ t6.W6.tend
∣ tend.t ⟨Mend⟩)
where the special terminating process t ⟨Mend⟩ is added to the workflow, triggered by tend.
7.2.5 The complete workflow model
We specify a complete, well-formed model of the workflow Ppurchase, which incorporates the workflow
manager W detailed above, agent and task processes, as follows:
Ppurchase ≜ W ∣ Task1 ∣ Task2 ∣ Task3 (7.7)
∣ Task4 ∣ Task5 ∣ Task6
∣ Agent1 ∣ Agent2 ∣ Agent3
∣ Agent4 ∣ Agent5
and the terminating model of the workflow is as follows:
Ptermp ≜ Wterm ∣ Task1 ∣ Task2 ∣ Task3 (7.8)
∣ Task4 ∣ Task5 ∣ Task6
∣ Agent1 ∣ Agent2 ∣ Agent3
∣ Agent4 ∣ Agent5
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7.3 Narrative explanation of the workflow model
Process M initialises identity values and key seeds (respectively IDx and Ky where x and y are work-
flow/agent/task identifiers). Process Ppurchase then proceeds. Workflow manager process W commences
in parallel with multiple copies of processes for each agent and each task involved in the workflow. Process
W proceeds as follows:
taskCall ⟨⟨IDTask1 ,KTask1 , IDW ,KW , [T (R) (role (idA, employee)) ∶]⟩⟩
initialises the task process for task Task1, advertises task Task1 to the agent pool representing organi-
sation employees then, on communication of an agent with the workflow manager, tests the substituted
agent identity variable idA against store R to verify or otherwise whether the agent has the role employee.
This test represents the standard role-based access control verification process. If the employee idA is
matched to the role employee using the data function role (idA, employee) within the store R, the process
continues, otherwise the process halts. Following the test, the process initiates secure communication be-
tween the agent IDA and the task Task1 and the task process writes to store S the data function
hasAccessed (idA, IDTask1 , IDW ) to record that the agent has interacted with the task.
On completion of the task-call process the workflow manager triggers the next task-call process by sending
a trigger on private channel t2.
On receipt of the trigger on t2 workflow manager W proceeds to:
taskCall ⟨⟨IDTask2 ,KTask2 , IDW ,KW ,
[T (R) (role (idA, clerk)) ∶
T (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDTask1 , IDW )) ∶ 0 ∶]⟩⟩
in which the task-call process initialises task Task2 and advertises the task to the agent pool. When an
agent communicates with the workflow manager W the task-call process applies the following tests on
the agent’s identity: first, the agent identity is tested against store R to match the agent to role clerk byT (R) (role (idA, clerk)) ∶. This test represents the standard role-based access control verification process
as before. If the match succeeds, the agent is tested against S by T (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDTask1 , IDW )) ∶
0 ∶. This test represents the dynamic access control verification process that ensures that an agent cannot
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access task Task2 if it has already accessed task Task1. If the test against store S succeeds, the task-call
process halts, otherwise it initiates communication between the agent and the task. The task process
Task2 writes hasAccessed (IDA, IDTask2 , IDW ) to the store S indicating that the agent has accessed
task Task2 then the workflow process triggers a pair of task-call processes using parallel private trigger
channels t3 and t4.
On receipt of the trigger on t3 workflow manager W proceeds to:
taskCall ⟨⟨IDTask3 ,KTask3 , IDW ,KW ,
[T (R) (role (idA, supervisor)) ∶
W (S) (canAccess (idA, IDTask3 , IDW )) .
T (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDTask1 , IDW )) ∶ 0 ∶
T (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDTask2 , IDW )) ∶ 0 ∶
T (S) (canAccess (idA, IDTask4 , IDW )) ∶ 0 ∶]⟩⟩
that continues as before but with task Task3 initialised and advertised to the agent pool. An agent
accesses the workflow process in response to the advertisement and the agent is tested against the stores
using the following access control tests: firstly, the agent identity variable idA is tested against store R
to match the agent to role supervisor using data function role (), i.e. T (R) (role (idA, supervisor)) ∶.
If there is a match to the store, the process first writes data function canAccess (idA, IDTask3 , IDW ) to
the store S and then tests idA against a collection of dynamic access control rules written to store S that
ensures that the agent has not accessed tasks Task1, Task2 and is not accessing Task4. If test matches
are achieved, the process halts, otherwise the workflow manager instigates communication between the
agent and task Task3. On completion of agent/task access the task process Task3 writes that the agent
identity substituted for idA has accessed task Task3 to store S and then the trigger t5a is fired by the
task-call process.
Concurrent with the processes outlined in the previous paragraph the workflow manager W , on receipt
of the trigger t4, continues as follows:
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taskCall ⟨⟨IDTask4 ,KTask4 , IDW ,KW ,
[T (R) (role (idA, supervisor)) ∶
W (S) (canAccess (idA, IDTask4 , IDW )) .
T (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDTask1 , IDW )) ∶ 0 ∶
T (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDTask2 , IDW )) ∶ 0 ∶
T (S) (canAccess (idA, IDTask3 , IDW )) ∶ 0 ∶]⟩⟩
This sequence proceeds in a similar manner to the previously discussed sequence, testing the agent for
the supervisor role, writing canAccess (idA, IDTask3 , IDW ) to the store S and checking that the agent
has not accessed tasks Task1, Task2 and is not accessing Task3. On completion of agent/task, access
the task process Task4 writes that the agent substituted for idA has accessed task Task4 to store S and
then the trigger t5b is fired by the task-call process.
The next task-call process sequence is triggered by the sequential receipt of triggers t5a and t5b so that
task Task5 can only be completed after both Task3 and Task4 have been completed. The workflow
manager W proceeds as follows:
∣ t5a.t5b.taskCall ⟨⟨IDTask5 ,KTask5 , IDW ,KW ,
[T (R) (role (idA, clerk)) ∶
T (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDTask1 , IDW )) ∶ 0 ∶
T (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDTask3 , IDW )) ∶ 0 ∶
T (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDTask4 , IDW )) ∶ 0 ∶]⟩⟩
In this process sequence the agent is tested for the role clerk and access to tasks Task1, Task3 and Task4.
Note that in this particular case our access-control policies allow for the agent permitted to access task
Task5 to be the same agent who accessed task Task2 but this is not a necessary condition for access to
task Task5. On completion of task Task5 the trigger t6 is fired.
On receipt of trigger t6 the workflow manager proceeds as follows:
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taskCall ⟨⟨IDTask6 ,KTask6 , IDW ,KW ,
[T (R) (role (idA, employee)) ∶
T (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDTask1 , IDW )) ∶]⟩⟩
In this process segment the agent is checked for role employee and is then matched to the agent who
accessed task Task1 via the test
T (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDTask1 , IDW )) ∶
The dynamic access control requirement in this case is that only the agent who has accessed task Task1
can access task Task6.
When the terminating workflow Wend is substituted for W in Ppurchase then the modified Ptermp
proceeds in the same manner as Ppurchase except that on completion of task Task6 the tend trigger fires
and the resulting terminating process sends message Mend over the public channel to indicate that the
workflow process has reached its end.
7.4 Comments on the workflow model
The simple purchases workflow demonstrates encoding under the applied pi calculus implementation of
BPAC. It is apparent from this example that our model environment is powerful and flexible and that
segregation of duties, as specified in the access control policy, can be applied via interaction with the
stores. However, it is also apparent that this power is realised at the expense of a degree of complexity
of encoding and that complex models can become long and unwieldy. To counter this, it is anticipated
that ultimately the BPAC modelling environment will be automated and potentially incorporated within
a BPM program suite with a graphical interface so that the details of the code are not exposed to the
user.
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7.5 Summary
In the section above we present the access control model representation of our simple workflow-based
access control example and outline how it properly encodes the access control constraints. In the next
chapter we present security analysis with the applied pi calculus implementation of BPAC.
111
Chapter 8
Security analysis within BPAC
8.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we present a simple workflow example encoded using the applied pi calculus
implementation of BPAC. Now we turn our attention to security testing within the modelling environment.
In the next section we discuss the security analysis requirements for access control models and this is
followed by a selection of security tests. Tests such as satisfiability and reachability (sections 8.2.6
and 8.2.4) require the “lightweight” analysis tool of the abstraction test as introduced in section 8.2.3
below. Tests of anonymity as outlined in section 8.2.7 below require the full power of observational
equivalence/labelled bisimilarity as per sections 5.3.4 and 5.3.6. In section 8.3 we present examples of
the application of these security tests.
8.2 Security analysis for access control models
8.2.1 The security model
Within our modelling environment all interactions between agent, workflow manager and task processes
are encrypted and executed over a public channel. Interactions between processes and the stores and
between the stores and set processes are ordinarily carried out over private channels restricted over the
scope of the model. In the applied pi calculus an attacker is represented by an arbitrary context that
can read from or write to the public (unbound) channels. Ostensibly, there is nothing of interest in a
well-formed workflow model as all that an attacker can see is random chatter over a public channel.
However, we can engineer the selective leaking of information into the public domain from the model in a
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variety of different ways and this enables us to analyse a vast collection of “what-if” scenarios for a given
workflow model.
Given the analytical power and flexibility of the applied pi calculus when coupled with the attacker
model outlined above, there is an enormous range of security analysis available to us within our BPAC
implementation. We devise a suite of security tests in the applied pi calculus based upon the properties
of BPAC defined in section 3.2.1 including:
• satisfiability analysis — satisfiability is defined in section 3.4.3 and is achieved if a workflow-based
access control is observed to be terminable given some set of agents, tasks and authorisation con-
straints. Within the applied pi calculus implementation of BPAC we perform tests for satisfiability
of workflow models using the abstraction test of section 8.2.3 below.
• Collusion analysis — we define collusion and the collusion metric in section 3.4.4. The collusion
metric is the minimum number of agents who can collectively secure complete control over resources
associated with a workflow. We perform collusion analysis in the applied pi calculus as an exten-
sion of satisfiability tests. The collusion metric is calculated for a workflow model from multiple
satisfiability experiments over different subsets of agents.
• Agent/task reachability analysis — agent/task reachability refers to the workflow property that
task resources can be accessed by an agent given that resources from some other workflow task can
also be accessed by the agent. We discuss testing for agent/task reachability in further detail in
section 8.2.6. Within a conference management example in section 8.3.2, we perform a variation
on satisfiability analysis as an agent/task reachability test to establish whether or not a conference
paper reviewer can gain sight of another review of the same paper prior to the execution of the
review task on that particular paper.
• Agent anonymity and collusion resistance — anonymity is introduced in section 3.4.5. In real-world
examples of systems of access control, protection against collusion is provided by non-disclosure
of the identities of participating agents. In a conference review system, for example, if a reviewer
does not know the identity of her fellow reviewers for a given paper, privacy-based access control
protection is afforded against collusion of participating parties. Testing for privacy can be achieved
by proving the observational equivalence of processes with interchanging participating agents as we
outline in section 8.2.7 below and demonstrate in an example in section 8.3.1.4.
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8.2.2 Uniqueness property for public channel messages within the modelling
environment
Our modelling environment is constructed from an initialisation process and agent, task and workflow
manager processes that interact with each other and with support processes, the stores, in a predefined
way. This interaction of processes, a collection of labelled and internal transitions called the standard
core protocol C, defined in section 6.4, provides the building blocks from which model examples of
workflow-based access control can be constructed within our modelling environment. A prerequisite for
the definition of our suite of analytical tools, which we can use to investigate our workflow models, is that
no two labelled transitions within a well-formed model are the same. We refer to this particular property
as uniqueness and this is presented in the next section. Now, at first sight, uniqueness would appear to
be a trivial property. However, given the underlying complexity of the standard core protocol, there is
always a possibility that duplicate messages could be sent over multiple instances of the protocol within
an access control model. If the uniqueness property does not hold for any model, we cannot assume
that encrypted private messages broadcast over the public channel are indistinguishable by an outside
observer from fresh messages broadcast over the public channel.
8.2.2.1 The uniqueness property
Let P be any secure well-formed workflow model as per section 6.12 comprising a number of linked cases
of standard core processes, C1, . . . ,Cm as defined in section 6.4, initialised by process M as defined in
section 6.9.4, such that P can undergo labelled transitions of the form P
α1Ð→ . . . αnÐ→ P′ then:
1. αi ≠ αj for i, j = 1 to n and i ≠ j
2. For any two instances of P, P1 and P2, say, initialised by process M, such that P1 α11Ð→ . . . αn1Ð→ P′1
and P2
α12Ð→ . . . αn2Ð→ P′2 then αk1 ≠ αl2 for k, l = 1 to n.
8.2.2.2 Outline of proof
The full details of the proof are presented in section B.1 of appendix B. In this section we outline the
basic components of the proof.
1. All well-formed workflow models are constructed from the standard core protocol. Therefore we
first compare all public transitions against each other within the standard protocol C and prove
that no two public transitions are the same.
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2. Next, we consider comparison of all public transitions between any two cases of the standard core
protocol within some well-formed workflow model P. We need to consider how complex workflows
are constructed from the standard core protocol, given that the standard core protocol is effectively
the interaction of the processes taskCall (actually sub-processes within the workflow, W process),
task and agent. If we consider any two standard protocol cases within the well-formed workflow
model P: C1 and C2, say, initialised respectively by fresh identities IDTa and IDTb then:
(a) all public communications are unique within C1 as per 1 above.
(b) All public communications are unique within C2 as per 1 above.
(c) All public communications within C1, when compared to all similar public communications
within C2 are unique because any communication within C1 contains a freshly declared task
identity name IDTa and any communication within C2 contains a freshly declared task iden-
tity name IDTb and as all functions enc (), encs () and sk () are collision-free then these
communications can never be equal.
(d) All public communications within C1, when compared to all dissimilar public communications
within C2 are unique, the proof being similar to 1 above except that comparison of public
transitions is performed across both cases of the core protocol.
3. Finally, we consider two instances P1 and P2, initialised by processM, of the well-formed workflow
modelP and we argue by extension of 1 and 2 above and the freshness of task identities IDT per each
instance of the standard core protocol that all public transitions are unique within this comparison.
8.2.2.3 Application of the uniqueness property to workflow analysis.
The uniqueness property says that public messages generated by a well-formed workflow model are
indistinguishable from random chatter by an outside observer. This is a powerful feature of the model
that enables us to simplify our security tests.
If it was always the case that our workflow models were well-formed, these models would be totally
uninteresting: a well-formed workflow is a black-box process that tells us nothing. However, our agent
processes have been designed so that they can be adapted to leak acquired messages unencrypted into the
public domain. This provides us with the ability to analyse all manner of “what-if” scenarios in respect of
agents securing control over task resources via the various security tests on workflow models. The basic
analytical component of our security tests is the abstraction test defined below.
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8.2.3 The abstraction test
In chapter 5 we present an important analytical tool for the applied pi calculus called observational
equivalence and its practical alternative technique called labelled bisimilarity. Proving observational
equivalence is a two-way process such that for A ≈ B we prove that, for some external observer, there
exists a B that satisfies the equivalence rules in respect of A then vice versa for A in respect of B. Within
the context of our modelling environment, some of our security tests for any given access control protocol
are unidirectional and existential, i.e. we need to identify or otherwise that there exists any example of
a model trace that behaves like some abstract process trace. The burden of proving full observational
equivalence is excessive and superfluous for these unidirectional security tests. Consequently, we use a
lightweight comparison test in one direction only. We attempt to demonstrate that, for some external
observer, there exists or otherwise a trace for some process A that is indistinguishable from the trace for
some test process B. We call this test the abstraction test and we use the test for the reachability class
of security problems for our access control models. If we can prove that a process P can behave like an
abstract model Q, we say that P abstracts to Q and we write this as:
P ∼ab Q
The abstraction test can be considered to be an applied pi calculus equivalent of the refinement test of
CSP [80]. In refinement a comparison is made between two model descriptions, the specification and the
implementation. If a check is successful then the specification is considered to be a refinement of the
implementation. In the abstraction test the abstract reference model Q is analogous to the specification
and the workflow model P is analogous to the implementation.
The formal definition of the abstraction test is as follows:
Definition 20
Abstraction (∼ab) is a relation R on closed unique extended processes such that AR B implies:
1. A ≈s B;
2. if B Ð→∗ B′ then ∃A′ s.t. AÐ→∗ A′ and A′ R B′;
3. if B Ð→∗ αÐ→Ð→∗ B′, fv (α) ⊆ dom (B) and bn (α) ∩ fn (A) = ∅, then ∃A′ s.t. A Ð→∗ αÐ→Ð→∗ A′
and A′ R B′
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The definition bears a likeness to the definition of labelled bisimilarity in chapter 5 except that it is
unidirectional i.e. a similarity. We can further simplify this test by the application of the uniqueness
principle in respect of the set of labelled transitions associated with the standard core protocol as outlined
below.
8.2.3.1 Practical application of the abstraction test
We devise a simple strategy for using the abstraction test as part of our security analysis. Given some
workflow model P, initialised by M, then we create a modified variant of P called P′ that releases
task messages of the form MT to an attacker via the agent processes or via a special terminating process
tend.t ⟨Mend⟩. We set up an abstract reference modelQ that releases task messages also and we endeavour
to find a trace of P′ that is indistinguishable from the trace of Q. If such a trace is found, we conclude
that:
P′ ∼ab Q
We simplify the test by the application of the uniqueness theorem and syntactic sugar for the transition
traces of the abstract reference model Q and the workflow variant P′.
8.2.3.2 Defining the abstract reference model Q
The abstract reference model Q is the benchmark against which the workflow model is analysed and
comprises sequential outputs of fresh names over the public channel together with the output of selected
messages that represents the anticipated behaviour of the workflow model P or its derivatives. A typical
example of reference model Q for the test of satisfiability would be formulated as:
νn1.t ⟨n1⟩ . . . . .νni.t ⟨ni⟩ .t ⟨Mend⟩ (8.1)
for some i such that the output trace for νn1.t ⟨n1⟩ . . . . .νni.t ⟨ni⟩ matches the output trace for the
encrypted components of model P or its terminating derivative Pterm and Mend is the message released
on the public channel as part of the workflow terminating process within Pterm . The precise form of Q
is not important to us provided that the trace is of the form:
νn1.t⟨n1⟩Ð→ . . . νni.t⟨ni⟩Ð→ t⟨Mend⟩Ð→ (8.2)
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as this is what we use as part of our analysis. We are able to use this in our abstraction test because the
uniqueness property says that the public messages in a well-formed workflow model are indistinguishable
from random chatter. More complex examples of Q can be devised that enable detailed analysis of
workflow models.
8.2.3.3 Syntactic sugar for the transition trace for the abstract reference model
Sequential fresh messages are included in Q to represent all encrypted messages on the public channel
in P and its derivatives that cannot be decrypted by an outside observer. In order to simplify our
understanding of the transition steps for reference model Q we use the syntax
νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ to represent a finite
number of
νn.t⟨n⟩Ð→ transitions. We are not concerned with knowing the exact number of νn.t⟨n⟩Ð→ steps in
νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ for our experiments provided that the steps are matched on both sides of the comparison. We can
do this because we are free in theory to devise Q with any finite number of sequential fresh messages and
we can always therefore incorporate the exact number of fresh messages that match the private messages
in P. These messages, like internal transactions, have no impact on our abstraction test other than to
act as placeholders that match the private messages in the target model P. Also, we know from our
uniqueness property that, so long as our model is properly constructed from the standard core protocol
C and assuming that no cryptographic secrets are exposed to an outside observer, all of the core protocol
transitions of the workflow model P and its derivatives are unique. In practice, whenever we devise Q for
our experiments we simply assume that an undisclosed quantity of fresh messages precedes each instance
of a public test message as in formula 8.1 above.
For instance, for some initialised model Pterm derived from P by incorporating a terminating process of
the form: ∣ tend.t ⟨Mend⟩ within the workflow manager, a test for satisfiability against abstract reference
model Q summarised as formula 8.1 above is as follows:
if a trace of Pterm matches:
νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨Mend⟩Ð→
then
Pterm ∼ab Q
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and Pterm is satisfiable.
Alternatively, a trace of a simple serial workflow model of four tasks might be compared to:
νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M1⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M2⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M3⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M4⟩Ð→ (8.3)
that is: we attempt to find a trace of our workflow model that is indistinguishable from the trace 8.3
above.
A workflow model with parallel tasks T2 and T3 might be tested to see if it yields a trace comparable to:
νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M1⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M2⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M3⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M4⟩Ð→ (8.4)
and:
νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M1⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M3⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M2⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M4⟩Ð→ (8.5)
The test is successful only if we can demonstrate that the model can undergo transitions indistinguishable
from both of the traces shown above. We abbreviate traces 8.4 and 8.5 as:
νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M1⟩Ð→ (νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M2⟩Ð→ ∧ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M3⟩Ð→ ) νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M4⟩Ð→ (8.6)
using the ∧ symbol to represent a conjunction of process traces i.e. both traces νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M2⟩Ð→ and νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M3⟩Ð→
have to occur prior to trace
νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M4⟩Ð→ occurring.
Alternatively, we might want to test our model to see if it performs like one trace or another. For example,
given a four task workflow with parallel tasks T2 and T3 then it might be sufficient to establish that the
model behaves like either of traces 8.4 or 8.5. We abbreviate the traces in this instance as follows using
the disjunction operator ∨:
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νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M1⟩Ð→ (νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M2⟩Ð→ ∨ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M3⟩Ð→ ) νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M4⟩Ð→ (8.7)
It is worth noting that two sequences of
νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ , i.e. νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ can be summarised as νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ as two
finite sequences of
νn.t⟨n⟩Ð→ are behaviourally the same as one larger finite sequence of νn.t⟨n⟩Ð→ but we cannot
arbitrarily deconstruct
νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ into νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ as νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ has to represent at least one instance of νn.t⟨n⟩Ð→
per our definition above.
8.2.3.4 Syntactic sugar for the transition trace for the standard core protocol
In order to simplify our analysis of the protocol model itself we use the following as syntactic sugar to
represent a summarised transition trace for the standard core protocol C where Ci is the ith instance
of C, effectively representing all of the unique encrypted transitions that occur between the workflow
sub-process Wq, the task process Tr and the agent process As :
Wq
Ci⇔ Tr,As
This represents all of the labelled transitions for the core process. For a well-formed workflow these
labelled transitions are indistinguishable from the same number of messages of the form:
νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
by the uniqueness property.
8.2.4 Satisfiability tests
We use the abstraction test to establish that an initialised workflow-based access control model P is
satisfiable as defined in section 3.4.3.
Firstly, we make sure that our workflow model includes a terminating process that broadcasts message
Mend on the public channel t. If not, then we extend the workflow manager model to create amended
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model Pterm by adding the following process to the end of the model, triggered by the Puhlmann and
Weske workflow triggers as usual:
taskend ≜ t ⟨Mend⟩
i.e. message Mend can be output on the public channel only if the interaction of agents, tasks and the
workflow manager results in the complete performance of the workflow as modelled by W .
Now we define a reference model Q in respect of its summarised labelled transitions that we specify as:
νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨Mend⟩Ð→
where message Mend is output on the public channel and all other outputs on public channels are a finite
number of fresh messages that precede it. If there exists Pterm that is observed to undergo transitions
that are indistinguishable from Q, i.e.:
Pterm ∼ab Q
then it can be concluded that Pterm is satisfiable and therefore the workflow-based access control policy
is satisfiable for a given set of agents and tasks.
8.2.5 Collusion analysis and calculating the collusion metric
If we have established that the workflow-based access control policy is satisfiable by the application of
satisfiability tests as per section 8.2.4, we know that there is a sufficient number of agent processes within
the initialised terminated access control model Pterm to ensure that the workflow can be completed. We
define the simple collusion metric in section 3.4.4 as the minimum number of agents that can obtain
complete control of all resources associated with a workflow. We can identify the simple collusion metric
by repeatedly performing the satisfiability test over modifications to Pterm containing subsets of the set of
agent processes and by counting the minimum number of agent processes required to ensure satisfiability
of the workflow model.
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The simple collusion metric is a reasonable attempt at quantifying the robustness of a workflow against
collusion. However, we can envisage a situation where agents are able to secure information about task
resources indirectly, via intra-agent communication for example. In this case the simple collusion metric
as defined might not be sufficient to properly represent the collusion resistance of a complete workflow-
based access control model. Consequently, we define the extended collusion metric as being the minimum
number of agents that can obtain complete control of all resources associated with a workflow by both
direct and indirect means. In order to calculate the extended collusion metric we perform the following
steps:
1. firstly, we define an abstract reference model Qc by reference to its transition sequence:
(a) we represent each and every task taski within the workflow model by an output transition of
the task message on the public channel t, i.e.
t⟨Mi⟩Ð→ for the ith task and:
(b) we precede each output transition
t⟨Mi⟩Ð→ by a finite number of transition steps given by νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
and:
(c) we sequence the labelled transitions
νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨Mi⟩Ð→ so as to replicate the anticipated output from
our workflow model so that Qc is some process that undergoes a transition trace of the form:
νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M1⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M2⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M3⟩Ð→ . . .
2. Next we attach a public output of messages to a selection of agent processes within Pterm using a
context of the form:
[] ∣! (t (xAi) .letmAi = fst (dec (xAi , sk (KAi))) in t ⟨mAi⟩)
for the ith agent process within Pterm. This context receives message mAi , which is broadcast by
the standard agent process encrypted under agent Ai’s public key, then it outputs the decryption
of this message on the public channel t.
3. Now we take the modified model from step 2 above, Pterm′, say, and we perform the abstraction
test to ascertain whether or not:
P′term ∼ab Qc
122
8.2 Security analysis for access control models
If this is satisfied, i.e. there exists a trace for P′term that is indistinguishable from the trace of Qc,
we have obtained a collusion set of agent processes for Pterm, being all of the agents that were
modified to release their messages onto the public channel t.
4. We continue to perform steps 2 and 3 for different combinations of agent processes leaking messages
and we obtain a minimum collusion set of agent processes for which:
P′term ∼ab Qc
is satisfied. The number of agents within this set is the extended collusion metric for the workflow-
based access control model Pterm.
8.2.6 Testing for reachability using satisfiability
The tests outlined above for satisfiability and the computation of the collusion metric are examples of
tests for workflow reachability. In our test for satisfiability we focus upon the reachability problem: can
an end state for a workflow model be reached given some initial state? In the collusion analysis tests we
ask a similar question but we test for a more comprehensive set of model properties given a number of
different initial states. A more general test for reachability is to identify one particular state of a workflow
model and observe if some other state can be reached thereafter. Of particular interest in this regard is
that tests for reachability can be devised that seek to ascertain whether or not at some particular state
in a workflow model run an agent has accessed a particular task. In this context we consider reachability
testing as a variation of satisfiability testing in which we attempt to identify whether or not specific
task/agent assignments can be identified within a satisfiability experiment. Such a test is particularly
useful, for example, for testing whether or not a reviewer has had access to a review of a paper prior to
her reviewing that paper in a conference management system.
8.2.7 Observational equivalence tests for anonymity
Anonymity is defined in section 3.4.5 as the property that an outsider observer is unable to match agents
to tasks or workflows within a workflow-based access control model and we test for anonymity using
labelled bisimilarity of section 5.3.6.
We consider a workflow model P and the uniqueness theorem as discussed above that ensures that all
private transitions are fresh. If we model a compromised agent Ai in P as the release of agent secrets, e.g.
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the agent’s identity IDAi and key seed KAi , to an attacker Att [], anonymity is preserved if an attacker
is unable to match agents to workflow tasks. We test for anonymity using labelled bisimilarity as follows:
for some target agent process Aj where Aj ≠ Ai, if we define a modified workflow process P′′ as the
workflow model process P less the agent processes Ai and Aj (we do not need to include compromised
agent Ai as the attacker can fully replicate Ai’s communication), anonymity is preserved if:
Aj ∣ P′′ ≈ P′′
and therefore an attacker, via some compromised agent, cannot identify which agent performed some
particular task within a workflow. All the attacker knows by reachability analysis is that particular tasks
may have been performed.
Anonymity is breached in the following circumstance in accordance with our anonymity definition of
section 3.4.5:
• If an agent Aj is critical to the workflow process then if compromised agent Ai interacts with some
task dependent upon agent Aj ’s interaction with the workflow process, the omission of process Aj
from the workflow model will result in compromised agent Ai being unable to complete its task and
Aj ∣ P′′ ≉ P′′.
This is the primary example of breach of anonymity for the purpose of this thesis, consistent with our
BPAC model of chapter 3. It is observed that the concept of anonymity can be extended in the real world
to encompass the effect of communication between agents. For example, a compromised agent tells an
untrusted third party the identity of an agent accessing a particular task or task secrets are released to
an untrusted third party through communicating agents. However, such extensions to the definition of
anonymity are outside the scope of this thesis.
8.2.7.1 Syntactic sugar for traces of the standard core protocol
In section 8.2.3.4 we introduce the following syntax to represent a complete transition trace of the standard
core protocol:
Wq
Ci⇔ Tr,As
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Whilst we use this notation for transitions when outputs are indistinguishable from fresh names over
the public channel, we need to adopt a modified version of this trace if messages mess1, . . . ,messn are
revealed on the public channel via the equational theory:
{Wq Ci⇔ Tr,As} «mess1, . . . ,messn
We use this syntax to represent all traces for a single instance Ci of the standard core protocol that do
not involve a compromised agent yet an attacker has access to the messages mess1, . . . ,messn.
In respect of a compromised agent we expand the trace syntax so that the following represents a complete
trace of the standard core protocol in which agent process As has been compromised by an attacker
(indicated by Att (As)) and messages mess1, . . . ,messn have been released to the attacker:
{Wq C⇔ Tr,Att (As)} «mess1, . . . ,messn
8.3 Some Examples of security tests
In this section we apply the security tests discussed above to BPAC examples that we model in the
applied pi calculus. In the first example we return to the simple, two-task workflow that we introduce in
chapter 3 and for the second example we analyse a flawed conference review model originally presented
by Nan Zhang [104].
8.3.1 The two-task workflow example
Consider the model workflow W of section 3.3.12 comprising two sequential task processes, T1 and T2
and three agent processes, A1, A2 and A3 and we assign roles to the agents using our model syntax as
follows:
role (IDA1 , clerk)
role (IDA2 , supervisor)
role (IDA3 ,manager)
Firstly, we define our initialisation process, M:
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νKW ,KOrg,KT1 ,KT2 , IDA1 , IDA2 , IDA3 , (8.8)
KA1 ,KA2 ,KA3 , set, storeQ, storeR, storeS.
(W (R) (role (IDA1 , clerk))
.W (R) (role (IDA2 , supervisor))
.W (R) (role (IDA3 ,manager)) ∣ χ)
where X represents all of the private internal support processes, such as the set handling processes and
the store processes Q, R and S. The W (R) processes write the agent/role assignments to the store R.
The agent processes are represented as:
A1 ≜ !agent ⟨⟨IDA1 ,KA1⟩⟩
A2 ≜ !agent ⟨⟨IDA2 ,KA2⟩⟩
A3 ≜ !agent ⟨⟨IDA3 ,KA3⟩⟩
The task processes as:
T1 ≜ !task ⟨⟨IDT1 ,KT1 ,MT1 , [τ] , [τ]⟩⟩
T2 ≜ !task ⟨⟨IDT2 ,KT2 ,MT2 , [τ] , [τ]⟩⟩
and the workflow manager process as:
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Wterm ≜ νt2, tend, IDW , IDT1 , IDT2 .
(taskCall ⟨⟨IDT1 ,KT1 , IDW ,KW ,
[T (R) (role (idA, clerk)) ∶]⟩⟩ .t2
∣ t2.taskCall ⟨⟨IDT2 ,KT2 , IDW ,KW ,
[T (R) (role (idA, supervisor)) ∶
T (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDT1 , IDW )) ∶ 0 ∶]⟩⟩
.tend ∣ tend.t ⟨Mend⟩)
that, for the purpose of our subsequent analysis, we abbreviate as follows:
Wterm ≜ νt2, tend, IDW , IDT1 , IDT2 . (8.9)
((W1.t2) ∣ (t2.W2.tend) ∣ (tend.t ⟨Mend⟩))
where
W1 ≜ taskCall ⟨⟨IDT1 ,KT1 , IDW ,KW , (8.10)
[T (R) (role (idA, clerk)) ∶]⟩⟩
and
W2 ≜ taskCall ⟨⟨IDT2 ,KT2 , IDW ,KW , (8.11)
[T (R) (role (idA, supervisor)) ∶
T (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDT1 , IDW )) ∶ 0 ∶]⟩⟩
and the basic model is then represented as:
Pterm ≜Wterm ∣ T1 ∣ T2 ∣ A1 ∣ A2 ∣ A3 (8.12)
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Note that our model Pterm contains a terminating process attached within Wterm of the form:
[] ∣ tend.t ⟨Mend⟩ (8.13)
where tend is a trigger and Mend is the usual termination message to indicate that the workflow has been
completed.
8.3.1.1 Testing the two-task workflow example for satisfiability
Given the two-task workflow-based access control model, initialised by processM, detailed above we seek
to establish that, given the access control constraints and given the available agents A1, A2 and A3, a
trace can be found in which the complete workflow can be executed.
Procedure
The procedure for this test is based upon the idea that we attempt to find a trace of our model Pterm
that behaves like a target model Q. We use the procedure that we describe as the abstraction test as
outlined in section 8.2.3 above.
We formulate the labelled transition behaviour of our test process Q as follows:
νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨Mend⟩Ð→
and we perform the abstraction test to establish or otherwise:
Pterm ∼ab Q
That is we seek to establish whether or not there exists a trace of Pterm that is indistinguishable from
the trace of Q in so far as an external observer is concerned.
Firstly, we rewrite Pterm as follows:
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Pterm ≜ Wterm ∣ T1 ∣ T2 ∣ A1 ∣ A2 ∣ A3
= νt2, IDW , IDT1 , IDT2 .
((W1.t2) ∣ (t2.W2.tend) ∣ (tend.t ⟨Mend⟩))
∣ T1 ∣ T2 ∣ A1 ∣ A2 ∣ A3
by substitution using 8.9 above.
By rewriting Pterm in this way we indicate that Pterm can be considered as a succession of core protocols.
In this case there are two core protocols: the interaction between W1 and either T1 or T2 and A1 or A2
or A3, which we can refer to as core protocol instance C1 and the interaction between W2 and either T1
or T2 and A1 or A2 or A3, which we can refer to as core protocol instance C2.
Now we attempt to find a trace of Pterm that is indistinguishable from the trace for Q (summarised
below):
No. Pterm Q
1 W1
C1⇔ T1,A1 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
2 W2
C2⇔ T2,A2 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
3
t⟨Mend⟩Ð→ t⟨Mend⟩Ð→
success
therefore
Pterm ∼ab Q
and there exists a trace wherein workflow sub-process W1 interacts with task process T1 and agent A1
(core protocol instance C1) and workflow sub-process W2 interacts with task process T2 and agent A2
(core protocol instance C2) followed by the terminating process t ⟨Mend⟩ and this trace is similar to the
trace of the abstract reference model Q. We can conclude, therefore, that the workflow-based access
control model is satisfiable using the specified access control constraints and given the set of agents{A1,A2,A3} and the set of tasks {T1, T2}.
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8.3.1.2 The simple collusion metric
As we discuss in section 8.2.4, we can extend the satisfiability test described above to create a test that
identifies the minimum number of agents required to ensure model satisfiability. That is, we perform the
satisfiability test for various combinations of agents and we identify the smallest number of agents, the
simple collusion metric, for which the satisfiability test succeeds. For our toy example above we perform
the full test for satisfiability first, i.e. we test to establish or otherwise:
Pterm ≜ Wterm ∣ T1 ∣ T2 ∣ A1 ∣ A2 ∣ A3
∼ab Q
Where Q has the transition trace
νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨Mend⟩Ð→ as before. We know this to be true from section 8.3.1.1
above. Now we remove agent process A1 and we test to establish or otherwise:
P′term ≜ Wterm ∣ T1 ∣ T2 ∣ A2 ∣ A3
∼ab Q
with Q as before and the resultant trace comparisons are:
No. P′term Q
1 W1
C1⇔ T1,A2 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
2 fail
and
No. P′term Q
1 W1
C1⇔ T1,A3 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
2 fail
therefore we conclude that
P′term ≁ab Q
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as the terminating process t ⟨Mend⟩ is never reached in the workflow model and the model is not satisfiable
using the specified access control constraints and given the set of agents {A2,A3} and the set of tasks{T1, T2}. Indeed, process P′ can never proceed beyond step 1 above as neither A2 nor A3 are permitted
to access task T1 by the role assignments and access control rules set out in the example and T1 will never
be completed.
Repeating the test for:
P′′term ≜ Wterm ∣ T1 ∣ T2 ∣ A1 ∣ A3
yields the same result in that P′′term cannot output Mend over the public channel although in this case
we can obtain a trace in which T1 is completed through interaction with agent A1. However, if we run
the test for:
P
′′′
term ≜ Wterm ∣ T1 ∣ T2 ∣ A1 ∣ A2
then we obtain the trace comparison:
No. P
′′′
term Q
1 W1
C1⇔ T1,A1 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
2 W2
C2⇔ T2,A2 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
3
t⟨Mend⟩Ð→ t⟨Mend⟩Ð→
4 success
and
P′′′term ∼ab Q
therefore, the workflow-based access control model is satisfiable using the specified access control con-
straints and given the set of agents {A1,A2} and the set of tasks {T1, T2}.
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Now, given that
P′term ≜ Wterm ∣ T1 ∣ T2 ∣ A2 ∣ A3
and
P′′term ≜ Wterm ∣ T1 ∣ T2 ∣ A1 ∣ A3
both failed the satisfiability tests we can say without further analysis that:
P4term ≜ Wterm ∣ T1 ∣ T2 ∣ A1
P5term ≜ Wterm ∣ T1 ∣ T2 ∣ A2
P6term ≜ Wterm ∣ T1 ∣ T2 ∣ A3
also fail the satisfiability tests.
We can conclude, therefore, that the minimum number of required agents to ensure satisfiability of our
workflow example, the simple collusion metric, is two and indeed the minimum set of agents required to
ensure satisfiability is {A1,A2}.
8.3.1.3 Extending the collusion metric analysis
We have calculated the simple collusion metric for our toy workflow example above. The result is a fair
representation of the resistance to collusion for the model, assuming that control of task resources cannot
pass to agents by other means, such as intra-agent communication. If we have a situation where agents
can communicate with each other then we need to consider the extended collusion metric per 8.2.5. We
can model all manner of interactions between agents and tasks in addition to the workflow-based access
control protocols using the applied pi calculus. For example, consider an adaptation of the toy example
presented above:
agent A1 communicates any messages it obtains via its interactions with workflow/task processes to agent
A2 via encrypted communication over the public channel. We can model this as follows, noting that the
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agent process outputs its acquired messages, encrypted under its own public key, on the public channel
t as part of the detailed encoding of agent processes per section A.5.2 in appendix A:
P8term ≜ Wterm ∣ T1 ∣ T2 ∣ (A1 ∣! (t (xA1) .letmA1 = fst (dec (xA1 , sk (KA1)))
in νnnonce.t ⟨enc ((mA1 , nnonce) , pubA2)⟩))
∣ (A2 ∣!t (xA2)) ∣ A3
Wherein workflow processWterm is as specified in formula 8.9 above and the fresh nonce nnonce is included
to maintain the uniqueness property of public transitions. If we perform the simple collusion metric test
again, we yield the same result as before: the minimum number of required agents to ensure satisfiability
of our workflow example is two and the minimum set of agents required to ensure satisfiability is still{A1,A2}. However, because of the communication between agents A1 and A2 then agent A2 has control
of both tasks (as task messages MT1and MT2) and we say that the extended collusion metric is one in
this example. Note that two agents are still required to perform the workflow but one agent can have
complete control over the workflow.
In practice, analysing a model for the extended collusion metric requires multiple tests. First we test
by assigning output messages to all of the agent processes, then we selectively apply outputs to agent
processes and we check at each stage that a complete set of messages can be output as specified by a
model Q′c that behaves as follows:
νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M1⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M2⟩Ð→ t⟨Mend⟩Ð→ (8.14)
Experiment 1: agents A1, A2 and A3 leak secrets
Our first experiment is performed on:
P8term ≜ Wterm ∣ T1 ∣ T2 ∣ (A1 ∣! (t (xA1) .letmA1 = fst (dec (xA1 , sk (KA1)))
in νnnonce.t ⟨enc ((mA1 , nnonce) , pubA2)⟩ .t ⟨mA1⟩))
∣ (A2 ∣! (t (xA2) .letmA2 = fst (dec (xA2 , sk (KA2))) in t ⟨mA2⟩))
∣ (A3 ∣! (t (xA3) .letmA3 = fst (dec (xA3 , sk (KA3))) in t ⟨mA3⟩))
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being the usual workflow and task processes together with agents A1, A2 and A3 all outputting their
messages on the public channel t and agent A1 communicating with agent A2. Performing the analysis
yields the following traces:
No. P8term Q
′
c
1 W1
C1⇔ T1,A1 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
2
(t(xA1).νnnonce.t⟨enc((mA1 ,nnonce),pubA2)⟩.t⟨mA1 ⟩)Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M1⟩Ð→
3 W2
C2⇔ T2,A2 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
4
(t(xA2).t⟨mA2 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M2⟩Ð→
5
t⟨Mend⟩Ð→ t⟨Mend⟩Ð→
success
therefore
P8term ∼ab Q′c
and the set of agents {A1,A2,A3} has access to all of the secrets that comprise the complete workflow.
Note that, given the manner in which information is leaked from agents then the order in which the test
sequence 8.14 is specified is irrelevant as the leaky agents in P8term can output secrets in any order.
Experiment 2: agents A2 and A3 leak secrets
Next, we perform the same test and we restrict outputs from the agent processes as follows:
P9term ≜ Wterm ∣ T1 ∣ T2 ∣ (A1 ∣! (t (xA1) .letmA1 = fst (dec (xA1 , sk (KA1)))
in νnnonce.t ⟨enc ((mA1 , nnonce) , pubA2)⟩))
∣ (A2 ∣! (t (xA2) .letmA2 = fst (dec (xA2 , sk (KA2))) in t ⟨mA2⟩))
∣ (A3 ∣! (t (xA3) .letmA3 = fst (dec (xA3 , sk (KA3))) in t ⟨mA3⟩))
that is we no longer output secrets from agent A1 although A1 still communicates with A2. The trace
results are as follows:
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No. P9term Q
′
c
1 W1
C1⇔ T1,A1 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
2
t(xA1).νnnonce.t⟨enc((mA1 ,nnonce),pubA2)⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
3
t(xA2).t⟨mA2 ⟩Ð→ t⟨MT1 ⟩Ð→
4 W2
C2⇔ T2,A2 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
5
t(xA2).t⟨mA2 ⟩Ð→ t⟨MT2 ⟩Ð→
6
t⟨Mend⟩Ð→ t⟨Mend⟩Ð→
success
therefore
P9term ∼ab Q′c
and the set of agents {A2,A3} has access to all of the secrets that comprise the complete workflow.
Experiment 3: agents A1 and A3 leak secrets
Next, we perform the test again but we restrict outputs from the agent processes as follows:
P10term ≜ Wterm ∣ T1 ∣ T2 ∣ (A1 ∣! (t (xA1) .letmA1 = fst (dec (xA1 , sk (KA1)))
in νnnonce.t ⟨enc ((mA1 , nnonce) , pubA2)⟩ .t ⟨mA1⟩)) ∣ (A2 ∣!t (xA2))
∣ (A3 ∣! (t (xA3) .letmA3 = fst (dec (xA3 , sk (KA3))) in t ⟨mA3⟩))
that is we no longer output secrets from agent A2. The trace results are as follows:
No. P10term Q
′
c
1 W1
C1⇔ T1,A1 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
2
t(xA1).νnnonce.t⟨enc((mA1 ,nnonce),pubA2)⟩.t⟨mA1 ⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨MT1 ⟩Ð→
3 W2
C2⇔ T2,A2 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
4
t(xA2)∣t⟨mA3 ⟩Ð→ fail
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therefore we conclude that
P10term ≁ab Q′c
and the agent set {A1,A3} does not have access to all of the secrets that comprise the complete workflow.
Experiment 4: agents A1 and A2 leak secrets
We perform the test again but we restrict outputs from the agent processes as follows:
P11term ≜ Wterm ∣ T1 ∣ T2 ∣ (A1 ∣! (t (xA1) .letmA1 = fst (dec (xA1 , sk (KA1)))
in νnnonce.t ⟨enc ((mA1 , nnonce) , pubA2)⟩ .t ⟨mA1⟩))
∣ (A2 ∣! (t (xA2) .letmA2 = fst (dec (xA2 , sk (KA2))) in t ⟨mA2⟩))
∣ (A3 ∣!t (xA3))
that is we no longer output secrets from agent A3. The trace results are as follows:
No. P11term Q
′
c
1 W1
C1⇔ T1,A1 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
2
t(xA1).νnnonce.t⟨enc((mA1 ,nnonce),pubA2)⟩.t⟨mA1 ⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨MT1 ⟩Ð→
3 W2
C2⇔ T2,A2 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
4
t(xA2).t⟨mA2 ⟩Ð→ t⟨MT2 ⟩Ð→
5
t⟨Mend⟩Ð→ t⟨Mend⟩Ð→
success
therefore
P11term ∼ab Q′c
and the agent set {A1,A2} has access to all of the secrets that comprise the complete workflow.
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Experiment 5: agent A1 leaks secrets
Having restricted the output of secrets to any two agents, we perform the tests again only this time we
restrict the output of secrets to single agents. Firstly, we restrict output to agent A1 only:
P12term ≜ Wterm ∣ T1 ∣ T2 ∣ (A1 ∣! (t (xA1) .letmA1 = fst (dec (xA1 , sk (KA1)))
in νnnonce.t ⟨enc ((mA1 , nnonce) , pubA2)⟩ .t ⟨mA1⟩))
∣ (A2 ∣!t (xA2)) ∣ (A3 ∣!t (xA3))
yielding the following trace results:
No. P12term Q
′
c
1 W1
C1⇔ T1,A1 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
2
t(xA1).νnnoncet⟨enc((mA1 ,nnonce),pubA2)⟩.t⟨mA1 ⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨MT1 ⟩Ð→
3 W2
C2⇔ T2,A2 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
4 fail
therefore we conclude that
P12term ≁ab Q′c
and agent A1 alone does not have access to all of the secrets that comprise the complete workflow.
Experiment 6: agent A2 leaks secrets
Next, we restrict output to agent A2 only:
P13term ≜ Wterm ∣ T1 ∣ T2 ∣ (A1 ∣! (t (xA1) .letmA1 = fst (dec (xA1 , sk (KA1)))
in νnnonce.t ⟨enc ((mA1 , nnonce) , pubA2)⟩))
∣ (A2 ∣! (t (xA2) .letmA2 = fst (dec (xA2 , sk (KA2))) in t ⟨mA2⟩))
∣ (A3 ∣!t (xA3))
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with the following trace results:
No. P13term Q
′
c
1 W1
C1⇔ T1,A1 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
2
t(xA1).νnnonce.t⟨enc((mA1 ,nnonce),pubA2)⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
3
t(xA2).t⟨mA2 ⟩Ð→ t⟨MT1 ⟩Ð→
4 W2
C2⇔ T2,A2 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
4
t(xA2).t⟨mA2 ⟩Ð→ .t⟨MT2 ⟩Ð→
5
t⟨Mend⟩Ð→ t⟨Mend⟩Ð→
success
therefore
P13term ∼ab Q′c
and agent A2 alone has access to all of the secrets that comprise the complete workflow.
Experiment 7: agent A3 leaks secrets
Finally, we restrict output to agent A3 only:
P14term ≜ Wterm ∣ T1 ∣ T2 ∣ (A1 ∣! (t (xA1) .letmA1 = fst (dec (xA1 , sk (KA1)))
in νnnonce.t ⟨enc ((mA1 , nnonce) , pubA2)⟩))
∣ (A2 ∣!t (xA2)) ∣ (A3 ∣! (t (xA3) .letmA3 = fst (dec (xA3 , sk (KA3)))
in t ⟨mA3⟩))
with the following trace results:
No. P14term Q
′
c
1 W1
C1⇔ T1,A1 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
2
t(xA1).νnnonce.t⟨enc((mA1 ,nnonce),pubA2)⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
3 W2
C2⇔ T2,A2 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
4
t(xA2)Ð→ fail
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therefore we conclude that
P14term ≁ab Q′c
and agent A3 alone does not have access to all of the secrets that comprise the complete workflow.
Conclusions
Given all of the above tests, we can conclude that the minimum number of agents that can have access
to all of the workflow messages by direct and indirect means and can therefore exercise complete control
over the workflow is one: agent A2 has access to all of the messages. We conclude, therefore, that the
example workflow has an extended collusion metric of one.
Clearly, in this toy example the calculation of the extended collusion metric does not yield results that are
terribly surprising. However, in a more complex workflow model with interactions between certain agents
(representing siblings, close friends or spouses perhaps) then the extended collusion metric can behave as
an indicator as to the success or otherwise of the application of segregation of duties to workflow-based
agent/task assignments.
8.3.1.4 Performing tests for anonymity
We return once again to our two-task workflow example of section 8.3.1 and this time we analyse the
model for anonymity. For the purpose of this set of experiments we assume that one agent, A2, has
been compromised so that an attacker, att [], has control over A2’s secrets: KA2 , the key seed, an
organisation-wide key seed Korg and the agent’s identity IDA2 . The results of these experiments are
displayed in summary form using the syntax of section 8.2.7.1. Details of the experiment traces are
included in appendix C.
Experiment 8
We perform the equivalence test to ascertain whether or not:
P15term =Wterm ∣ T1 ∣ T2 ∣ A1 ≈ P16term =Wterm ∣ T1 ∣ T2 ∣ A3
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that is we test the model with agent A1 and the attacker behaving as agent A2 against the model with
agent A3 and the attacker behaving as agent A2.
The comparative reductions for P15term and P
16
term are summarised as follows (details in appendix C
section C.1):
No. P15term P
16
term
1 {Wterm C1⇔ T1,A1} « IDT1 , pubT1 {Wterm C1⇔ T1,A3} « IDT1 , pubT1FAIL
In this instance it is clear that labelled reduction of Wterm ∣ T1 ∣ T2 ∣ A3 cannot proceed beyond T1 as
neither the attacker nor agent process A3 can access T1 due to access control constraints and
P15term =Wterm ∣ T1 ∣ T2 ∣ A1 ≉ P16term =Wterm ∣ T1 ∣ T2 ∣ A3
So in this case agent process A1 can be linked with the completion of a task or tasks on which task
process T2 depends and agent process A1 is not anonymous in respect of the attacker.
Experiment 9
Let us now consider the case where we have an additional agent A4 with role clerk within our set of
agents in our model.
We perform an equivalence test to ascertain whether or not:
P19term =Wterm ∣ T1 ∣ T2 ∣ A1 ∣ A3 ≈ P20term =Wterm ∣ T1 ∣ T2 ∣ A3 ∣ A4
The fourth agent process A4 is defined as follows:
A4 ≜ !agent ⟨⟨IDA4 ,KA4⟩⟩
The agent/role assignment for agent A4 is given as:
role (IDA4 , clerk)
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and this is written to the store R using the following process:
W (R) (role (IDA4 , clerk))
The trace comparison from P19term to P
20
term can be summarised as follows (detailed labelled reductions
and static equivalences for this experiment are displayed in appendix C section C.2):
P19term P
20
term
{W1 C11⇔ T1,A1} « IDT1 , pubT1 {W1 C12⇔ T1,A4} « IDT1 , pubT1
{W2 C21⇔ T2,Att (A2)} « IDT2 , pubT2 ,MT2 {W2 C22⇔ T2,Att (A2)} « IDT2 , pubT2 ,MT2
then we perform the same exercise from P20term to P
19
term.
Based upon the tests performed above we can conclude that:
P19term ≈ P20term
and we can infer from this result that anonymity is preserved in respect of an agent interacting with
task T1 from the perspective of a compromised agent A2. In other words, a compromised agent and an
attacker know that some agent must have interacted with task T1 but they do not know the identity of
that agent in the workflow model under investigation.
8.3.1.5 Conclusions
We demonstrate the application of the suite of security analysis tests for the applied pi calculus im-
plementation of BPAC in respect of a trivial workflow example. We observe from the results of these
tests that the security problems of BPAC highlighted in chapter 3 such as satisfiability, collusion and
anonymity are properly identified by our tests.
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8.3.2 Analysing a simple conference management system
8.3.2.1 Introduction
In order to demonstrate the application of reachability analysis to BPAC models of workflow-based access
control we consider the example of a simple flawed conference management system per Zhang [104]. We
present the example in section 8.3.2.2, then we encode the model in our BPAC modelling environment per
section 8.3.2.3 and perform an analysis based upon reachability/satisfiability testing in section 8.3.2.4.
8.3.2.2 Outline of the conference management system
We turn our attention to an access control example that demonstrates weaknesses in a naive conference
management system. For this particular test we consider the following simple flawed example of a
conference management system as per Nan Zhang [104]:
1. The chair C of the PC (Programme Committee) assigns papers to PC members for review.
2. A PC member a can read PC member b’s review for paper p provided that p is not assigned to a.
3. If two members a and b are both assigned paper p for reviewing a can read b’s review for p only if
a has already submitted its review for p.
4. Having been given a paper p member a can give up being a reviewer before reviewing finished.
We model the basic conference management system as a workflow comprising two connected sub-workflows
of five tasks each and we allocate static constraints based upon the rules outlined above. For example,
rule 4 above is implemented by tasks T3a, T3b (give up review). Completion of either of tasks T3a and T5a
results in the triggering of the second sub-workflow so as to represent the idea of a loop back to the start
of the workflow. Additionally, we add dummy tasks Tjoin and Tend to the overall combined workflow
model to ensure consistency with the workflow requirements of chapter 3, specifically, the matching of
XOR split tasks with XOR join tasks and the addition of a terminating task to the combined workflow.
These tasks do not represent any activity. The list of tasks is outlined in table 8.1 and a diagram of the
workflows is presented in figure 8.1.
8.3.2.3 A BPAC model of the conference management system
As usual, we model the access control problem as an interaction between processes: a workflow manager
W , a collection of i parallel tasks and a collection of j parallel agents, initialised by process M. We
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T1a
assign p
T2a
review p
T3a
give up
T4a
submit p
T5a
read p
T1b
assign p
T2b
review p
T3b
give up
T4b
submit p
T5b
read p
Tjoin
dummy
Tend
dummy
XOR split XOR split
XOR join
XOR join
Figure 8.1: A flawed conference management system
Tasks Task detail Constraint
T1a, T1b assign paper p to PC members for review is a chair
T2a, T2b review p is assigned review of p
T3a, T3b give up review of p is assigned review of p
T4a, T4b submit review of p is assigned review of p
T5a, T5b read review of p is not assigned review of p
OR has submitted a review of p
Tjoin dummy join task none
Tend dummy end task none
Table 8.1: List of tasks for the flawed conference management system
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decide to use three agents in this model representing the chair C and members a and b as per the outline
of the example in section 8.3.2.2. This number of agents is sufficient to allow the correct function of the
protocol model. For instance, chair C assigns a review to member a and member b reads the review.
The number is also sufficient to identify a flaw in the protocol such as agent a reading agent b’s review
without a submitting a review. We use the name p to represent the conference paper.
Firstly we define our initialisation process M as follows:
νKW ,KOrg,KT1 ,KT2 ,KT3 ,KT4 ,KT5 ,Kjoin,Kend (8.15)
KA1 ,KA2 ,KA3 , IDA1 , IDA2 , IDA3 , p,
set, storeQ, storeR, storeS.
(W (R) (role (IDA1 , PCMember))
.W (R) (role (IDA2 , PCMember))
.W (R) (role (IDA3 , PCMember))
.W (R) (role (IDA3 ,Chair)) ∣ χ)
where, as usual, X represents all of the private internal support processes, such as the set handling
processes and the store processes Q, R and S. WithinM we assign PCMember roles to the three agents
that are participating in the model and we assign the Chair to agent A3.
We define the workflow manager as follows so that all of the constraints outlined in section 8.3.2.2 above
are implemented:
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W ≜ νIDT1 , IDT2 , IDT3 , IDT4 , IDT5 , IDTjoin , IDTend , t2, t3, t4, t5, tjoin, tend.
(tW .taskCall ⟨⟨IDT1 ,KT1 , IDW ,KW , [T (R) (role (idA, chairman)) ∶]⟩⟩ .t2
∣ t2.taskCall ⟨⟨IDT2 ,KT2 , IDW ,KW , [T (S) (review (idA, p)) ∶]⟩⟩
. (t3 + t4)
∣ t3.taskCall ⟨⟨IDT3 ,KT3 , IDW ,KW , [T (S) (review (idA, p)) ∶]⟩⟩ . (tW + tjoin)
∣ t4.taskCall ⟨⟨IDT4 ,KT4 , IDW ,KW , [T (S) (review (idA, p)) ∶]⟩⟩ .t5
∣ t5. (taskCall ⟨⟨IDT5 ,KT5 , IDW ,KW , [T (S) (review (idA, p)) ∶ 0 ∶]⟩⟩
+taskCall ⟨⟨IDT5 ,KT5 , IDW ,KW , [T (S) (submitted (idA, p)) ∶]⟩⟩) . (tW + tjoin)
∣ tjoin.taskCall ⟨⟨IDTjoin ,KTjoin , IDW ,KW , [τ]⟩⟩ .tend
∣ tend.taskCall ⟨⟨IDTend ,KTend , IDW ,KW , [τ]⟩⟩)
A complete model Pconf of the conference management system using the workflow manager and agent
and task processes is as follows for the three participating agents and two runs of the workflow process:
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Pconf ≜ νtW . (tW ∣W ∣W )
∣ task ⟨⟨IDT1a ,KT1 ,MT1a , [W (S) (review (idA, p))] , [τ]⟩⟩
∣ task ⟨⟨IDT1b ,KT1 ,MT1b , [W (S) (review (idA, p))] , [τ]⟩⟩
∣ task ⟨⟨IDT1c ,KT1 ,MT1c , [W (S) (review (idA, p))] , [τ]⟩⟩
∣ task ⟨⟨IDT2a ,KT2 ,MT2a , [τ] , [τ]⟩⟩
∣ task ⟨⟨IDT2b ,KT2 ,MT2b , [τ] , [τ]⟩⟩
∣ task ⟨⟨IDT3a ,KT3 ,MT3a , [D (S) (review (idA, p))] , [τ]⟩⟩
∣ task ⟨⟨IDT3b ,KT3 ,MT3b , [D (S) (review (idA, p))] , [τ]⟩⟩
∣ task ⟨⟨IDT3c ,KT3 ,MT3c , [D (S) (review (idA, p))] , [τ]⟩⟩
∣ task ⟨⟨IDT4a ,KT4 ,MT4a , [D (S) (review (idA, p))]
, [W (S) (submitted (idA, p))]⟩⟩
∣ task ⟨⟨IDT4b ,KT4 ,MT4b , [D (S) (review (idA, p))]
, [W (S) (submitted (idA, p))]⟩⟩
∣ task ⟨⟨IDT4c ,KT4 ,MT4c , [D (S) (review (idA, p))]
, [W (S) (submitted (idA, p))]⟩⟩
∣ task ⟨⟨IDT5a ,KT5 ,MT5a , [τ] , [τ]⟩⟩
∣ task ⟨⟨IDT5b ,KT5 ,MT5b , [τ] , [τ]⟩⟩
∣ task ⟨⟨IDTjoin ,KTjoin ,MTjoin , [τ] , [τ]⟩⟩
∣ task ⟨⟨IDTend ,KTend ,MTend , [τ] , [τ]⟩⟩
∣!agent ⟨⟨IDA1 ,KA1⟩⟩
∣!agent ⟨⟨IDA2 ,KA2⟩⟩
∣!agent ⟨⟨IDA3 ,KA3⟩⟩
Note that we have introduced multiple instances of the workflow manager and task processes within this
model for the purpose of our investigation. Also, we have introduced multiple versions of the task resource
messages MTi so that we can differentiate multiple task runs in our tests. Where a task process includes
a store interaction there are three variants of the task process, recognising that the store interaction can
be in respect of any of the three participating agents.
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8.3.2.4 Analysing the model for dependency
A possible security test for this workflow model is to find out whether or not an agent can read another
person’s review of a paper that she is to review herself, in breach of rule 3 above. Within our model
this security compromise can be represented by demonstrating that an agent can obtain the task message
(MT5) for task 5 (T5), followed by the task messages (MT2 andMT4) for tasks 2 (T2) and 4 (T4) respectively.
That is, some agent has access to task 5 and reads a review of paper p then subsequently she reviews
paper p via task 2 and submits the review via task 4. Output of MTend indicates that the workflow is
satisfiable.
We define abstract reference model Qconf as being a process that has the following transition steps:
νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨MT5a ⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨MT2b ⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨MT4b ⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨MTend ⟩Ð→ (8.16)
and we modify the process for agent A2, !agent ⟨⟨IDA2 ,KA2⟩⟩, inPconf so that it can output its discovered
task messages on the public channel t:
!agent ⟨⟨IDA2 ,KA2⟩⟩ ∣ (t (xA2a) . (8.17)
letmA2a = fst (dec (xA2 , sk (KA2))) in t ⟨mA2a⟩ .
t (xA2b) .letmA2b = fst (dec (xA2 , sk (KA2))) in t ⟨mA2b⟩)
Note that on this occasion we have made the message disclosures serially dependent so that the second
release of a discovered message can only occur after the first discovered message has been released. Now
P′conf represents the conference process Pconf with the original process for A2 replaced by the modified
process 8.17 above. If P′conf ∼ab Qconf , we have demonstrated that rule 3 can be breached as this
indicates that an agent can read another agent’s review of the same paper before she has reviewed and
submitted her own review of the paper. A trace comparison for this experiment is presented below:
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No. P′conf Qconf
1 W1
C1a⇔ T1a,A3 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
2 W2
C2a⇔ T2a,A1 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
3 W4
C4a⇔ T4a,A1 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
4 W5
C5a⇔ T5a,A2 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
5
t(xA2).t⟨mA2 ⟩Ð→ t⟨MT5a ⟩Ð→
6 W1
C1b⇔ T1b,A3 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
7 W2
C2b⇔ T2b,A2 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
8
t(xA2).t⟨mA2 ⟩Ð→ t⟨MT2b ⟩Ð→
9 W4
C4b⇔ T4b,A2 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
10
t(xA2).t⟨mA2 ⟩Ð→ t⟨MT4b ⟩Ð→
11 W5
C5b⇔ T5b,A1 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
12 Wjoin
Cjoin⇔ Tjoin,A3 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
13 Wend
Cend⇔ Tend,A2 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
14
t(xA2).t⟨mA2 ⟩Ð→ t⟨MTend ⟩Ð→
success
Running the abstraction test does indeed identify that P′conf ∼ab Qconf i.e. an agent can read another
agent’s review of a paper p, before being assigned that paper for review, in breach of rule three.
8.3.2.5 Conclusions
We demonstrate with this model of access control for a naive conference management system that satisfi-
ability tests based upon the abstraction test can be used to highlight particular flaws in the access control
model within BPAC. We note that the example highlights issues with activation and deactivation of roles
and that BPAC does not support this. However, we demonstrate that BPAC can model and analyse this
particular example through the use of task-based dynamic constraints. We consider that such an ap-
proach is more appropriate as role assignment lacks the required granularity. Access control based solely
upon the allocation of roles such as “reviewer”, say, provides access to a whole class of resources, such as
papers in the example, but our approach applies access control to the individual papers themselves.
It could be argued that the test material and the test itself is somewhat contrived and that real-world
discovery of flaws would be rather more difficult than it appears from this example. Certainly, this
example has been selected to provide a proof of concept with known flaws to demonstrate the test
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process. Careful selection of test strategies and formulation of the abstract reference model would be
required in practice.
8.4 Computational complexity
8.4.1 Introduction
In section 8.3 above we provide some toy examples of security analysis for models of workflow-based
access control within our BPAC environment. As the example workflow model comprises only two tasks
and three or four agents then the number of possible processes required for each test is maintained at
manageable levels. In practice, the workflow models are likely to be much more complex and the number
of processes required will be substantially greater. In this section we discuss the issue of computational
complexity with regard to the collusion metric test. Discussions regarding the other security tests would
follow a broadly similar theme.
8.4.2 Complexity of the extended collusion metric computation
In section 8.3.1.3 we compute the extended collusion metric for our two-task toy workflow example. A
number of processes are required to perform this computation as experiments have to be performed for
different combinations of agent processes. In general, we can state that the identification of the extended
collusion metric depends upon the execution of multiple experiments based upon the number of agent
processes within the model. Indeed in the worst case we are required to perform 2NA − 1 experiments
where NA is the total number of participating agent processes within the model. Whilst a test with a
worst time complexity of O (2NA) is rather less than ideal, it is anticipated that, in practice, substantially
fewer experiments would need to be performed, as we discuss below.
Discovery of a valid execution path for a workflow of tasks and a set of agents requires multiple executions
of the order of (NA)NT where NA is the total number of agents as before and NT is the total number
of tasks in the workflow model. Again we are faced with exponential time complexity. In practice, most
of these outcomes are likely to fail due to access control constraints but for a workflow, task and agent
model there may be numerous possible execution paths depending upon the number of agents that can
successfully interact with the workflow manager and tasks. As we are going to have to perform many
experiments for different agents releasing secrets then we only need to check the full number of outcomes
once as the release of secrets is independent of the access control process.
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A further problem to note is that the experiments themselves may have a multiplicity of outcomes. In our
toy example the only satisfiable outcome is obtained from agent processes A1 and A2 and the subsequent
experiments are relatively straightforward. However, in a more complex example, like our purchases
workflow, there could be a number of valid agent mixes that lead to satisfiable outcomes.
Mitigating against computational explosion in extended collusion metric analysis
We suggest above that a problem with the extended collusion metric analysis as outlined above is worst
time complexity of O (2n) in respect of the performance of experiments. In practice, time complexity can
be reduced somewhat.
Given a number of agents NA and a number of tasks NT and given that no more than one agent can
interact with a task via the standard core protocol then:
If NA ≥ NT , we do not need to test for combinations of agents greater than or equal to NT out of a total
of NA agents and only if NA < NT do we need, potentially, to test up to NA agents.
An organisation is likely to be interested in a minimum value for the collusion metric. That is, an
organisation would seek to confirm that the collusion metric for a particular workflow-based access control
model does not fall below some value. For example, given a number of agents and a workflow model it
might be decided that a minimum collusion metric is three, say. The strategy, therefore, would be to
perform experiments with single agent leaks of secrets, then experiments with pairs and if all tests are
false and if the model passes the satisfiability test then we can conclude that the collusion metric is at least
three. For a large set of agents a small minimum collusion metric produces the greatest computational
savings with respect to the worst case time complexity.
It may be possible to reduce the size of the set of participating agents by removing those agents that clearly
play no part in the workflow model. However, care needs to be taken as agents that are not directly
associated with the workflow might nonetheless be a communication conduit or a process facilitator
enabling other agents to obtain secrets. An agent might gain control over a number of task secrets and
yet play no direct part in the workflow interaction.
A further possibility is to reduce the workflow to smaller components and perform experiments on these
workflow components instead of on the workflow in its entirety.
8.4.3 Conclusion
We recognise that computational explosion is a problem with our security analysis tests within our
modelling environment. We observe that there may be possible strategies to mitigate against this problem
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and it is likely that improvements to our test methods could yield improved performance in this respect.
Whilst we would like to use the applied pi calculus modelling environment to analyse complex access
control problems it is not yet possible to implement this approach using an automated checking tool
such as ProVerif. Additional work is required in this regard. For example, ProVerif does not implement
observational equivalence fully and it is unable to perform our abstraction test. Also, ProVerif doe not
provide a mechanism for retaining state histories as exemplified by the use of stores in our modelling
environment. These issues have to be addressed if our modelling environment is to be implemented by
an automated checking tool. Furthermore, the high level trace comparisons that we use as part of our
security tests and which provide shortcuts to our protocol analysis also need to be implemented in an
automated checking tool. An automated checking tool, when so amended, in addition to the use of
optimising strategies, would provide a practical application of our BPAC modelling environment and its
security tests in mitigation against the complexity issues discussed above.
8.5 Summary
In this chapter we present a discussion on the analysis of security properties within access control models
using our modelling environment and this is followed by a detailed presentation of analysis techniques for
a number of security tests. We introduce a lightweight test called the abstraction test and we demonstrate
its use and flexibility over a number of security analysis examples for model systems of workflow-based
access control. The security test for anonymity presented in section 8.2.7, with example experiments
in 8.3.1.4, utilises the full power of observational equivalence/labelled bisimilarity, a key strength of the
applied pi calculus. However, we identify complexity issues with the implementation of security tests to
all but the smallest toy access control examples and further work is required in this respect, particularly
with regard to automation of the modelling environment.
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Analysing the simple workflow
9.1 Introduction
In chapter 4 we introduce a simple BPAC purchases workflow example and we present the applied pi
calculus coding of this example in chapter 7. In this chapter we return to our purchases workflow and we
perform a collection of security tests on the BPAC workflow model. In section 9.2 we perform satisfiability
checks and in section 9.3 we calculate the collusion metric for this particular example. In section 9.4 we
perform anonymity tests on the purchases model.
9.2 Testing the purchases workflow for satisfiability
Given the terminating simple purchases workflow model Ptermp (7.7), initialised byM (7.1), detailed in
chapters 4 and 7 above, we seek to establish that, given the access control constraints and given the set
of available agents:
A = {Agent1, Agent2, Agent3, Agent4,Agent5}
a trace can be found in which the complete workflow can be executed.
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9.2.1 Procedure
We attempt to find a trace of our model Ptermp that is indistinguishable from the trace for an abstract
reference model Qp. We use the procedure that we describe as the abstraction test as outlined in
section 8.2.3 above.
Now we formulate the labelled transition behaviour of our abstract reference model Qp as follows:
νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨Mend⟩Ð→
that is, any number of fresh names broadcast over the public channel t are followed by the output of
name Mend over t. We perform the abstraction test to establish or otherwise:
Ptermp ∼ab Qp
that is we seek to establish whether or not there exists a trace of Ptermp that behaves as Qp in so far as
an external observer is concerned.
Firstly, we rewrite Ptermp as follows:
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Ptermp ≜ Wterm ∣ Task1 ∣ Task2 ∣ Task3
∣ Task4 ∣ Task5 ∣ Task6
∣ Agent1 ∣ Agent2 ∣ Agent3
∣ Agent4 ∣ Agent5
= νIDW , IDTask1 , IDTask2 , IDTask3 ,
IDTask4 , IDTask5 , IDTask6 ,
t2, t3, t4, t5a, t5b, t6, tend.
(W1.t2 ∣ t2.W2. (t3 ∣ t4)
∣ t3.W3.t5a ∣ t4.W4.t5b
∣ t5a.t5b.W5.t6 ∣ t6.W6.tend
∣ tend.t ⟨Mend⟩)
∣ Task1 ∣ Task2 ∣ Task3
∣ Task4 ∣ Task5 ∣ Task6
∣ Agent1 ∣ Agent2 ∣ Agent3
∣ Agent4 ∣ Agent5
by substitution using 7.5 above.
As in our examples in the previous chapters, this rewriting of Ptermp highlights the core protocol tran-
sitions. In this case, there are six core protocol transitions being the interaction between W1, one of
Task1 . . . Task6 and one of Agent1 . . .Agent5, which we refer to as core protocol instance C1; the interac-
tion between W2, one of Task1 . . . Task6 and one of Agent1 . . .Agent5, which we refer to as core protocol
instance C2 and so on through to protocol instance C6.
9.2.2 Results
We attempt to find a trace of Ptermp that behaves like Qp (summarised below):
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No. Ptermp Qp
1 W1
C1⇔ Task1,Agent1 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
2 W2
C2⇔ Task2,Agent2 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
3 W3
C3⇔ Task3,Agent4 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
4 W4
C4⇔ Task4,Agent5 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
5 W5
C5⇔ Task5,Agent2 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
6 W6
C6⇔ Task6,Agent1 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
7
t⟨Mend⟩Ð→ t⟨Mend⟩Ð→
success
We can conclude from the above trace comparison that:
Ptermp ∼ab Qp
That is, there exists a trace where workflow sub-process W1 interacts with task process Task1 and agent
Agent1 (core protocol instance C1), workflow sub-processW2 interacts with task process Task2 and agent
Agent2(core protocol instance C2) and so on through to the terminating process t ⟨Mend⟩ and this trace
is similar to the trace of test process Qp.
9.2.3 Conclusion
Based upon the experiment outlined above we can conclude that the workflow-based access control model
is satisfiable using the specified access control constraints and given the set of agents:
{Agent1,Agent2,Agent3,Agent4,Agent5}
and the set of tasks:
{Task1, Task2, Task3, Task4, Task5, Task6}
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9.3 The extended collusion metric for the simple purchases work-
flow
9.3.1 Procedure
Firstly, we modify our terminating workflow modelPtermp so that all agents Agent1 . . .Agent5 can output
any messages received from interactions with the workflow manager Wterm and tasks Task1 . . . Task6,
noting that the agent processes as per A.5.2 above output any received messages on public channel t
encrypted under the agent’s own public key:
156
9.3 The extended collusion metric for the simple purchases workflow
P′termp ≜ Wterm ∣ Task1 ∣ Task2 ∣ Task3 (9.1)
∣ Task4 ∣ Task5 ∣ Task6
∣ Agent1 ∣ Agent2 ∣ Agent3
∣ Agent4 ∣ Agent5
= νIDW , IDTask1 , IDTask2 , IDTask3 ,
IDTask4 , IDTask5 , IDTask6 ,
t2, t3, t4, t5a, t5b, t6, tend.
(W1.t2 ∣ t2.W2. (t3 ∣ t4)
∣ t3.W3.t5a ∣ t4.W4.t5b
∣ t5a.t5b.W5.t6 ∣ t6.W6.tend
∣ tend.t ⟨Mend⟩)
∣ Task1 ∣ Task2 ∣ Task3
∣ Task4 ∣ Task5 ∣ Task6
∣ (Agent1 ∣! (t (xAgent1) .letmAgent1
= fst (dec (xAgent1 , sk (KAgent1))) in t ⟨mAgent1⟩))
∣ (Agent2 ∣! (t (xAgent2) .letmAgent2
= fst (dec (xAgent2 , sk (KAgent2))) in t ⟨mAgent2⟩))
∣ (Agent3 ∣! (t (xAgent3) .letmAgent3
= fst (dec (xAgent3 , sk (KAgent3))) in t ⟨mAgent3⟩))
∣ (Agent4 ∣! (t (xAgent4) .letmAgent4
= fst (dec (xAgent4 , sk (KAgent4))) in t ⟨mAgent4⟩))
∣ (Agent5 ∣! (t (xAgent5) .letmAgent5
= fst (dec (xAgent5 , sk (KAgent5))) in t ⟨mAgent5⟩))
Next, we define our abstract model Q′p, which will be the target for our analysis using the format
outlined in section 8.2.5. Our model Q′p summarises all of the messages of our workflow model that
could be observed on a public channel if they were released to the public channel. The labelled transition
behaviour of our abstract model Q′p is specified as follows:
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νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M1⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M2⟩Ð→ (νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M3⟩Ð→ ∧ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M4⟩Ð→ ) (9.2)
νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M5⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M6⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨Mend⟩Ð→
Note the conjunctive form representing the parallel output of messages M3 and M4. This requires us to
perform two comparisons for each experiment, comparison against:
νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M1⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M2⟩Ð→ (νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M3⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M4⟩Ð→ )
νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M5⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M6⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨Mend⟩Ð→
and comparison against:
νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M1⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M2⟩Ð→ (νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M4⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M3⟩Ð→ )
νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M5⟩Ð→ νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒ t⟨M6⟩Ð→ t⟨Mend⟩Ð→
in order to confirm full parallel workflow behaviour in our test model.
9.3.2 Experiment with P′termp unmodified — five agent outputs
9.3.2.1 Experiment 1
Our first experiment compares traces of P′termp as per 9.1 above with the trace of Q′p as per 9.2 above.
The results are as follows:
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No. P′termp Q′p
1 W1
C1⇔ Task1,Agent1 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
2
(t(xAgent1).t⟨mAgent1 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M1⟩Ð→
3 W2
C2⇔ Task2,Agent2 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
4
(t(xAgent2).t⟨mAgent2 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M2⟩Ð→
5 W3
C3⇔ Task3,Agent4 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
6
(t(xAgent4).t⟨mAgent4 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M3⟩Ð→
7 W4
C4⇔ Task4,Agent5 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
8
(t(xAgent5).t⟨mAgent5 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M4⟩Ð→
9 W5
C5⇔ Task5,Agent2 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
10
(t(xAgent2).t⟨mAgent2 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M5⟩Ð→
11 W6
C6⇔ Task6,Agent1 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
12
(t(xAgent1).t⟨mAgent1 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M6⟩Ð→
13
t⟨Mend⟩Ð→ t⟨Mend⟩Ð→
success
and:
No. P′termp Q′p
1 W1
C1⇔ Task1,Agent1 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
2
(t(xAgent1).t⟨mAgent1 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M1⟩Ð→
3 W2
C2⇔ Task2,Agent2 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
4
(t(xAgent2).t⟨mAgent2 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M2⟩Ð→
5 W4
C4⇔ Task4,Agent4 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
6
(t(xAgent4).t⟨mAgent4 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M4⟩Ð→
7 W3
C3⇔ Task3,Agent5 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
8
(t(xAgent5).t⟨mAgent5 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M3⟩Ð→
9 W5
C5⇔ Task5,Agent2 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
10
(t(xAgent2).t⟨mAgent2 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M5⟩Ð→
11 W6
C6⇔ Task6,Agent1 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
12
(t(xAgent1).t⟨mAgent1 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M6⟩Ð→
13
t⟨Mend⟩Ð→ t⟨Mend⟩Ð→
success
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therefore we can conclude that:
P′termp ∼ab Q′p
and the set of agents {Agent1,Agent2,Agent3,Agent4,Agent5} has access to all of the secrets that
comprise the complete workflow.
9.3.3 Experiments with P′termp modified — four agent outputs
9.3.3.1 Experiment 2: removing Agent1 output
Our second experiment compares:
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P′′termp ≜ Wterm ∣ Task1 ∣ Task2 ∣ Task3
∣ Task4 ∣ Task5 ∣ Task6
∣ Agent1 ∣ Agent2 ∣ Agent3
∣ Agent4 ∣ Agent5
= νIDW , IDTask1 , IDTask2 , IDTask3 ,
IDTask4 , IDTask5 , IDTask6 ,
t2, t3, t4, t5a, t5b, t6, tend.
(W1.t2 ∣ t2.W2. (t3 ∣ t4)
∣ t3.W3.t5a ∣ t4.W4.t5b
∣ t5a.t5b.W5.t6 ∣ t6.W6.tend
∣ tend.t ⟨Mend⟩)
∣ Task1 ∣ Task2 ∣ Task3
∣ Task4 ∣ Task5 ∣ Task6
∣ Agent1
∣ (Agent2 ∣! (t (xAgent2) .letmAgent2
= fst (dec (xAgent2 , sk (KAgent2))) in t ⟨mAgent2⟩))
∣ (Agent3 ∣! (t (xAgent3) .letmAgent3
= fst (dec (xAgent3 , sk (KAgent3))) in t ⟨mAgent3⟩))
∣ (Agent4 ∣! (t (xAgent4) .letmAgent4
= fst (dec (xAgent4 , sk (KAgent4))) in t ⟨mAgent4⟩))
∣ (Agent5 ∣! (t (xAgent5) .letmAgent5
= fst (dec (xAgent5 , sk (KAgent5))) in t ⟨mAgent5⟩))
i.e. agent Agent1 does not output any acquired messages on t, to Q′p and the results are as follows:
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No. P′′termp Q′p
1 W1
C1⇔ Task1,Agent2 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
2
(t(xAgent2).t⟨mAgent2 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M1⟩Ð→
3 W2
C2⇔ Task2,Agent3 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
4
(t(xAgent3).t⟨mAgent3 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M2⟩Ð→
5 W3
C3⇔ Task3,Agent4 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
6
(t(xAgent4).t⟨mAgent4 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M3⟩Ð→
7 W4
C4⇔ Task4,Agent5 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
8
(t(xAgent5).t⟨mAgent5 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M4⟩Ð→
9 W5
C5⇔ Task5,Agent3 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
10
(t(xAgent3).t⟨mAgent3 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M5⟩Ð→
11 W6
C6⇔ Task6,Agent2 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
12
(t(xAgent2).t⟨mAgent2 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M6⟩Ð→
13
t⟨Mend⟩Ð→ t⟨Mend⟩Ð→
success
and:
No. P′′termp Q′p
1 W1
C1⇔ Task1,Agent2 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
2
(t(xAgent2).t⟨mAgent2 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M1⟩Ð→
3 W2
C2⇔ Task2,Agent3 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
4
(t(xAgent3).t⟨mAgent3 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M2⟩Ð→
5 W4
C4⇔ Task4,Agent4 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
6
(t(xAgent4).t⟨mAgent4 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M4⟩Ð→
7 W3
C3⇔ Task3,Agent5 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
8
(t(xAgent5).t⟨mAgent5 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M3⟩Ð→
9 W5
C5⇔ Task5,Agent3 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
10
(t(xAgent3).t⟨mAgent3 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M5⟩Ð→
11 W6
C6⇔ Task6,Agent2 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
12
(t(xAgent2).t⟨mAgent2 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M6⟩Ð→
13
t⟨Mend⟩Ð→ t⟨Mend⟩Ð→
success
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therefore we can conclude that:
P′′termp ∼ab Q′p
and the set of agents {Agent2,Agent3,Agent4,Agent5} has access to all of the secrets that comprise the
complete workflow.
Now, as we have successfully found a trace comparison for four agents we do not need to consider any
other cases for four agents.
9.3.4 Experiments with P′termp modified — three agent outputs
9.3.4.1 Experiment 3: removing Agent1 and Agent2 output
Our third experiment compares:
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P′′′termp ≜ Wterm ∣ Task1 ∣ Task2 ∣ Task3
∣ Task4 ∣ Task5 ∣ Task6
∣ Agent1 ∣ Agent2 ∣ Agent3
∣ Agent4 ∣ Agent5
= νIDW , IDTask1 , IDTask2 , IDTask3 ,
IDTask4 , IDTask5 , IDTask6 ,
t2, t3, t4, t5a, t5b, t6, tend.
(W1.t2 ∣ t2.W2. (t3 ∣ t4)
∣ t3.W3.t5a ∣ t4.W4.t5b
∣ t5a.t5b.W5.t6 ∣ t6.W6.tend
∣ tend.t ⟨Mend⟩)
∣ Task1 ∣ Task2 ∣ Task3
∣ Task4 ∣ Task5 ∣ Task6
∣ Agent1 ∣ Agent2
∣ (Agent3 ∣! (t (xAgent3) .letmAgent3
= fst (dec (xAgent3 , sk (KAgent3))) in t ⟨mAgent3⟩))
∣ (Agent4 ∣! (t (xAgent4) .letmAgent4
= fst (dec (xAgent4 , sk (KAgent4))) in t ⟨mAgent4⟩))
∣ (Agent5 ∣! (t (xAgent5) .letmAgent5
= fst (dec (xAgent5 , sk (KAgent5))) in t ⟨mAgent5⟩))
i.e. agents Agent1 and Agent2 do not output any acquired messages on t, to Q′p and the trace comparison
results are as follows:
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No. P′′′termp Q′p
1 W1
C1⇔ Task1,Agent3 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
2
(t(xAgent3).t⟨mAgent3 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M1⟩Ð→
3 W2
C2⇔ Task2,Agent4 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
4
(t(xAgent4).t⟨mAgent4 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M2⟩Ð→
5 W3
C3⇔ Task3,Agent5 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
6
(t(xAgent5).t⟨mAgent5 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M3⟩Ð→
7 fail
νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
and:
No. P′′′termp Q′p
1 W1
C1⇔ Task1,Agent3 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
2
(t(xAgent3).t⟨mAgent3 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M1⟩Ð→
3 W2
C2⇔ Task2,Agent4 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
4
(t(xAgent4).t⟨mAgent4 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M2⟩Ð→
5 W4
C4⇔ Task4,Agent5 νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
6
(t(xAgent5).t⟨mAgent5 ⟩)Ð→ t⟨M4⟩Ð→
7 fail
νn.t⟨n⟩Ô⇒
therefore we can conclude that:
P′′′termp ≁ab Q′p
and the set of agents {Agent3,Agent4,Agent5} does not have access to all of the secrets that comprise
the complete workflow.
9.3.4.2 Further experiments
We repeat experiment 3 above only this time we remove the output for Agent1 and Agent3 from 9.1 above.
We discover that {Agent2,Agent4,Agent5} does not have access to all of the secrets that comprise the
complete workflow. Performing the experiments on all of the remaining combinations of 9.1 with two
agent outputs removed we find that:
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{Agent2,Agent3,Agent5},
{Agent2,Agent3,Agent4},
{Agent1,Agent4,Agent5},
{Agent1,Agent3,Agent5},
{Agent1,Agent3,Agent4},
{Agent1,Agent2,Agent5},
{Agent1,Agent2,Agent4},
{Agent1,Agent2,Agent3}
do not have access to all of the secrets that comprise the complete workflow. In other words, no set of
three agents has access to all of the secrets that comprise the complete workflow.
9.3.5 Conclusion
Given that we have established that there exists a set of four agents for which the comparison test
is successful and there is no set of three agents for which the comparison test is successful then we
conclude that the extended collusion metric for our purchases workflow is four. In other words, at least
four agents would need to collude in order to obtain complete control over the purchases workflow.
Judgements as to the level of security of the purchase workflow indicated by the collusion metric depend
upon the circumstances of the workflow such as the interaction with other workflows, the importance or
significance of the workflow within an organisation and the management attitude to risk. However, in
this particular case it can be observed that a collusion metric of four for a six-task workflow represents,
in most circumstances, a high level of security and an effective implementation of segregation of duties.
Note that we would have obtained the same result had we calculated the simple collusion metric as there
is no interaction between agents in the example.
9.4 Anonymity testing
We perform anonymity tests on the simple access control model of chapter 7.
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9.4.1 Critical agent tests
9.4.1.1 Procedure
Firstly, let us consider our example workflow from chapter 7:
Ppurchase ≜ W ∣ Task1 ∣ Task2 ∣ Task3
∣ Task4 ∣ Task5 ∣ Task6
∣ Agent1 ∣ Agent2 ∣ Agent3
∣ Agent4 ∣ Agent5
initialised by M, and assume that no agents have been compromised. Let us test our model to see if
Agent1 is critical to the model. If we define P4purchase as our purchase model Ppurchase without agent
process Agent1:
P4purchase ≜ W ∣ Task1 ∣ Task2 ∣ Task3
∣ Task4 ∣ Task5 ∣ Task6
∣ Agent2 ∣ Agent3
∣ Agent4 ∣ Agent5
Then if Ppurchase ≈ P4purchase we can conclude that Agent1 is not critical to Ppurchase.
9.4.1.2 Results
We run comparison traces and static equivalences for all permutations of agent processes interacting with
the workflow manager and task processes comparing model Ppurchase to P4purchase and P
4
purchase to
Ppurchase. A selection of traces is detailed below.
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Ppurchase P4purchase
W1
C11⇔ Task1,Agent1 W1 C12⇔ Task1,Agent3
W2
C21⇔ Task2,Agent2 W2 C22⇔ Task2,Agent2
W3
C31⇔ Task3,Agent4 W3 C32⇔ Task3,Agent4
W4
C41⇔ Task4,Agent5 W4 C42⇔ Task4,Agent5
W5
C51⇔ Task5,Agent2 W5 C52⇔ Task5,Agent2
W6
C61⇔ Task6,Agent1 W6 C62⇔ Task6,Agent3
and a similar exercise can be performed for all of the alternative traces:
Ppurchase P4purchase
W1
C11⇔ Task1,Agent1 W1 C12⇔ Task1,Agent3
W2
C21⇔ Task2,Agent3 W2 C22⇔ Task2,Agent2
W3
C31⇔ Task3,Agent4 W3 C32⇔ Task3,Agent4
W4
C41⇔ Task4,Agent5 W4 C42⇔ Task4,Agent5
W5
C51⇔ Task5,Agent3 W5 C52⇔ Task5,Agent2
W6
C61⇔ Task6,Agent1 W6 C62⇔ Task6,Agent3
etc. and vice versa and all traces that do not complete such as:
Ppurchase P4purchase
W1
C11⇔ Task1,Agent4 W1 C12⇔ Task1,Agent4
W2
C21⇔ Task2,Agent2 W2 C22⇔ Task2,Agent2
W3
C31⇔ Task3,Agent5 W3 C32⇔ Task3,Agent5
access to Task4 fails access to Task4 fails
and vice versa and we can conclude that Ppurchase ≈ P4purchase and agent process Agent1 is not critical
to the workflow model. As Agent1 is not critical to the workflow then we can say that Agent1 is not
identifiable by an external observer from workflow behaviour i.e. Agent1 is anonymous to the external
observer.
9.4.1.3 Conclusion
We demonstrate above that Agent1 is not critical to our simple workflow model and we can perform
similar experiments for the remaining agents within the model. We find that agent processes Agent2 and
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Agent3 are not critical to the simple workflow model but processes Agent4 and Agent5 are critical and
identifiable and are not anonymous to an outside observer in this context. That is we can conclude that
anonymity is preserved in respect of our model and agents Agent1, Agent2 and Agent3 but we cannot
conclude that anonymity is preserved in respect of our model and agents Agent4 and Agent5.
9.4.2 Anonymity tests with a compromised agent
9.4.2.1 Procedure
Let us now consider a scenario wherein one of the agents in our model Ppurchase releases its secrets, the
agent’s key seed and the organisation key seed, to an outside third party. If there are sufficient agents and
the model workflow access control protocol is well formed, it should not be possible for the outside third
party to recover any information that associates agents, other than the compromised agent, with any
task or any portion of a workflow. We say that anonymity is preserved as, whilst the compromised agent
and the third party can possibly reason that certain tasks have been performed, the identity of agents
attached to tasks cannot be ascertained. In contrast, if the third party is able to reason from available
information the identity of an agent associated with a task or a portion of workflow, anonymity is not
preserved and the third party may be able to identify an agent target if they wish to increase control
over a workflow.
For our example we assume that an agent is compromised: Agent2, say. Now if P5purchase is the full
purchase workflow model with compromised Agent2 and P6purchase is the full purchase workflow model
with compromised Agent2 and Agent1 process removed, anonymity is preserved if:
P5purchase ≈ P6purchase
9.4.2.2 Results
Now we can display a complete successful trace comparison as follows:
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P5purchase P
6
purchase
{W1 C11⇔ Task1,Agent1} « IDTask1 , pubTask1 {W1 C12⇔ Task1,Agent3} « IDTask1 , pubTask1
{W2 C21⇔ Task2,Att (Agent2)} « IDTask2 , pubTask2 ,M2 {W2 C22⇔ Task2,Att (Agent2)} « IDTask2 , pubTask2 ,M2
{W3 C31⇔ Task3,Agent4} « IDTask3 , pubTask3 {W3 C32⇔ Task3,Agent4} « IDTask3 , pubTask3
{W4 C41⇔ Task4,Agent5} « IDTask4 , pubTask4 {W4 C42⇔ Task4,Agent5} « IDTask4 , pubTask4
{W5 C51⇔ Task5,Att (Agent2)} « IDTask5 , pubTask5 ,M5 {W5 C52⇔ Task5,Att (Agent2)} « IDTask5 , pubTask5 ,M5
{W6 C61⇔ Task6,Agent1} « IDTask6 , pubTask6 {W6 C62⇔ Task6,Agent3} « IDTask6 , pubTask6
Whilst the above trace comparison is successful trace comparisons can be found for models P5purchase
and P6purchase that are not successful such as:
P5purchase P
6
purchase
{W1 C11⇔ Task1,Agent1} « IDTask1 , pubTask1 {W1 C12⇔ Task1,Agent3} « IDTask1 , pubTask1
{W2 C21⇔ Task2,Agent3} « IDTask2 , pubTask2 No comparable trace — access to Task2 fails
{W3 C31⇔ Task3,Agent4} « IDTask3 , pubTask3
{W4 C41⇔ Task4,Agent5} « IDTask4 , pubTask4
{W5 C51⇔ Task5,Agent3} « IDTask5 , pubTask5
{W6 C61⇔ Task6,Agent1} « IDTask6 , pubTask6
This failure occurs because:
If Agent3 accesses Task1 within P6purchase, either Agent2 or Agent5 must access Task2. However, if
Agent5 accesses Task2, it cannot access Task3 or Task4 and there are insufficient agents to access both
of tasks Task3 and Task4. If Agent2 accesses Task2, static equivalence fails as Agent2 is compromised
and an attacker obtains message M2 but if Agent3 accesses Task2 under P5purchase, there is no release
of M2 within the trace of P5purchase so observational equivalence fails.
If the model includes an additional agent that also has access to task Task1 and that agent is redundant
elsewhere throughout the model, the failure of observational equivalence no longer occurs as agent Agent3
is available to access Task2 and all subsequent agent/task assignments can occur in the normal way.
Given this failure we can conclude that:
P5purchase ≉ P6purchase
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Now let us consider performing the same experiment only we reinstate agent Agent1 and remove Agent3
instead.
Now, P5purchase is the same as before but this time we compare it with P
7
purchase being P
5
purchase less
Agent3. Again we can find equivalent traces such as:
P5purchase P
7
purchase
{W1 C11⇔ Task1,Agent3} « IDTask1 , pubTask1 {W1 C12⇔ Task1,Agent1} « IDTask1 , pubTask1
{W2 C21⇔ Task2,Att (Agent2)} « IDTask2 , pubTask2 ,M2 {W2 C22⇔ Task2,Att (Agent2)} « IDTask2 , pubTask2 ,M2
{W3 C31⇔ Task3,Agent4} « IDTask3 , pubTask3 {W3 C32⇔ Task3,Agent4} « IDTask3 , pubTask3
{W4 C41⇔ Task4,Agent5} « IDTask4 , pubTask4 {W4 C42⇔ Task4,Agent5} « IDTask4 , pubTask4
{W5 C51⇔ Task5,Att (Agent2)} « IDTask5 , pubTask5 ,M5 {W5 C52⇔ Task5,Att (Agent2)} « IDTask5 , pubTask5 ,M5
{W6 C61⇔ Task6,Agent3} « IDTask6 , pubTask6 {W6 C62⇔ Task6,Agent1} « IDTask6 , pubTask6
But now we obtain the following failed traces:
P5purchase P
7
purchase
{W1 C11⇔ Task1,Att (Agent2)} « IDTask1 , pubTask1 ,M1 {W1 C12⇔ Task1,Att (Agent2)} « IDTask1 , pubTask1 ,M1
{W2 C21⇔ Task2,Agent3} « IDTask2 , pubTask2 No comparable trace — access to Task2 fails
{W3 C31⇔ Task3,Agent4} « IDTask3 , pubTask3
{W4 C41⇔ Task4,Agent5} « IDTask4 , pubTask4
{W5 C51⇔ Task5,Agent3} « IDTask5 , pubTask5
{W6 C61⇔ Task6,Att (Agent2)} « IDTask6 , pubTask6 ,M6
This failure occurs because if Agent2 accesses Task1, either Agent3 or Agent5 must access Task2. How-
ever, Agent3 is not present in P7purchase and if Agent5 accesses Task2, Agent5 can no longer access Task3
or Task4 and the workflow cannot complete. Given this failure we can conclude that:
P5purchase ≉ P7purchase
Alternatively:
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P5purchase P
7
purchase
{W1 C11⇔ Task1,Agent1} « IDTask1 , pubTask1 {W1 C12⇔ Task1,Agent1} « IDTask1 , pubTask1
{W2 C21⇔ Task2,Agent3} « IDTask2 , pubTask2 No comparable trace — access to Task2 fails
{W3 C31⇔ Task3,Agent4} « IDTask3 , pubTask3
{W4 C41⇔ Task4,Agent5} « IDTask4 , pubTask4
{W5 C51⇔ Task5,Att (Agent2)} « IDTask5 , pubTask5 ,M1
{W6 C61⇔ Task6,Agent1} « IDTask6 , pubTask6
Now comparison failure occurs because either Agent2 or Agent5 must access Task2 in P7purchase but
although a successful trace can be obtained with Agent2 this fails static equivalence when compared to
Agent3 accessing Task2 and we have already seen that the workflow fails if Agent5 accesses Task2.
Currently, our tests do not differentiate further than to say that both Agent1 and Agent3 can be linked
with Task1 and Task2. However, if we look at the trace comparison above for P5purchase and P
7
purchase
with Agent2 assigned to Task1, we observe that Agent3 must be the only agent associated with access
to Task2 and completion of the workflow, in addition to our compromised agent Agent2. So Agent3 can
be identified by its association with Task2. In respect of the trace comparison between P5purchase and
P6purchase then trace failure occurs because we have to use Agent2 with either Task1 or Task2 in order
to get a successfully completed workflow trace in P6purchase. This is not comparable to a trace utilising
Agent1 and Agent3 with tasks Task1 or Task2 in P5purchase. We can conclude therefore that Agent1
must be associated with Task1 or Task2 and completion of the workflow if Agent2 has not accessed either
task.
The primary purpose of the anonymity test is to confirm anonymity for a given access control model
and any equivalence failure may or may not reflect an exploitable real world example of an anonymity
breach. The amount of information obtainable from failure of this anonymity test for different models with
different numbers of agents and tasks and different access control constraints will vary over the models.
Consequently, we have to be careful in our assessment of the test results as it is easy to overstate real
world conclusions based upon failed model traces. When we analyse failed traces we have to bear in mind
that the compromised agent or agents and the external observer do not necessarily have a modeller’s eye
view of the access control procedure. Consequently, in the case of P5purchase and P
6
purchase for example,
the modeller knows that Agent1 can access Task1 and not Task2 but our compromised agent Agent2
and our outside observer do not necessarily know this a priori.
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9.4.2.3 Conclusion
We demonstrate with this experiment that, given a single compromised agent, Agent2 in this case,
we cannot conclude that anonymity is preserved for our simple purchases model in respect of agent
Agent1, nor can we conclude that anonymity is preserved for our purchases model in respect of Agent3.
In the particular experimental cases discussed above it is possible to reason as to how the breach of
anonymity occurred and to interpret this breach in the context of a real-world implementation of the
model. However, it might not always be the case that breaches of anonymity can necessarily be linked
to a real-world context. Our anonymity test proves or otherwise anonymity of agent processes within
workflow models but it does not necessarily prove that an exploitable anonymity breach has occurred on
failure of the test.
9.5 Summary
In this chapter we apply the security tests that we introduce in chapter 8 to the simple purchases workflow
introduced in chapter 4 and encoded in chapter 7. Our security tests confirm that our purchases model is
satisfiable given the available set of tasks and agents per section 9.2. We identify a collusion metric of four
for our model as per the experiments of section 9.3, so at least four different agents are required to gain
complete control over workflow resources. Whilst we cannot make specific judgements concerning the
level of security suggested by the collusion metric we can say that, in the context of a small organisation, a
metric of four reflects a reasonable application of separation of duties to the purchase workflow. We would
generally consider this to be a high level of security in the circumstances. Finally, we perform anonymity
experiments in section 9.4 and we identify some examples of anonymity of agents in the context of our
purchases workflow. Additionally, we identify some examples of possible breaches of anonymity for agents
and we discuss how such potential breaches might be interpreted given that our test is a test for anonymity
and not a test for breaches of anonymity.
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Chapter 10
Discussion and conclusions
10.1 Discussion
Resource management and access control have become increasingly important and complex components
of an organisation’s activities. In part this is due to the regulatory framework associated with account-
ability and good corporate governance, protection of the individual, security and taxation that applies
to companies, charitable institutions and governmental bodies. Also, this reflects the fact that there is
a multitude of threat vectors arising from widespread information access and increasingly sophisticated
attack mechanisms. When combined with powerful motivators for humans to behave dishonestly, such
as reduced job security, ideologies and greed, then the need for robust systems of access control within
organisations is clear.
The strategic management of access control to resources is provided by business rules. These rules have
long been accepted as best able to confront the problems of resource management by major organisations
such as the accountancy bodies in the UK [8] and elsewhere and although there have been (and will
continue to be) debates over the efficacy of these rules they are the best approach to resource management
that is available to us at present.
The primary motivation for our thesis is that business rules, particularly segregation of duties, are not
handled satisfactorily by access control systems. Given this premise then the consequences of the failure
to apply business rules properly are also not addressed when seeking to verify the adequacy or otherwise
of access control policies within organisations.
We identify workflow-based access control as a mechanism whereby segregation of duties can be properly
implemented, particularly when combined with a means to memorise access control state. Researchers
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have addressed some of the issues regarding workflow-based access control systems such as policy language
development. Bertino et al [20, 19], Botha [25, 26, 27] and Wainer et al [98, 99, 100] have all addressed
this aspect of workflow-based access control and in the case of Wainer et al the definition and application
of static and dynamic segregation of duties are incorporated within the policy language. However, none of
these has sought to address the questions concerning the successful application of these policy languages
and the security consequences that entail from their failure. There is no attempt within these publications
to systematically identify and analyse the consequences of the failure to adequately apply segregation
of duties and other business rules or to identify the potential for inconsistencies within access control
policies. We argue that the formulation of access control policies requires not only a framework, policy
language and prototyping but also tools that enable access control policies to be tested in respect of a
selection of potential security concerns, such as collusion and the leaking of information to untrusted
third parties, that arise from failure of these policies.
Crampton has successfully extended the research into the modelling and analysis of workflow-based access
control systems. He has concentrated on model testing for reachability properties, such as satisfiability and
has not extended the testing to security aspects arising from the failure of access control policies [31, 32].
Other researchers have investigated access control modelling and security testing such as Zhang and
Ryan [105] and Qunoo and Ryan [78]. Whilst this research has yielded strong model-based testing
of security issues within RBAC, these approaches have not addressed access control from a workflow
perspective and have not generated tests of security issues arising from the inadequate application of
business rules.
Our thesis proposal, Business Process Access Control (BPAC), addresses the modelling of workflow-based
systems of access control and focuses upon the analysis and testing of security issues arising from the
inadequate application of business rules, particularly segregation of duties, whilst also ensuring that the
more traditional tests for access control systems, such as reachability-based tests, can also be applied
within the modelling environment.
10.2 Security testing of workflow-based access control policies
We identify a number of security tests that can be applied to workflow-based access control systems.
These include basic reachability tests such as satisfiability and completeness, a simple quantifiable test
for the susceptibility of workflows to complete control by some number of agents, which we call the
collusion metric and an analysis of anonymity of agents and agent/task interactions within workflows.
The latter two tests, the collusion metric and the anonymity test are, to our knowledge, unique to
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our thesis with regard to the published work on access control. However, these tests are based upon
established analytical principles within process algebras such as refinement in CSP [80] and observational
equivalence in pi calculus and its derivatives [66, 67, 3].
10.2.1 Reachability tests — satisfiability and completeness
These tests are, at their simplest, verification techniques that ensure that a workflow, when coupled with
an access control policy and a set of agents, can operate correctly. In this context, it could be argued
that our approach adds little to the work of Crampton and others in respect of workflow-based access
control analysis. However, we extend our tests to enable us to reveal certain security properties as, for
example, in our analysis of a simple conference management system in section 8.3.2 wherein we are able
to highlight an agent access flaw by reachability methods.
10.2.2 The collusion metric
The collusion metric represents an extension of the reachability tests summarised above. It is a simple
numerical guide as to the robustness of a workflow, achieved through the implementation of segregation of
duties, against complete control over the workflow being obtained by a set of agents and/or an external
third party. We observe that control over resources can be obtained by indirect means, such as via
communication between agents, and we extend the collusion metric to reflect this possibility.
The collusion metric provides a reasonable initial estimate of workflow robustness but it has limitations.
Firstly, the estimation of the collusion metric requires multiple satisfiability tests over various subsets
of agents. It is, therefore, likely to be a long-winded exercise when workflow models contain complex
workflows and large numbers of participating agents. This problem can be mitigated to an extent by
efficiencies in the agent selection process. Secondly, complex workflows with non-deterministic choice
have multiple collusion metrics depending upon the satisfiable paths through the workflow. Thirdly, the
collusion metric assigns no weight to differing agent roles. Consequently, a director of an organisation is
assigned equal importance to an employee within the context of workflow control. In practice, attempting
to value agent contributions differently is fraught with difficulty. It can be argued that senior agents are
more responsible and reliable and therefore less risky than junior agents. Alternatively, senior agents are
a higher security risk than junior agents because they have greater responsibility and access to a wider
range of organisational resources.
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10.2.3 Anonymity
We introduce the concept of anonymity in respect of workflow-based access control systems. The basic
idea is that anonymity is preserved if an agent (or an untrusted third party via a compromised agent) is
unable to ascertain which agent or agents has accessed tasks within a workflow. For a workflow such as
a purchase order to operate effectively an agent need only be concerned that previous tasks have been
completed prior to the completion of her own task. For instance, a purchaser can proceed with a purchase
if she has evidence that the transaction has been approved but she does not necessarily need to know
who approved the transaction. If the agent is able to deduce the identity of agents accessing prior tasks,
that agent (especially if she has been compromised by an external third party) has narrowed the search
for potential collusion candidates in respect of the workflow as a whole. Testing for anonymity cannot
be achieved simply through the use of reachability methods and requires the power of observational
equivalence within our BPAC modelling environment.
10.3 The applied pi calculus as the basis for the BPAC environ-
ment
When considering the basis for the BPAC modelling environment we focused upon workflow-friendly pos-
sibilities such as Petri nets and process calculi. We eliminated Petri nets as an option as, although they
naturally model workflow transitions and can provide a suitable graphical means of establishing satisfia-
bility of workflows, they are limited in a number of respects. In particular, Petri nets cannot satisfactorily
handle the interaction of complex data components that comprise constraints-based access-control. Be-
ing closed systems they do not handle real-world interactions well, e.g. with a pool of agents, especially
when there is uncertainty and non-determinism in respect of these interactions. Further problems arise
when attempting to model complex or multiple interacting workflows, hierarchies and reuseable processes
where Petri net methods are unwieldy.
Given the above, our attention turned to process calculi and it quickly became apparent that a process
calculus approach would be more appropriate to our requirements. We decided upon the applied pi
calculus of Abadi and Fournet [3] because it features the theoretical and expressive power of Milner’s
original pi calculus [66, 67] coupled with the additional ability to handle functions with an equational
theory and to differentiate names from variables. We adopted the pi calculus handling of workflows of
Puhlmann and Weske [77] and through the use of function-based authentication modelling, as per Abadi
et al [3, 4], we were able to develop a secure interactive protocol that forms the basic building block for
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the implementation of our BPAC modelling environment.
One of the limitations of our use of the applied pi calculus for our BPAC modelling environment is that the
detailed code is somewhat impenetrable and difficult to both read and write. Whilst we have attempted
to simplify matters through the use of syntactic sugar wherever appropriate nevertheless the encoded
workflow models can become complex and unwieldy very quickly. Also, some aspects of programming
models within applied pi calculus demonstrate considerable subtlety, which is not necessarily obvious to
the casual observer. However, it was always envisaged that the modelling of access control would behave
as an adjunct to the problem of business process management (BPM) as a whole. As a consequence
of the isomorphism between workflows for access control and workflows for BPM, a visual approach
incorporating access control modelling within BPM would likely occur in practice.
10.4 Support processes for the BPAC modelling environment
An important aspect of the development of the BPAC modelling environment was the requirement for
some systematic approach to memorising access control state within an access control model. In order that
we can properly model dynamic segregation of duties we considered it necessary to develop some means
whereby answers to such questions as “who has accessed the previous task?” or “is an agent currently
accessing another workflow?” are made available within the modelling environment. To this end we
devised applied pi calculus processes called stores, which could be used to retain access state information
such as “agent A1 has accessed task T1 in workflowW1”. Such information can be represented in predicate
form as:
hasAccessed (IDA1 , IDT1 , IDW1)
and we model this in the applied pi calculus by a one-way data function that has a similar form to the
above:
hasAccessed (X,Y,Z)
where X, Y and Z are any terms within the model. Given this mechanism we were then able to develop
a constraint test for processes that could construct a data function from input information and pattern
match it against the store contents. In order to formulate this approach to constraint testing we had to
devise set handling processes within the applied pi calculus so that we could create ongoing stores that
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could be tested against, written to and have elements deleted. Strictly speaking, our approach creates
and uses ordered lists as opposed to sets but the lists behave sufficiently like sets for our purpose.
Having developed the stores we then devised a compact syntax for handling store information: writing,
deleting and testing against the store. Whilst this store approach to access state management works for
manual processing of BPAC models it might not translate well to automated theorem proving software,
such as ProVerif. Currently, ProVerif has no mechanism for memorising state and the ongoing processing
of the store and support processes is potentially very resource hungry. More efficient approaches to the
store problem may well be possible that circumvent this particular problem.
10.5 Building blocks for access control modelling — the standard
core protocol
Using the applied pi calculus we developed standard processes for the three main participants in our
implementation of workflow-based access control namely the workflow manager, the agent and the task.
The interaction between these participants is called the standard core protocol and complex workflows
can be built from multiples of the standard core protocol connected by Puhlmann and Weske trigger
functions to form the workflow pattern [77].
10.6 Observational equivalence and the abstraction test for secu-
rity testing
In order that we could properly implement the security tests identified above we decided to utilise the
power of observational equivalence/labelled bisimilarity within the applied pi calculus. It became ap-
parent, however, that observational equivalence was too powerful and process intensive for the simpler
reachability-based tests and so we devised a lightweight unidirectional variant of observational equivalence
called the abstraction test, which is more suited to reachability type problems. The principle requirement
of the abstraction test is the generation of a simplified abstract workflow model in respect of message
outputs from tasks. We then perform trace experiments of the full workflow model in an attempt to
identify the existence of a trace that behaves as the abstract model. This test is very flexible as it is
possible to devise all manner of target abstract workflows. However, the test can involve considerable
subtlety in respect of the generation of the abstract models and there is the problem of computational
explosion with complex workflows and numbers of agents.
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Utilising the abstraction test we were able to develop tests for satisfiability and computation of the
collusion metric. Also we devised a reachability test based upon the abstraction test that enabled us to
identify the security flaw in the simple conference management problem mentioned above.
We applied the full observational equivalence to our tests for anonymity as the abstraction test was not
sufficiently powerful for this security test. The basic principle of the test is to compare two variations
of the same workflow model that differ by the presence or absence of a single agent. If there is full
observational equivalence between the two variations, anonymity is preserved as the agent cannot be
exclusively associated with one or more tasks within the workflow. We extended the test in our examples
to recognise the contribution of a compromised agent to anonymity within the workflow model and we
demonstrated both successful and unsuccessful anonymity proofs with our examples. It was noted that our
anonymity test is a proof for anonymity and that failure of proof did not of itself indicate that anonymity
could be compromised. It is important to stress, therefore, that care be taken when interpreting failed
anonymity tests as there is no guarantee that the failure might correspond to a real-world example of
anonymity compromise. Also, as in the case of the the abstraction test, there is a potential issue with
computational explosion with complex workflows and multiple agents and tasks.
10.7 Summary
The key proposal of this thesis is the BPAC modelling environment as a tool for analysing workflow-based
access control models. The summary of contributions is presented below:
• We use the applied pi calculus as the basis for our modelling environment.
• We extended the syntax of the applied pi calculus for the purpose of our modelling environment.
• We developed processes in the applied pi calculus for handling sets.
• We developed store processes from the set handling processes so that we can properly handle access
control state within our environment.
• We propose a lightweight, one-way variation of observational equivalence, which we call the ab-
straction test, for reachability-based testing of workflow models.
• We identify business rules, particularly segregation of duties, as an aspect of access control that in
our opinion has not been adequately addressed in the research literature.
• We identify workflow-based access control, when coupled with memory for access control state, as
a suitable mechanism for properly implementing segregation of duties.
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• We identify specific security issues arising from the failure to properly implement segregation of
duties, in particular collusion and anonymity.
• We present tests for these security issues. The collusion metric is a measure of the susceptibility of
a workflow to total control by agents and external third parties. Anonymity is a test of the inability
of external third parties to identify agents and their interactions with tasks in workflows.
• We apply the abstraction test and observational equivalence to tests for the security issues identified
above.
• We provide examples of encoding of workflow-based access control scenarios in our modelling envi-
ronment and we demonstrate the application of the security tests to these models.
10.8 Future work
We were unable to transfer the BPAC modelling environment to an automated verifier tool, such as
ProVerif, because of its limitations with the handling of state and the lack of completeness of the obser-
vational equivalence implementation. Transfer to an automated verifier, therefore, requires adaptation of
existing tools or the creation of a new computer-based tool for this purpose.
There are numerous inefficiencies within the BPAC modelling environment that could be addressed in
order to produce a more useable tool. The coding of the standard core protocol components could
undoubtedly be simplified and the processes involved in security testing need to be optimised if a practical
implementation is to be achieved.
Whilst the potential links between the BPAC modelling environment and BPM is discussed in this thesis
no attempt has been made to date to formally connect the modelling environment to examples of BPM
systems. At the very least a visual analysis tool is required for a practical implementation of the modelling
environment.
We have devised and demonstrated a selection of security tests, primarily in respect of reachability
analysis and the implementation of segregation of duties. No doubt there is scope for additional testing
of security properties that have not been addressed within this thesis.
The collusion metric is a very basic first attempt at providing a measure for collusion. However, as we
discussed above, this measure is somewhat limited and a more meaningful measure could possibly be
devised that better reflects the security properties of workflows.
181
10.8 Future work
We have not sought to introduce external contributions to constraint handling such as timing or other
factors that may influence access control and the incorporation of these factors would add to the practical
functionality of the modelling environment.
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The standard core protocol in detail
A.1 Introduction
In chapter 6 we outline the broad structure of the applied pi calculus implementation of BPAC. We
indicate that the modelling environment is based upon encrypted coding of the key components of BPAC:
the workflow manager, agents and tasks that interact with each other in a specific way called the standard
core protocol. In this appendix we present the detailed coding of the core components of the modelling
system. In the first section we present the unencrypted protocol so as to highlight the salient features of
the access control modelling environment and then in the second section we present the full encrypted
version of the protocol.
A.2 The basic access control protocol unencrypted
We consider the basic core protocol, which we refer to as C, as representing the interaction between the
workflow manager, W , comprising a single taskCall ⟨⟨IDT ,KT , IDW ,KW []⟩⟩ context, single agent, A
and task T processes as indicated in the visualisation in figure 6.1 above. All complex workflow-based
interactions can be constructed from the basic protocol. The basic protocol is visualised in its unencrypted
form in figure A.1. In summary, the protocol proceeds as follows:
• The workflow manager process W initiates a session of task process T by sending a fresh identity
for the task, IDT together with a workflow session identity IDW to the task process T .
• The task process acknowledges receipt of IDT by returning same to the workflow process.
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• The workflow manager process advertises the task session by broadcasting IDT .
• An agent process A receives IDT and returns it with it’s agent identity IDA to the workflow process
so as to signify an interest in accessing task T .
• The workflow manager tests IDA against history stores. This process is the model enactment of the
workflow-based access control policy. Depending upon the outcome of the tests then the workflow
manager process continues or halts.
• The workflow manager sends IDA, IDT and a freshly generated nonce nT to the task process T .
This signifies to the task process that agent process A has been cleared to communicate with task
process T .
• The workflow manager process sends IDT and the nonce nT to the agent process A. This signifies
to the agent process that it has been cleared to communicate with task process T .
• The agent process A sends IDA, IDT and the nonce nT to the task process T to initiate authorised
communication between A and T .
• The task process T sends secret MT together with IDT to the agent process A. We use MT to
represent the resources associated with task T so that A having MT effectively means that A has
control over T .
• Agent process A sends its acquired secret, together with a fresh nonce to itself for further commu-
nication.
• The agent process A sends data function end (MT , IDT ) to the task process T to indicate that
processing of task resources has been completed.
• The task process T writes to the stores data function
hasAccessed (IDA, IDT , . . .)
(the data function should take IDA and IDT as arguments at the very least) to record that agent
A has accessed the instance of task T identified by IDT .
• Task process T sends the data function endTask (IDT ) to the workflow manager process W to
indicate that the task session has been completed.
Whilst this protocol provides suitable interaction between the three parties, namely the workflow manager,
tasks and agents, so as to represent the management of access control with static and dynamic constraints,
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we also need to recreate a secure space so that this protocol can operate as if it is within the confines
of an organisation from the perspective of an outside observer. We can do this either by ensuring that
all communication takes place over private channels or we can adopt basic cryptography over public
channels. We choose to use the latter approach.
A.3 The case for encryption of the access control protocol
Whilst a level of trust between organisations and their employees or agents must exist if employees
are to make a meaningful contribution towards an organisation’s activities, nevertheless no employee or
agent, however senior, can be totally trusted as the potential cost to an organisation of their defection is
potentially too great to countenance.
Separation of duties is implemented within organisations to ensure that agents have limited resource
access scope within an organisation and the cost of defection of a single agent is therefore constrained.
Ordinarily, agents should not be able to see the details of communications between other agents, workflow
managers and tasks. We want to be able to model what happens when an agent turns over to the ’dark
side’ and in particular, we want to consider this in respect of the limited access scope of the turned
agent coupled with whatever extra information is made available to her via intra-agent communication,
tasks performed etc. Also, we want to perform tests on these workflows, such as tests for anonymity,
that consider the impact of a compromised agent on the information released to external third parties (a
Dolev-Yao attacker). Consequently, we model the core protocol using encrypted communication over a
public channel. Such an approach to our modelling environment ensures that an operational scope can
be implemented over agents and their interactions with tasks and resources as mediated by the systems
of access control. Our investigations can then reveal answers to the following queries:
• given the constraints can workflows be performed properly?
• Can an agent secure complete control over a workflow or workflows and their associated resources?
• If a single agent cannot secure complete control over a workflow and its resources, what is the
minimum number of agents, given the constraints, that can collectively secure complete control
over a workflow and its resources. Is this minimum number acceptable to an organisation?
• Can a compromised agent identify and provide information about the activities of other agents
to an external third party that could assist with obtaining complete control over a workflow and
associated resources?
In the next section we present the basic protocol with the addition of encryption.
185
A.3 The case for encryption of the access control protocol
W T
IDA, IDT
νIDT,IDW.(IDT,IDW)
IDT
A
IDT  
Test the certificate and test task ID against generated ID
Test the agent ID against access constraints (the store)
νnT.(IDT, nT,IDA)
IDT, nT
IDT, IDA,nT
MT, IDT
end(MT, IDT)
W(S)(hasAccessed(IDA, IDT,...))
S
endtask(IDT)
Figure A.1: the basic protocol unencrypted
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A.4 The basic protocol with encryption
As in section A.1 above we consider the basic core protocol C as representing the interaction between the
workflow manager W , single agent A and task T processes as indicated in the visualisation in figure 6.1.
All complex workflow-based interactions can be constructed from the basic protocol. The basic protocol
is visualised in figure A.2 and the detailed coding of the protocol is presented in section A.5. The protocol
makes extensive use of public key encryption and decryption as communication between W , A and T is
carried out over the public channel and we require messages to remain secret. The encryption process
is given in the protocol diagram by enc (M,pub), where M is an unencrypted message, pub is the public
key of the recipient. Decryption is given by dec (N,pte), where N is the encrypted message and pte is
the private key of the recipient. Additionally, we use signature encryption and decryption denoted by
encs (M,pte) and decs (N,pub) to provide verification of the identity of the message generator to the
recipient.
The protocol as visualised can be summarised as follows:
• The workflow manager W initiates a new task session with a fresh task identity, IDT , sent signed
and encrypted to task T .
• On receipt of an encrypted and signed acknowledgement from the new task instance the workflow
manager then advertises the task identity to agents as a message IDT , source verifiable through
the accompanying signature and encrypted using an organisation-wide public key, pubOrg. The
organisation-wide encryption is a low grade security component: there is not a great security risk
to the information being sent in plaintext over the public channel. The encryption simply provides
a perimeter to the organisation’s activities.
• An agent picks up the task advertisement and sends its identity IDA, matched with the task identity
IDT , signed and encrypted to the workflow manager.
• On receipt of a response from an agent the workflow manager tests the agent identity IDA against
sets of constraints held in the stores. These constraints might include the agent/role assignment
and other passive access control rules and dynamic constraints such as agent access to previous
tasks.
• The workflow manager sends the agent identity IDA coupled with the task session identity IDT
and a freshly generated nonce nT to the task process signed and encrypted. The nonce provides
protection against replay attacks.
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• The workflow manager passes the same nonce and the task session identity to the agent, signed and
encrypted.
• The agent now sends the agent identity IDA, the task identity IDT and the nonce nT to the task
process, signed and encrypted.
• The task process passes its resource message, MT , coupled with the task identity IDT to the agent,
signed and encrypted.
• The agent process sends its acquired resource message MA, together with its own generated nonce
nnonce, encrypted by its own public key over the public channel t as a potential communication for
leaking information to other processes, particularly agents. The nonce ensures that this communi-
cation is unique over multiple instances of the core process C.
• The agent process passes an end () constraint term to the task process containing such arguments
as the agent identity IDA and the task identity IDT .
• The task process writes a hasAccessed () constraint term to a store containing such arguments as
the agent identity IDA and the task identity IDT .
• The task sends an endTask () constraint term to the workflow manager containing the task identity
IDT , signed and encrypted, to signal completion of the communication.
Now we turn our attention to the detailed encoding of the access control protocol.
A.5 Detailed encoding of the core processes for the basic protocol
In the following subsections we present the detailed coding of the core processes that provide the building
blocks for access control modelling.
A.5.1 Task
We consider a core task process as comprising the following context code with a pair of holes that can
be populated with store communications or the internal process τ as appropriate. We use the syntactic
sugar task ⟨⟨KT ,MT , [] , []⟩⟩ to represent this context:
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W T
enc((encs((IDA, IDT),sk(KA)),pubA),pubW)
νIDT,IDW(enc(encs((IDT,IDW),sk(KW)),pubT))
(enc(encs(IDT,sk(KT)),pubW))
A
enc((encs((IDT, pubT ),sk(KW)), IDT ,pubT),pubOrg) 
Test the certificate and test task ID against generated ID
Test the agent ID against access constraints (the store)
νnT.(enc(encs((IDT, nT,IDA,pubA),sk(KW)),pubT))
enc(encs((IDT, nT),sk(KW)),pubA)
enc(encs((IDT, IDA,nT),sk(KA)),pubT)
enc(encs((MT, IDT),sk(KT)), pubA)
enc(encs(end(MT, IDT),sk(KA)), pubT)
W(S)(hasAccessed(IDA, IDT,...))
S
enc(encs(endtask(IDT),sk(KT)), pubW)
A
enc((MA, nnonce), pubA)
Figure A.2: Workflow-based access control — the basic protocol
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t (twencT ) .let tdecT = dec (twencT , sk (KT )) in
let idT = fst (decs (tdecT , pubW )) in
let idW = snd (decs (tdecT , pubW )) in
let tencT = encs (idT , sk (KT )) in
let wtencT = enc (tencT , pubW ) in
t ⟨wtencT ⟩ .t (twencT,n,A,pubA)
.if fst (decs (dec (twencT,n,A,pubA , sk (KT )) , pubW )) = idT then
let n = snd (decs (dec (twencT,n,A,pubA , sk (KT )) , pubW )) in
let idA = thd (decs (dec (twencT,n,A,pubA , sk (KT )) , pubW )) in
let pubA = fth (decs (dec (twencT,n,A,pubA , sk (KT )) , pubW )) in
t (taencT,A,n) .if fst (decs (dec (taencT,A,n, sk (KT )) , pubA)) = idT then
if snd (decs (dec (taencT,A,n, sk (KT )) , pubA)) = idA then
if thd (decs (dec (taencT,A,n, sk (KT )) , pubA)) = n then
[]
. (let tencMT ,T = encs ((MT , idT ) , sk (KT )) in
let atencMT ,T = enc (tencMT ,T , pubA) in
t ⟨atencMT ,T ⟩ .t (taencend,MA,T )
.if decs (dec (taencend,MA,T , sk (KT )) , pubA) = end (MT , idT ) then
[]
.W (S) (hasAccessed (idA, idT , idW ))
.let tencend,MT ,T = encs (endtask (idT ) , sk (KT )) in
let wtencend,MT ,T = enc (tencend,MT ,T , pubW ) in
t ⟨wtencend,MT ,T ⟩)
Based on the above a task Ta without additional user-generated code would be defined as follows:
Ta ≜ νKTa .task ⟨⟨KTa ,MTa , [τ] , [τ]⟩⟩
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with task resource label MTa and a task Tb that deletes a term reviewer (idA, p) from the store S and
writes a new term submitted (idA, p) to the store S is written as follows:
Tb ≜ νKTb .task ⟨⟨KTb ,MTb ,
[D (S) (reviewer (idA, p))] , [W (S) (submitted (idA, p))]⟩⟩
with label MTb representing the resources assigned to task Tb.
A.5.2 Agent
We define agent ⟨⟨IDA,KA⟩⟩ as syntactic sugar for the following code:
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νnnonce. (t (owencT,pubT )
.let wencT,pubT = fst (dec (owencT,pubT , sk (KOrg))) in
let idT = snd (dec (owencT,pubT , sk (KOrg))) in
let pubT = thd (dec (owencT,pubT , sk (KOrg))) in
let id2T = fst (decs (wencT,pubT , pubW )) in
let pub2T = snd (decs (wencT,pubT , pubW )) in
if id2T = idT then
if pub2T = pubT then
let aencA,T = encs ((idA, idT ) , sk (KA)) in
let waencA,T,pubA = enc ((aencA,T , pubA) , pubW ) in
t ⟨waencA,T,pubA⟩
.t (awencT,n) .if fst (decs (dec (awencT,n, sk (KA)) , pubW )) = idT then
let n = snd (decs (dec (awencT,n, sk (KA)) , pubW )) in
let aencT,A,n = encs ((idT , idA, n) , sk (KA)) in
let taencT,A,n = enc (aencT,A,n, pubT ) in
t ⟨taencT,A,n⟩
.t (atencMT ,T ) .letMA = fst (decs (dec (atencMT ,T , sk (KA)) , pubT )) in
let aencMA,nnonce = enc ((MA, nnonce) , pubA) in
t ⟨aencMA,nnonce⟩
let aencend,MA,T = encs (end (MA, idT ) , sk (KA)) in
let taencend,MA,T = enc (aencend,MA,T , pubT ) in
.t ⟨taencend,MA,T ⟩)
A.5.3 Workflow manager
We use taskCall ⟨⟨IDT ,KT , IDW ,KW , []⟩⟩ to provide the building blocks for the definition of access
control workflows within workflow manager W . Process context taskCall ⟨⟨IDT ,KT , IDW ,KW , []⟩⟩ is
defined as follows:
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(let wencT = encs ((IDT , IDW ) , sk (KW )) in
let twencT = enc (wencT , pubT ) in
t ⟨twencT ⟩ .t (wtencT )
.if decs (dec (wtencT , sk (KW )) , pubT ) = IDT then
let wencT,pubT = encs ((IDT , pubT ) , sk (KW )) in
let owencT,pubT = enc ((wencT,pubT , IDT , pubT ) , pubOrg) in
t ⟨owencT,pubT ⟩ .t (waencA,T,pubA)
.let pubA = snd (dec (waencA,T,pubA , sk (KW ))) in
let idA = fst (decs (fst (dec (waencA,T,pubA , sk (KW ))) , pubA)) in
if snd (decs (fst (dec (waencA,T,pubA , sk (KW ))) , pubA)) = IDT then
T (Q) ((idA, pubA)) ∶
[]
.νnT . (let wencT,nT ,A,pubA = encs ((IDT , nT , idA, pubA) , sk (KW )) in
let twencT,nT ,A,pubA = enc (wencT,nT ,A,pubA , pubT ) in
t ⟨twencT,nT ,A,pubA⟩
.let wencT,nT = encs ((IDT , nT ) , sk (KW )) in
let awencT,nT = enc (wencT,nT , pubA) in
t ⟨awencT,nT ⟩) .t (wtencend,MT ,T )
.if decs (dec (wtencend,MT ,T , sk (KW )) , pubT ) = endtask (IDT ) then τ)
An example of a task call using this syntax is:
TaskCall2 ≜ νIDT2 .taskCall ⟨⟨IDT2 ,KT2 , IDW ,KW ,
[(T (R) (role (idA, clerk)) ∶
T (S) (hasAccessed (idA, IDT1 , IDW )) ∶ 0 ∶)]⟩⟩
wherein an instance of the task process identified by the public key pubT2 , is assigned a fresh identity
IDT2 , and the task is advertised on the public channel. Once the task identity has been picked up
193
A.6 Restrictions on model coding within the BPAC environment
by an agent process then the task manager checks the credentials of the agent against the stores using
the T (R) and T (S) test processes. On a satisfactory outcome the workflow manager then facilitates
communication between the successful agent and the task.
A.5.4 The standard core protocol C
In section A.5 above we present the complete encoding with encryption for the three main processes
that comprise our workflow model, namely agents A, tasks T and the workflow manager W . All three
processes interact with each other in a predefined manner for the purpose of our modelling environment
and we call this interaction the standard core protocol C.
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Given a task process T as set out in section A.5.1, an agent process A as set out in section A.5.2 and
a task-call sub-process taskCall ⟨⟨IDT ,KT , IDW ,KW , []⟩⟩ within a workflow process W as outlined in
section A.5.3, all defined to follow the initialisation process M as per section 6.9, then the standard
core protocol C is defined as the communication interaction between T , A and W as represented by the
diagram 6.1.
A.6 Restrictions on model coding within the BPAC environment
A.6.1 Populating context holes
In formulating the detailed code for tasks (section A.5.1) and the workflow manager (section A.5.3) we
have used the standard applied pi calculus concept of contexts and context holes. These indicate that
the processes can be altered so that they incorporate the components that we use to manage access
control, such as the interactions between processes and the stores. Although context holes can ordinarily
be populated by any properly formulated applied pi calculus process, for the purpose of our BPAC
environment we restrict the potential contents of these holes to the following: W (store), T (store),D (store) and τ . That is the context holes can only be populated by write, test and delete store functions
and the internal process and no other applied pi calculus code. The reason for this restriction is that it
ensures that the uniqueness property for the BPAC modelling environment, a key requirement for our
security analysis methods, is not compromised.
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A.6.2 Adding code to workflow models
Given that the BPAC modelling environment is based upon the applied pi calculus then it is to be
expected that workflow models be extended with additional code to enable such features as, for example,
simulation of inter-agent communication. Whilst any code that is properly formulated in accordance
with the syntactic requirements of the applied pi calculus can, in theory, be added to a workflow model
care must be taken to ensure that the uniqueness property is not violated. If it is, tests on the workflow
model must be adapted accordingly to taken into account any repetition of transactions. In practice, with
simple additions to workflow models, such as communications between agents, the uniqueness property
can be maintained by the use of fresh nonces that are added to communicated messages.
A.7 Summary
In this appendix we have presented the detailed coding of the core access control protocol components. In
section A.2 communication between core processes is discussed without encryption so as to highlight the
salient features of the access control protocol. In section A.4 the fully encrypted protocol communications
are discussed and this is followed in section A.5 with a presentation of the detailed encoding in the applied
pi calculus of the core components of the access control modelling environment.
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Appendix B
Detailed proofs
B.1 Detailed proof of the uniqueness property
B.1.1 The uniqueness property
Let P be any secure well-formed workflow model as per section 6.12 comprising a number of linked cases
of standard core processes, C1, . . . ,Cm as defined in section A.5.4, initialised by process M as defined in
section 6.9.4, such that P can undergo labelled transitions of the form P
α1Ð→ . . . αnÐ→ P′ then:
1. αi ≠ αj for i, j = 1 to n and i ≠ j
2. For any two instances of P, P1 and P2, say, initialised by process M, such that P1 α11Ð→ . . . αn1Ð→ P′1
and P2
α12Ð→ . . . αn2Ð→ P′2 then αk1 ≠ αl2 for k, l = 1 to n.
B.1.2 Stage 1
Firstly, we consider a single run of the standard core protocol and we compare all transitions for that
single run.
Let a single run of the standard core protocol within the well-formed workflow model P be represented
by the following trace:
P
η1Ð→ . . . ηnÐ→ P′
Where η1 . . . ηn represent the n public transitions of the core protocol as previously defined and we ignore
all private transitions.
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Then ηi ≠ ηj where i = 1 to n, j = 1 to n and i ≠ j.
B.1.3 Proof
We compare all public transitions, η1 . . . ηn, against each other within the standard core protocol of
chapter 6 and appendix A. We prove that for each transition within the core protocol there is no equal
transition within the rest of the core protocol as follows:
1. η1 = νIDT , IDW . (enc (encs ((IDT , IDW ) , sk (KW )) , pubT ))
(a) Case η2 = enc (encs (IDT , sk (KT )) , pubW ):
Now pubT ≜ pk (KT ) and pubW ≜ pk (KW ) and
pubT ≠ pubW as pk (x) is collision-free∴ νIDT , IDW . (enc (encs ((IDT , IDW ) , sk (KW )) , pubT )) ≠
enc (encs (IDT , sk (KT )) , pubW ) as enc (x, y) is collision-free
(b) Case η3 = enc ((encs ((IDT , pubT ) , sk (KW )) , IDT , pubT ) , pubOrg):
Now pubT ≜ pk (KT ) and pubOrg ≜ pk (KOrg) and
pubT ≠ pubOrg as pk (x) is collision-free∴ νIDT , IDW . (enc (encs ((IDT , IDW ) , sk (KW )) , pubT )) ≠
enc ((encs ((IDT , pubT ) , sk (KW )) , IDT , pubT ) , pubOrg)
as enc (x, y) is collision-free
(c) Case η4 = enc ((encs ((IDA, IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubA) , pubW ):
Now pubT ≜ pk (KT ) and pubW ≜ pk (KW ) and
pubT ≠ pubW as pk (x) is collision-free and∴ νIDT , IDW . (enc (encs ((IDT , IDW ) , sk (KW )) , pubT )) ≠
enc ((encs ((IDA, IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubA) , pubW )
as enc (x, y) is collision-free
(d) Case η5 = νnT . (enc (encs ((IDT , nT , IDA, pubA) , sk (KW )) , pubT )):
now (IDT , IDW ) ≠ (IDT , nT , IDA, pubA) by typing over tuples then
encs ((IDT , IDW ) , sk (KW )) ≠ encs ((IDT , nT , IDA, pubA) , sk (KW ))
as encs (x, y) is collision-free and
∴ νIDT , IDW . (enc (encs ((IDT , IDW ) , sk (KW )) , pubT )) ≠
νnT . (enc (encs ((IDT , nT , IDA, pubA) , sk (KW )) , pubT ))
as enc (x, y) is collision-free
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(e) Case η6 = enc (encs ((IDT , nT ) , sk (KW )) , pubA):
Now pubT ≜ pk (KT ) and pubA ≜ pk (KA) and
pubT ≠ pubA as pk (x) is collision-free and
∴ νIDT , IDW . (enc (encs ((IDT , IDW ) , sk (KW )) , pubT )) ≠
enc (encs ((IDT , nT ) , sk (KW )) , pubA) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(f) Case η7 = enc (encs ((IDT , IDA, nT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ):
sk (KW ) ≠ sk (KA) as sk (x) is collision-free and
encs ((IDT , IDW ) , sk (KW )) ≠
encs ((IDT , IDA, nT ) , sk (KA)) as
encs (x, y) is collision-free
∴ νIDT , IDW . (enc (encs ((IDT , IDW ) , sk (KW )) , pubT )) ≠
enc (encs ((IDT , IDA, nT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(g) Case η8 = enc (encs ((MT , IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubA):
Now pubT ≜ pk (KT ) and pubA ≜ pk (KA) and
pubT ≠ pubA as pk (x) is collision-free and
∴ νIDT , IDW . (enc (encs ((IDT , IDW ) , sk (KW )) , pubT )) ≠
enc (encs ((MT , IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubA) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(h) Case η9 = enc ((MA, nnonce) , pubA):
Now pubT ≜ pk (KT ) and pubA ≜ pk (KA) and
pubT ≠ pubA as pk (x) is collision-free and
∴ νIDT , IDW . (enc (encs ((IDT , IDW ) , sk (KW )) , pubT )) ≠
enc ((MA, nnonce) , pubA) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(i) Case η10 = enc (encs (end (MT , IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ):
sk (KW ) ≠ sk (KA) as sk (x) is collision-free and
encs ((IDT , IDW ) , sk (KW )) ≠
encs (end (MT , IDT ) , sk (KA)) as
encs (x, y) is collision-free
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∴ νIDT , IDW . (enc (encs ((IDT , IDW ) , sk (KW )) , pubT )) ≠
enc (encs (end (MT , IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(j) Case η11 = enc (encs (endtask (IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubW ):
Now pubT ≜ pk (KT ) and pubW ≜ pk (KW ) and
pubT ≠ pubW as pk (x) is collision-free and
∴ νIDT , IDW . (enc (encs ((IDT , IDW ) , sk (KW )) , pubT )) ≠
enc (encs (endtask (IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubW ) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
2. η2 = enc (encs (IDT , sk (KT )) , pubW )
(a) Case η3 = enc ((encs ((IDT , pubT ) , sk (KW )) , IDT , pubT ) , pubOrg):
Now pubW ≜ pk (KW ) and pubOrg ≜ pk (KOrg) and
pubW ≠ pubOrg as pk (x) is collision-free and
∴ enc (encs (IDT , sk (KT )) , pubW ) ≠
enc ((encs ((IDT , pubT ) , sk (KW )) , IDT , pubT ) , pubOrg)
as enc (x, y) is collision-free
(b) Case η4 = enc ((encs ((IDA, IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubA) , pubW ):
Now encs (IDT , sk (KT )) ≠ encs ((IDA, IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubA
by typing over tuples and
∴ enc (encs (IDT , sk (KT )) , pubW ) ≠
enc ((encs ((IDA, IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubA) , pubW ) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(c) Case η5 = νnT . (enc (encs ((IDT , nT , IDA, pubA) , sk (KW )) , pubT )):
Now pubW ≜ pk (KW ) and pubT ≜ pk (KT ) and
pubW ≠ pubT as pk (x) is collision-free and
∴ enc (encs (IDT , sk (KT )) , pubW ) ≠
νnT . (enc (encs ((IDT , nT , IDA, pubA) , sk (KW )) , pubT ))
as enc (x, y) is collision-free
(d) Case η6 = enc (encs ((IDT , nT ) , sk (KW )) , pubA):
Now pubW ≜ pk (KW ) and pubA ≜ pk (KA) and
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pubW ≠ pubA as pk (x) is collision-free and
∴ enc (encs (IDT , sk (KT )) , pubW ) ≠
enc (encs ((IDT , nT ) , sk (KW )) , pubA) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(e) Case η7 = enc (encs ((IDT , IDA, nT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ):
Now pubW ≜ pk (KW ) and pubT ≜ pk (KT ) and
pubW ≠ pubT as pk (x) is collision-free and
∴ enc (encs (IDT , sk (KT )) , pubW ) ≠
enc (encs ((IDT , IDA, nT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(f) Case η8 = enc (encs ((MT , IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubA):
Now pubW ≜ pk (KW ) and pubA ≜ pk (KA) and
pubW ≠ pubA as pk (x) is collision-free and
∴ enc (encs (IDT , sk (KT )) , pubW ) ≠
enc (encs ((MT , IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubA) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(g) Case η9 = enc ((MA, nnonce) , pubA):
Now pubW ≜ pk (KW ) and pubA ≜ pk (KA) and
pubW ≠ pubA as pk (x) is collision-free and
∴ enc (encs (IDT , sk (KT )) , pubW ) ≠
enc ((MA, nnonce) , pubA) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(h) Case η10 = enc (encs (end (MT , IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ):
Now pubW ≜ pk (KW ) and pubT ≜ pk (KT ) and
pubW ≠ pubT as pk (x) is collision-free and
∴ enc (encs (IDT , sk (KT )) , pubW ) ≠
enc (encs (end (MT , IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(i) Case η11 = enc (encs (endtask (IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubW ):
Now IDT ≠ endtask (IDT ) as endtask (x)
is a one-way function and
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encs (IDT , sk (KT )) ≠
encs (endtask (IDT ) , sk (KT )) as
encs (x, y) is collision-free
∴ enc (encs (IDT , sk (KT )) , pubW ) ≠
enc (encs (endtask (IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubW ) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
3. η3 = enc ((encs ((IDT , pubT ) , sk (KW )) , IDT , pubT ) , pubOrg)
(a) Case η4 = enc ((encs ((IDA, IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubA) , pubW ):
Now pubOrg ≜ pk (KOrg) and pubW ≜ pk (KW ) and
pubOrg ≠ pubW as pk (x) is collision-free and∴ enc ((encs ((IDT , pubT ) , sk (KW )) , IDT , pubT ) , pubOrg)≠ enc ((encs ((IDA, IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubA) , pubW )
as enc (x, y) is collision-free
(b) Case η5 = νnT . (enc (encs ((IDT , nT , IDA, pubA) , sk (KW )) , pubT )):
Now pubOrg ≜ pk (KOrg) and pubT ≜ pk (KT ) and
pubOrg ≠ pubT as pk (x) is collision-free and∴ enc ((encs ((IDT , pubT ) , sk (KW )) , IDT , pubT ) , pubOrg)≠ νnT . (enc (encs ((IDT , nT , IDA, pubA) , sk (KW )) , pubT ))
as enc (x, y) is collision-free
(c) Case η6 = enc (encs ((IDT , nT ) , sk (KW )) , pubA):
Now pubOrg ≜ pk (KOrg) and pubA ≜ pk (KA) and
pubOrg ≠ pubA as pk (x) is collision-free and∴ enc ((encs ((IDT , pubT ) , sk (KW )) , IDT , pubT ) , pubOrg)≠ enc (encs ((IDT , nT ) , sk (KW )) , pubA)
as enc (x, y) is collision-free
(d) Case η7 = enc (encs ((IDT , IDA, nT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ):
Now pubOrg ≜ pk (KOrg) and pubT ≜ pk (KT ) and
pubOrg ≠ pubT as pk (x) is collision-free and∴ enc ((encs ((IDT , pubT ) , sk (KW )) , IDT , pubT ) , pubOrg)≠ enc (encs ((IDT , IDA, nT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT )
as enc (x, y) is collision-free
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(e) Case η8 = enc (encs ((MT , IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubA):
Now pubOrg ≜ pk (KOrg) and pubA ≜ pk (KA) and
pubOrg ≠ pubA as pk (x) is collision-free and∴ enc ((encs ((IDT , pubT ) , sk (KW )) , IDT , pubT ) , pubOrg)≠ enc (encs ((MT , IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubA)
as enc (x, y) is collision-free
(f) Case η9 = enc ((MA, nnonce) , pubA):
Now pubOrg ≜ pk (KOrg) and pubA ≜ pk (KA) and
pubOrg ≠ pubA as pk (x) is collision-free and∴ enc ((encs ((IDT , pubT ) , sk (KW )) , IDT , pubT ) , pubOrg)
enc ((MA, nnonce) , pubA) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(g) Case η10 = enc (encs (end (MT , IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ):
Now pubOrg ≜ pk (KOrg) and pubT ≜ pk (KT ) and
pubOrg ≠ pubT as pk (x) is collision-free and∴ enc ((encs ((IDT , pubT ) , sk (KW )) , IDT , pubT ) , pubOrg)≠ enc (encs (end (MT , IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT )
as enc (x, y) is collision-free
(h) Case η11 = enc (encs (endtask (IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubW ):
Now pubOrg ≜ pk (KOrg) and pubW ≜ pk (KW ) and
pubOrg ≠ pubW as pk (x) is collision-free and∴ enc ((encs ((IDT , pubT ) , sk (KW )) , IDT , pubT ) , pubOrg)≠ enc (encs (endtask (IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubW )
as enc (x, y) is collision-free
4. η4 = enc ((encs ((IDA, IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubA) , pubW )
(a) Case η5 = νnT . (enc (encs ((IDT , nT , IDA, pubA) , sk (KW )) , pubT )):
Now pubW ≜ pk (KW ) and pubT ≜ pk (KT ) and
pubW ≠ pubT as pk (x) is collision-free and∴ enc ((encs ((IDA, IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubA) , pubW ) ≠
νnT . (enc (encs ((IDT , nT , IDA, pubA) , sk (KW )) , pubT )) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
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(b) Case η6 = enc (encs ((IDT , nT ) , sk (KW )) , pubA):
Now pubW ≜ pk (KW ) and pubA ≜ pk (KA) and
pubW ≠ pubA as pk (x) is collision-free and
∴ enc ((encs ((IDA, IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubA) , pubW ) ≠
enc (encs ((IDT , nT ) , sk (KW )) , pubA) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(c) Case η7 = enc (encs ((IDT , IDA, nT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ):
Now pubW ≜ pk (KW ) and pubT ≜ pk (KT ) and
pubW ≠ pubT as pk (x) is collision-free and
∴ enc ((encs ((IDA, IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubA) , pubW ) ≠
enc (encs ((IDT , IDA, nT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(d) Case η8 = enc (encs ((MT , IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubA):
Now pubW ≜ pk (KW ) and pubA ≜ pk (KA) and
pubW ≠ pubA as pk (x) is collision-free and
∴ enc ((encs ((IDA, IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubA) , pubW ) ≠
enc (encs ((MT , IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubA) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(e) Case η9 = enc ((MA, nnonce) , pubA):
Now pubW ≜ pk (KW ) and pubA ≜ pk (KA) and
pubW ≠ pubA as pk (x) is collision-free and
∴ enc ((encs ((IDA, IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubA) , pubW ) ≠
enc ((MA, nnonce) , pubA) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(f) Case η10 = enc (encs (end (MT , IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ):
Now pubW ≜ pk (KW ) and pubT ≜ pk (KT ) and
pubW ≠ pubT as pk (x) is collision-free and
∴ enc ((encs ((IDA, IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubA) , pubW ) ≠
enc (encs (end (MT , IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
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(g) Case η11 = enc (encs (endtask (IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubW ):
Now encs ((IDA, IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubA ≠
encs (endtask (IDT ) , sk (KT ))
by typing over tuples
∴ enc ((encs ((IDA, IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubA) , pubW ) ≠
enc (encs (endtask (IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubW ) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
5. η5 = νnT . (enc (encs ((IDT , nT , IDA, pubA) , sk (KW )) , pubT ))
(a) Case η6 = enc (encs ((IDT , nT ) , sk (KW )) , pubA):
Now pubT ≜ pk (KT ) and pubA ≜ pk (KA) and
pubT ≠ pubA as pk (x) is collision-free and
∴ νnT . (enc (encs ((IDT , nT , IDA, pubA) , sk (KW )) , pubT )) ≠
enc (encs ((IDT , nT ) , sk (KW )) , pubA) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(b) Case η7 = enc (encs ((IDT , IDA, nT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ):
sk (KW ) ≠ sk (KA) as sk (x) is collision-free and
encs ((IDT , nT , IDA, pubA) , sk (KW )) ≠
encs ((IDT , IDA, nT ) , sk (KA)) as
encs (x, y) is collision-free
∴ νnT . (enc (encs ((IDT , nT , IDA, pubA) , sk (KW )) , pubT )) ≠
enc (encs ((IDT , IDA, nT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(c) Case η8 = enc (encs (end (MT , IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ):
Now pubT ≜ pk (KT ) and pubA ≜ pk (KA) and
pubT ≠ pubA as pk (x) is collision-free and
∴ νnT . (enc (encs ((IDT , nT , IDA, pubA) , sk (KW )) , pubT )) ≠
enc (encs (end (MT , IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(d) Case η9 = enc ((MA, nnonce) , pubA):
Now pubT ≜ pk (KT ) and pubA ≜ pk (KA) and
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pubT ≠ pubA as pk (x) is collision-free and
∴ νnT . (enc (encs ((IDT , nT , IDA, pubA) , sk (KW )) , pubT )) ≠
enc ((MA, nnonce) , pubA) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(e) Case η10 = enc (encs (end (MT , IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ):
sk (KW ) ≠ sk (KA) as sk (x) is collision-free and
∴ enc ((encs ((IDA, IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubA) , pubW ) ≠
encs (end (MT , IDT ) , sk (KA)) as
encs (x, y) is collision-free
∴ νnT . (enc (encs ((IDT , nT , IDA, pubA) , sk (KW )) , pubT )) ≠
enc (encs (end (MT , IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(f) Case η11 = enc (encs (endtask (IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubW ):
Now pubT ≜ pk (KT ) and pubW ≜ pk (KW ) and
pubT ≠ pubA as pk (x) is collision-free and
∴ νnT . (enc (encs ((IDT , nT , IDA, pubA) , sk (KW )) , pubT )) ≠
enc (encs (endtask (IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubW ) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
6. η6 = enc (encs ((IDT , nT ) , sk (KW )) , pubA)
(a) Case η7 = enc (encs ((IDT , IDA, nT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ):
Now pubA ≜ pk (KA) and pubT ≜ pk (KT ) and
pubA ≠ pubT as pk (x) is collision-free and
∴ enc (encs ((IDT , nT ) , sk (KW )) , pubA) ≠
enc (encs ((IDT , IDA, nT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(b) Case η8 = enc (encs ((MT , IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubA):
sk (KW ) ≠ sk (KT ) as sk (x) is collision-free and
encs ((IDT , nT ) , sk (KW )) ≠
encs ((MT , IDT ) , sk (KT )) as
encs (x, y) is collision-free
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∴ enc (encs ((IDT , nT ) , sk (KW )) , pubA) ≠
enc (encs ((MT , IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubA) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(c) Case η9 = enc ((MA, nnonce) , pubA):
Now encs ((IDT , nT ) , sk (KW )) ≠ (MA, nnonce)
as collision-free and
∴ enc (encs ((IDT , nT ) , sk (KW )) , pubA) ≠
enc ((MA, nnonce) , pubA) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(d) Case η10 = enc (encs (end (MT , IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ):
Now pubA ≜ pk (KA) and pubT ≜ pk (KT ) and
pubA ≠ pubT as pk (x) is collision-free and
∴ enc (encs ((IDT , nT ) , sk (KW )) , pubA) ≠
enc (encs (end (MT , IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(e) Case η11 = enc (encs (endtask (IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubW ):
Now pubA ≜ pk (KA) and pubW ≜ pk (KW ) and
pubA ≠ pubW as pk (x) is collision-free and
∴ enc (encs ((IDT , nT ) , sk (KW )) , pubA) ≠
enc (encs (endtask (IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubW ) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
7. η7 = enc (encs ((IDT , IDA, nT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT )
(a) Case η8 = enc (encs ((MT , IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubA):
Now pubT ≜ pk (KT ) and pubA ≜ pk (KA) and
pubT ≠ pubA as pk (x) is collision-free
∴ enc (encs ((IDT , IDA, nT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ) ≠
enc (encs ((MT , IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubA) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(b) Case η9 = enc ((MA, nnonce) , pubA):
Now pubT ≜ pk (KT ) and pubA ≜ pk (KA) and
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pubT ≠ pubA as pk (x) is collision-free and
∴ enc (encs ((IDT , IDA, nT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ) ≠
enc ((MA, nnonce) , pubA) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(c) Case η10 = enc (encs (end (MT , IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ):
Now (IDT , IDA, nT ) ≠ end (MT , IDT ) as
end (x, y) is a one-way function and
encs ((IDT , IDA, nT ) , sk (KA)) ≠
encs (end (MT , IDT ) , sk (KA)) as
encs (x, y) is collision-free
∴ enc (encs ((IDT , IDA, nT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ) ≠
enc (encs (end (MT , IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(d) Case η11 = enc (encs (endtask (IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubW ):
Now pubT ≜ pk (KT ) and pubW ≜ pk (KW ) and
pubT ≠ pubW as pk (x) is collision-free
∴ enc (encs ((IDT , IDA, nT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ) ≠
enc (encs (endtask (IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubW ) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
8. η8 = enc (encs ((MT , IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubA)
(a) Case η9 = enc ((MA, nnonce) , pubA):
Now encs ((IDT , IDA, nT ) , sk (KA)) ≠ (MA, nnonce)
as collision-free and
∴ enc (encs ((MT , IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubA) ≠
enc ((MA, nnonce) , pubA) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(b) Case η10 = enc (encs (end (MT , IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ):
Now pubA ≜ pk (KA) and pubT ≜ pk (KT ) and
pubA ≠ pubT as pk (x) is collision-free
∴ enc (encs ((MT , IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubA) ≠
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enc (encs (end (MT , IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(c) Case η11 = enc (encs (endtask (IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubW ):
Now pubA ≜ pk (KA) and pubW ≜ pk (KW ) and
pubA ≠ pubW as pk (x) is collision-free
∴ enc (encs ((MT , IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubA) ≠
enc (encs (endtask (IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubW ) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
9. η9 = enc ((MA, nnonce) , pubA)
(a) Case η10 = enc (encs (end (MT , IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ):
Now pubA ≜ pk (KA) and pubT ≜ pk (KT ) and
pubA ≠ pubT as pk (x) is collision-free
∴ enc ((MA, nnonce) , pubA) ≠
enc (encs (end (MT , IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
(b) Case η11 = enc (encs (endtask (IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubW ):
Now pubA ≜ pk (KA) and pubW ≜ pk (KW ) and
pubA ≠ pubW as pk (x) is collision-free
∴ enc ((MA, nnonce) , pubA) ≠
enc (encs (endtask (IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubW ) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
10. η10 = enc (encs (end (MT , IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT )
(a) Case η11 = enc (encs (endtask (IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubW ):
Now pubT ≜ pk (KT ) and pubW ≜ pk (KW ) and
pubT ≠ pubW as pk (x) is collision-free
∴ enc (encs (end (MT , IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ) ≠
enc (encs (endtask (IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubW ) as
enc (x, y) is collision-free
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B.1.4 Conclusion
It can be concluded that there are no circumstances within the standard core protocol in which public
transitions are equal therefore we conclude that all public transitions within the standard core protocol
are unique.
B.1.5 Stage 2
Now we know from stage 1 of the proof that uniqueness is preserved for a single instance of the core
protocol so that now we need to prove that uniqueness is preserved over multiple instances of the core
protocol. For stage 2 of this proof we consider two generalised instances of the core protocol, C1 and C2
within the well-formed workflow model P. We consider each protocol transition, η1i and η
2
i with i = 1 . . . n
in turn and compare the transition for some task Ta represented by the task identity IDTa within C1
against the equivalent transition for some task Tb represented by the task identity IDTb in C2. In all of
the following cases pubT ≜ pk (KT ), pubW ≜ pk (KW ) and pubA ≜ pk (KA) as usual.
B.1.6 Proof
We prove that the similar transitions within the core protocol for each of IDTa and IDTb are not equal
as follows:
1. Case η1 = νIDT , IDW . (enc (encs ((IDT , IDW ) , sk (KW )) , pubT )):
Now IDTa ≠ IDTb for any a or b if IDTa and IDTb are freshly declared as is required for the
workflow model.
∴ νIDTa , IDW . (enc (encs ((IDTa , IDW ) , sk (KW )) , pubT )) ≠
νIDTb , IDW . (enc (encs ((IDTb , IDW ) , sk (KW )) , pubT ))
as encs (x, y) and enc (x, y) are collision-free for any IDW , KW and KT .
2. Case η2 = enc (encs (IDT , sk (KT )) , pubW ):
Now IDTa ≠ IDTb for any a or b given IDTa and IDTb were freshly declared in 1. above.
∴ enc (encs (IDTa , sk (KT )) , pubW ) ≠
enc (encs (IDTb , sk (KT )) , pubW )
as encs (x, y) and enc (x, y) are collision-free for any KW and KT .
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3. Case η3 = enc ((encs ((IDT , pubT ) , sk (KW )) , IDT , pubT ) , pubOrg)
Now IDTa ≠ IDTb for any a or b given IDTa and IDTb were freshly declared in 1. above.
∴ encs ((IDTa , pubT ) , sk (KW )) , IDTa , pubT ≠
encs ((IDTb , pubT ) , sk (KW )) , IDTb , pubT
as encs (x, y) is collision-free for any KW and KT .
and ∴ enc ((encs ((IDTa , pubT ) , sk (KW )) , IDTa , pubT ) , pubOrg)
≠ enc ((encs ((IDTb , pubT ) , sk (KW )) , IDTb , pubT ) , pubOrg)
as enc (x, y) is collision-free for any KOrg .
4. Case η4 = enc ((encs ((IDA, IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubA) , pubW )
Now IDTa ≠ IDTb for any a or b given IDTa and IDTb were freshly declared in 1. above.
∴ enc ((encs ((IDA, IDTa) , sk (KA)) , pubA) , pubW ) ≠
enc ((encs ((IDA, IDTb) , sk (KA)) , pubA) , pubW )
as encs (x, y) and enc (x, y) are collision-free for any IDA, KA and KW .
5. Case η5 = νnT . (enc (encs ((IDT , nT , IDA, pubA) , sk (KW )) , pubT )):
Now IDTa ≠ IDTb for any a or b given IDTa and IDTb were freshly declared in 1. above.
∴ νnT . (enc (encs ((IDTa , nT , IDA, pubA) , sk (KW )) , pubT )) ≠
νnT . (enc (encs ((IDTb , nT , IDA, pubA) , sk (KW )) , pubT ))
as encs (x, y) and enc (x, y) are collision-free for any IDA, KA, KT and KW .
6. Case η6 = enc (encs ((IDT , nT ) , sk (KW )) , pubA):
Now IDTa ≠ IDTb for any a or b given IDTa and IDTb were freshly declared in 1. above.
∴ enc (encs ((IDTa , nT ) , sk (KW )) , pubA) ≠
enc (encs ((IDTb , nT ) , sk (KW )) , pubA)
as encs (x, y) and enc (x, y) are collision-free for any KA and KW .
7. Case η7 = enc (encs ((IDT , IDA, nT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ):
Now IDTa ≠ IDTb for any a or b given IDTa and IDTb were freshly declared in 1. above.
∴ enc (encs ((IDTa , IDA, nT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ) ≠
enc (encs ((IDTb , IDA, nT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT )
as encs (x, y) and enc (x, y) are collision-free for any IDA, KA and KT .
210
B.1 Detailed proof of the uniqueness property
8. Case η8 = enc (encs ((MT , IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubA):
Now IDTa ≠ IDTb for any a or b given IDTa and IDTb were freshly declared in 1. above.
∴ enc (encs ((MT , IDTa) , sk (KT )) , pubA) ≠
enc (encs ((MT , IDTb) , sk (KT )) , pubA)
as encs (x, y) and enc (x, y) are collision-free for any MT , KA and KT .
9. Case η9 = enc (encs (end (MT , IDT ) , sk (KA)) , pubT ):
Now IDTa ≠ IDTb for any a or b given IDTa and IDTb were freshly declared in 1. above.
∴ enc (encs (end (MT , IDTa) , sk (KA)) , pubT ) ≠
enc (encs (end (MT , IDTb) , sk (KA)) , pubT )
as end (x, y), encs (x, y) and enc (x, y) are collision-free for any MT , KA and KT .
10. Case η10 = enc (encs (endtask (IDT ) , sk (KT )) , pubW ):
Now IDTa ≠ IDTb for any a or b given IDTa and IDTb were freshly declared in 1. above.
∴ enc (encs (endtask (IDTa) , sk (KTa)) , pubW ) ≠
enc (encs (endtask (IDTb) , sk (KTb)) , pubW )
as endtask (x, y), encs (x, y) and enc (x, y) are collision-free for any KW and KT .
11. We prove that η1i ≠ η2j where i ≠ j in a similar manner to stage 1 of the proof, i.e. we consider
each η1i in turn from η
1
1 to η
1
10 and we compare against η
2
i+1 to η210. All proof cases for stage 1 are
independent of IDT therefore all proof steps are the same for η1i ≠ η2j .
B.1.7 Conclusion
It can be concluded that no public transitions are equal for any two cases of the standard core protocol
within well-formed workflow model P and all public transitions within the well-formed workflow model
are unique.
B.1.8 Stage 3
Finally, we consider any two instances P1 and P2 of the well-formed workflow model P and we prove
that public transitions are unique for these two instances P1 and P2.
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B.1.9 Proof
1. By renaming we know that points 1 to 11 above apply for any IDTa and IDTb and we generalise
to say that no two public transitions within multiple instances of the core protocol are equal.
B.1.10 Conclusion
It can be concluded that there are no circumstances within multiple instances of the core protocol for
any task identities IDTa and IDTb in which public transitions are equal therefore we conclude that all
public transitions within multiple instances of the core protocol are unique.
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Appendix C
Labelled reductions for anonymity
experiments
C.1 Experiment 8
The detailed labelled reduction steps for experiment 8 summarised by
No. P15term P
16
term
1 Wterm
C1⇔ T1,A1 Wterm C1⇔ T1,A3 FAIL
are as displayed in figure C.1.
No. P15term P
16
term
1 νy41.t ⟨y41⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→ νy42.t ⟨y42⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→
2 Ð→∗ νz11.t ⟨z11⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (z11)ÐÐÐ→ Ð→∗ νz12.t ⟨z12⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (z12)ÐÐÐ→
3 Ð→∗ νu11.t ⟨u11⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (u11)ÐÐÐ→ Ð→∗ νu12.t ⟨u12⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (u12)ÐÐÐ→
4 Ð→∗ νz21.t ⟨z21⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (z21)ÐÐÐ→ Ð→∗ νz22.t ⟨z22⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (z22)ÐÐÐ→
5 Ð→∗ νy11.t ⟨y11⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (y11)ÐÐÐ→ Ð→∗ νy12.t ⟨y12⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (y12)ÐÐÐ→
6 Ð→∗ ∅ Ð→∗ ∅
7 OR νz51.t ⟨z51⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (z51)ÐÐÐ→ FAIL
. . .
Figure C.1: Reduction steps for processes P15termand P
16
term
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C.2 Experiment 9
The detailed labelled reduction steps for experiment 9 summarised by
P19term P
20
term
{W1 C11⇔ T1,A1} « IDT1 , pubT1 {W1 C12⇔ T1,A4} « IDT1 , pubT1
{W2 C21⇔ T2,Att (A2)} « IDT2 , pubT2 ,MT2 {W2 C22⇔ T2,Att (A2)} « IDT2 , pubT2 ,MT2
Represents the detailed test process based upon labelled bisimilarity as presented below.
We step through process P19term reductions, matching the reductions to P
20
term and we confirm static
equivalence at each reduction step then we step through process P20term, matching reductions to P
19
term
and confirming static equivalence at each reduction step. We display the reductions for process P19term
and tasks T1 and T2 in graphic form in figure C.2 and for process P20term in figure C.3. These graphics
show successive states and labelled transitions that are numerically referenced to the tables of reductions
for P19term and P
20
term and task T1 in figure C.1 and P
19
term and P
20
term and task T2 in figure C.2. Also, we
display the static equivalences for each reduction stage of P19term and P
20
term in figures C.4 and C.5 and
these are numerically cross-referenced to the representations of transitions and reduction steps.
Static equivalence at each stage of the reduction is as displayed for task T1 in figure C.4 and for task T2
in figures C.5 and C.6.
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P190
*
P191
*
*
P192
*
*
P193
*∅
P194
*
*
*∅ *
*∅ *
P195
*
1
2
4
3
5
6
7
*∅ *
*∅ *
8
9
*
*
11
*
*
12
P196
P197
*∅
P198
*
*
14
13
*∅
P199
*
*
14
15
*∅*
16
*∅*
17
*∅*
18
P1910
*
*
19
P1911
*
*
20
*
*
*
23
P1914
P1915
*∅*
24
Task T1 
Transition diagram
for process Pterm
19
*∅
10
P1912
*
21
P1913
*
22
P1916
*
P1917
*
*
P1918
*
*
P1919
*∅
P1920
*
*
*∅ *
*∅ *
P1921
*
25
26
28
27
29
30
31
*∅ *
*∅ *
32
33
*
*
35
*
*
36
P1922
P1923
*∅
P1924
*
*
38
37
*∅
P1925
*
*
38
39
*∅*
40
*∅*
41
*∅*
42
P1926
*
*
43
P1927
*
*
44
*
*
*
47
P1930
P1931
*∅*
48
Task T2 
*∅
34
P1928
*
45
P529
*
46
P19end
*
49
Figure C.2: Transition diagram for process P19term
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P200
*
P201
*
*
P202
*
*
P203
*∅
P204
*
*
*∅ *
*∅ *
P205
*
1
2
4
3
5
6
7
*∅ *
*∅ *
8
9
*
*
11
*
*
12
P206
P207
*∅
P208
*
*
14
13
*∅
P209
*
*
14
15
*∅*
16
*∅*
17
*∅*
18
P2010
*
*
19
P2011
*
*
20
*
*
*
23
P2014
P2015
*∅*
24
Task T1 
Transition diagram
for process Pterm
20
*∅
10
P2012
*
21
P2013
*
22
P2016
*
P2017
*
*
P2018
*
*
P2019
*∅
P2020
*
*
*∅ *
*∅ *
P2021
*
25
26
28
27
29
30
31
*∅ *
*∅ *
32
33
*
*
35
*
*
36
P2022
P2023
*∅
P6024
*
*
38
37
*∅
P2025
*
*
38
39
*∅*
40
*∅*
41
*∅*
42
P2026
*
*
43
P2027
*
*
44
*
*
*
47
P2030
P2031
*∅*
48
Task T2 
*∅
34
P2028
*
45
P2029
*
46
P20end
*
49
Figure C.3: Transition diagram for process P20term
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P19term P
20
term
Task T1
No. State Transition State Transition
0 P 190 Ð→∗ P 200 Ð→∗
1 P 191 Ð→∗ νz15.t ⟨z15⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (z15)ÐÐÐ→Ð→∗ P 201 Ð→∗ νz16.t ⟨z16⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (z16)ÐÐÐ→Ð→∗
2 P 192 Ð→∗ νu15.t ⟨u15⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (u15)ÐÐÐÐ→Ð→∗ P 202 Ð→∗ νu16.t ⟨u16⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (u16)ÐÐÐÐ→Ð→∗
3 P 193 Ð→∗ ∅ P 203 Ð→∗ ∅
4 OR Ð→∗ νz25.t ⟨z25⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (z25)ÐÐÐ→Ð→∗ OR Ð→∗ νz26.t ⟨z26⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (z26)ÐÐÐ→Ð→∗
5 P 194 Ð→∗ ∅ P 204 Ð→∗ ∅
6 OR Ð→∗ ∅ OR Ð→∗ ∅
7 OR Ð→∗ νy15.t ⟨y15⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (y15)ÐÐÐ→Ð→∗ OR Ð→∗ νy16.t ⟨y16⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (y16)ÐÐÐ→Ð→∗
8 P 195 Ð→∗ ∅ P 205 Ð→∗ ∅
9 OR Ð→∗ ∅ OR Ð→∗ ∅
10 OR Ð→∗ ∅ OR Ð→∗ ∅
11 OR Ð→∗ νz55.t ⟨z55⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (z55)ÐÐÐ→Ð→∗ OR Ð→∗ νz56.t ⟨z56⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (z56)ÐÐÐ→Ð→∗
12 P 196 Ð→∗ νz65.t ⟨z65⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (z65)ÐÐÐ→Ð→∗ P 206 Ð→∗ νz66.t ⟨z66⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (z66)ÐÐÐ→Ð→∗
13 P 197 Ð→∗ ∅ P 207 Ð→∗ ∅
14 OR Ð→∗ νy25.t ⟨y25⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→Ð→∗ OR Ð→∗ νy26.t ⟨y26⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→Ð→∗
15 P 198 Ð→∗ ∅ P 208 Ð→∗ ∅
14 OR t (y25)ÐÐÐ→Ð→∗ OR t (y26)ÐÐÐ→Ð→∗
16 P 199 Ð→∗ ∅ P 209 Ð→∗ ∅
17 OR Ð→∗ ∅ OR Ð→∗ ∅
18 OR Ð→∗ ∅ OR Ð→∗ ∅
OR Ð→∗ OR Ð→∗
19 P 1910 Ð→∗ νu25.t ⟨u25⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (u25)ÐÐÐÐ→Ð→∗ P 2010 Ð→∗ νu26.t ⟨u26⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (u26)ÐÐÐÐ→Ð→∗
20 P 1911 Ð→∗ νy35.t ⟨y35⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→Ð→∗ P 2011 Ð→∗ νy36.t ⟨y36⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→Ð→∗
21 P 1912 Ð→∗ νy45.t ⟨y45⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (y45)ÐÐÐ→Ð→∗ P 2012 Ð→∗ νy46.t ⟨y46⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (y46)ÐÐÐ→Ð→∗
22 P 1913 Ð→∗ ∅ P 2013 Ð→∗ ∅
OR Ð→∗ OR Ð→∗
23 P 1914 Ð→∗ νu35.t ⟨u35⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (u35)ÐÐÐÐ→Ð→∗ P 2014 Ð→∗ νu36.t ⟨u36⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (u36)ÐÐÐÐ→Ð→∗
24 P 1915 Ð→∗ ∅ P 2015 Ð→∗ ∅
OR Ð→∗ OR Ð→∗
Table C.1: Reduction steps for processes P19term and P
20
term — task T1
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Task T2
No. State Transition State Transition
P 1916 Ð→∗ P 2016 Ð→∗
25 P 1917 Ð→∗ νz75.t ⟨z75⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (z75)ÐÐÐ→Ð→∗ P 2017 Ð→∗ νz76.t ⟨z76⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (z76)ÐÐÐ→Ð→∗
26 P 1918 Ð→∗ νu45.t ⟨u45⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (u45)ÐÐÐÐ→Ð→∗ P 2018 Ð→∗ νu46.t ⟨u46⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (u46)ÐÐÐÐ→Ð→∗
27 P 1919 Ð→∗ ∅ P 2019 Ð→∗ ∅
28 OR Ð→∗ νz85.t ⟨z85⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (z85)ÐÐÐ→ OR Ð→∗ νz86.t ⟨z86⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (z86)ÐÐÐ→
29 P 1920 Ð→∗ ∅ P 2020 Ð→∗ ∅
30 OR Ð→∗ ∅ OR Ð→∗ ∅
31 OR Ð→∗ νy55.t ⟨y55⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (y55)ÐÐÐ→Ð→∗ OR Ð→∗ νy56.t ⟨y56⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (y56)ÐÐÐ→Ð→∗
32 P 1921 Ð→∗ ∅ P 2021 Ð→∗ ∅
33 OR Ð→∗ ∅ OR Ð→∗ ∅
34 OR Ð→∗ ∅ OR Ð→∗ ∅
35 OR Ð→∗ νz115.t ⟨z115⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (z115)ÐÐÐÐ→Ð→∗ OR Ð→∗ νz116.t ⟨z116⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (z116)ÐÐÐÐ→Ð→∗
36 P 1922 Ð→∗ νz125.t ⟨z125⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (z125)ÐÐÐÐ→Ð→∗ P 2022 Ð→∗ νz126.t ⟨z126⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (z126)ÐÐÐÐ→Ð→∗
37 P 1923 Ð→∗ ∅ P 2023 Ð→∗ ∅
38 OR νy65.t ⟨y65⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→Ð→∗ OR νy66.t ⟨y66⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→Ð→∗
39 P 1924 Ð→∗ ∅ P 2024 Ð→∗ ∅
38 OR t (y65)ÐÐÐ→Ð→∗ OR t (y66)ÐÐÐ→Ð→∗
40 P 1925 Ð→∗ ∅ P 2025 Ð→∗ ∅
41 OR Ð→∗ ∅ OR Ð→∗ ∅
42 OR Ð→∗ ∅ OR Ð→∗ ∅
OR Ð→∗ OR Ð→∗
43 P 1926 Ð→∗ νu55.t ⟨u55⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (u55)ÐÐÐÐ→Ð→∗ P 2026 Ð→∗ νu56.t ⟨u56⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (u56)ÐÐÐÐ→Ð→∗
44 P 1927 Ð→∗ νy75.t ⟨y75⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→Ð→∗ P 2027 Ð→∗ νy76.t ⟨y76⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→Ð→∗
45 P 1928 Ð→∗ νy85.t ⟨y85⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (y85)ÐÐÐ→Ð→∗ P 2028 Ð→∗ νy86.t ⟨y86⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (y86)ÐÐÐ→Ð→∗
46 P 1929 Ð→∗ ∅ P 2029 Ð→∗ ∅
OR Ð→∗ OR Ð→∗
47 P 1930 Ð→∗ νu65.t ⟨u65⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (u65)ÐÐÐÐ→Ð→∗ P 2030 Ð→∗ νu66.t ⟨u66⟩ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t (u66)ÐÐÐÐ→Ð→∗
48 P 1931 Ð→∗ ∅ P 2031 Ð→∗ ∅
OR Ð→∗ OR Ð→∗
49 P 19end Ð→∗ t ⟨Mend⟩ÐÐÐÐÐ→ P 20end Ð→∗ t ⟨Mend⟩ÐÐÐÐÐ→
Table C.2: Reduction steps for processes P19term and P
20
term — task T2
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20
term
Task T1
No.
1 νtwencT1 .{twencT1/z15} ≈S νtwencT1 .{twencT1/z16}
2 νwtencT1 .{wtencT1/u15} ≈S νwtencT1 .{wtencT1/u16}
{fst(decs(wencT1,pubT1 ,pubW ))/idT } ∣ {fst(decs(wencT1,pubT1 ,pubW ))/idT1} ∣{snd(decs(wencT1,pubT1 ,pubW ))/pubT } ∣ {snd(decs(wencT1,pubT1 ,pubW ))/pubT1} ∣{fst(dec(owencT1,pubT1 ,sk(KOrg)))/wencT1,pubT1 } ∣ {fst(dec(owencT1,pubT1 ,sk(KOrg)))/wencT1,pubT1 } ∣{snd(dec(owencT1,pubT1 ,sk(KOrg)))/id2T } ∣ {snd(dec(owencT1,pubT1 ,sk(KOrg)))/id2T1} ∣{thd(dec(owencT1,pubT1 ,sk(KOrg)))/pub2T } ∣ {thd(dec(owencT1,pubT1 ,sk(KOrg)))/pub2T1} ∣
4 {owencT1,pubT1/z25} ≈S {owencT1,pubT1/z26}
νwaencA1,T1,pubA1
. νwaencA4,T1,pubA4
.
7 {waencA1,T1,pubA1/y15} ≈S {waencA4,T1,pubA4/y16}
νtwencT1,nT1 ,A1,pubA1
. νtwencT1,nT1 ,A4,pubA4
.
11 {twencT1,nT1 ,A1,pubA1/z55} ≈S {twencT1,nT1 ,A4,pubA4/z56}
νawencT1,nT1
. νawencT1,nT1
.
12 {awencT1,nT1/z65} ≈S {awencT1,nT1/z66}
νtaencT1,A1,nT1
. νtaencT1,A4,nT1
.
14 {taencT1,A1,nT1/y25} ≈S {taencT1,A4,nT1/y26}
νtaencT1,A1,nT1
. νtaencT1,A4,nT1
.
14 {taencT1,A1,nT1/y25} ≈S {taencT1,A4,nT1/y26}
νatencMT1 ,T1
. νatencMT1 ,T1
.
19 {atencMT1 ,T1/u25} ≈S {atencMT1 ,T1/u26}
νaencMT1 ,nnonce
. νaencMT1 ,nnonce
.
20 {aencMT1 ,nnonce/y35} ≈S {aencMT1 ,nnonce/y36}
νtaencend,MT1 ,T1
. νtaencend,MT1 ,T1
.
21 {taencend,MT1 ,T1/y45} ≈S {taencend,MT1 ,T1/y46}
νwtencend,MT1 ,T1
. νwtencend,MT1 ,T1
.
23 {wtencend,MT1 ,T1/u35} ≈S {wtencend,MT1 ,T1/u36}
Figure C.4: Static equivalence for processes P19term and P
20
term — task T1
219
C.2 Experiment 9
P19term P
20
term
Task T2
No.
24 νtwencT2 .{twencT2/z75} ≈S νtwencT2 .{twencT2/z76}
25 νwtencT2 .{wtencT2/u45} ≈S νwtencT2 .{wtencT2/u46}
{fst(decs(wencT2,pubT2 ,pubW ))/idT2} ∣ {fst(decs(wencT2,pubT2 ,pubW ))/idT2} ∣{snd(decs(wencT2,pubT2 ,pubW ))/pubT2} ∣ {snd(decs(wencT2,pubT2 ,pubW ))/pubT2} ∣{fst(dec(owencT2,pubT2 ,sk(KOrg)))/wencT2,pubT2 } ∣ {fst(dec(owencT2,pubT2 ,sk(KOrg)))/wencT2,pubT2 } ∣{snd(dec(owencT2,pubT2 ,sk(KOrg)))/id2T2} ∣ {snd(dec(owencT2,pubT2 ,sk(KOrg)))/id2T2} ∣{thd(dec(owencT2,pubT2 ,sk(KOrg)))/pub2T2} ∣ {thd(dec(owencT2,pubT2 ,sk(KOrg)))/pub2T2} ∣
27 {owencT2,pubT2/z85} ≈S {owencT2,pubT2/z86}
{encs((IDA2 ,idT2),sk(KT2))/aencA2,T2} ∣ {encs((IDA2 ,idT2),sk(KT2))/aencA2,T2} ∣{enc((aencA2,T2 ,pubA2),pubW )/waencA2,T2,pubA2 } ∣ {enc((aencA2,T2 ,pubA2),pubW )/waencA2,T2,pubA2 } ∣
31 {waencA2,T2,pubA2/y55} ≈S {waencA2,T2,pubA2/y56}
νtwencT2,nT2 ,A2,pubA2
. νtwencT2,nT2 ,A2,pubA2
.
35 {twencT2,nT2 ,A2,pubA2/z115} ≈S {twencT2,nT2 ,A2,pubA2/z116}
{fst(decs(wencT2,nT2 ,pubW ))/id3T2} ∣ {fst(decs(wencT2,nT2 ,pubW ))/id3T2} ∣{snd(decs(wencT2,nT2 ,pubW ))/nT2} ∣ {snd(decs(wencT2,nT2 ,pubW ))/nT2} ∣{dec(awencT2,nT2 ,sk(KA2))/wencT2,nT2 } ∣ {dec(awencT2,nT2 ,sk(KA2))/wencT2,nT2 } ∣
36 {awencT2,nT2/z125} ≈S {awencT2,nT2/z126}
νn. νn.{encs((idT2 ,IDA2 ,n),sk(KA2))/aencT2,A2,n} ∣ {encs((idT2 ,IDA2 ,n),sk(KA2))/aencT2,A2,n} ∣{enc(aencT2,A2,n,pubT2)/taencT2,A2,nT2 } ∣ {enc(aencT2,A2,n,pubT2)/taencT2,A2,nT2 } ∣
38 {taencT2,A2,nT2/y65} ≈S {taencT2,A2,nT2/y66}
{encs((idT2 ,IDA2 ,n),sk(KA2))/aencT2,A2,n} ∣ {encs((idT2 ,IDA2 ,n),sk(KA2))/aencT2,A2,n} ∣{enc(aencT2,A2,n,pubT2)/taencT2,A2,nT2 } ∣ {enc(aencT2,A2,n,pubT2)/taencT2,A2,nT2 } ∣
38 {taencT2,A2,nT2/y65} ≈S {taencT2,A2,nT2/y66}
{fst(decs(tencMT2 ,T2 ,pubT2))/MT2} ∣ {fst(decs(tencMT2 ,T2 ,pubT2))/MT2} ∣{snd(decs(tencMT2 ,T2 ,pubT2))/id4T2} ∣ {snd(decs(tencMT2 ,T2 ,pubT2))/id4T2} ∣{dec(atencMT2 ,T2 ,sk(KA2))/tencMT2 ,T2} ∣ {dec(atencMT2 ,T2 ,sk(KA2))/tencMT2 ,T2} ∣
43 {atencMT2 ,T2/u55} ≈S {atencMT2 ,T2/u56}
Figure C.5: Static equivalence for processes P19term and P
20
term — task T2 part 1
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νaencMT2 ,nnonce
. νaencMT2 ,nnonce
.
44 {aencMT2 ,nnonce/y75} ≈S {aencMT2 ,nnonce/y76}
{encs(end(MT2 ,idT2),sk(KA2))/aencend,MT2 ,T2} ∣ {encs(end(MT2 ,idT2),sk(KA2))/aencend,MT2 ,T2} ∣{enc(aencend,MT2 ,T2 ,pubT2)/taencend,MT2 ,T2} ∣ {enc(aencend,MT2 ,T2 ,pubT2)/taencend,MT2 ,T2} ∣
45 {taencend,MT2 ,T2/y85} ≈S {taencend,MT2 ,T2/y86}
νwtencend,MT2 ,T2
. νwtencend,MT2 ,T2
.
47 {wtencend,MT2 ,T2/u65} ≈S {wtencend,MT2 ,T2/u66}
49 {Mend/x5end} ≈S {Mend/x6end}
Figure C.6: Static equivalence for processes P19term and P
20
term — task T2 part 2
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